[ G.R. No: 14383. November 29, 1919 ] 40 Phil. 504
[ G.R. No: 14383. November 29, 1919 ]
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE INCOMPETENT JOSE R. DE INCHAUSTI. CONSUELO RICO VDA. DE INCHAUSTI, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. J. R. DE INCHAUSTI, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
TORRES, J.:
This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila thru a petition filed by attorneys Crossfield and O’Brien in behalf of the petitioner, Consuelo Rico viuda de Inchausti. On January 11, 1911, said petition (without date) was verified before the notary public, C. W. O’Brien, by A. S. Crossfield and was signed by the law firm of Crossfield & O’Brien. Said petition alleges that Jose R. de Inchausti’s mother is Maria de Consolacion Rico, viuda de Inchausti; that Jose R. de Inchausti has become temporarily insane; that he is now confined in San Lazaro Hospital; that he has considerable real and personal property; that he is about to receive an inheritance from the partition of the estate of Rafael de Inchausti ; that he is not competent to receive said inheritance that he requires a guardian for his person and property; that his inheritance, represented primarily iby an interest in the mercantile firm of Inchausti & Co. and secondarily by real estate, is approximately one hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P175,000). Wherefore the petitioner prays that, having fulfilled the requirement of law, she be appointed guardian of the person and property of her said son, Jose R. de Inchausti, after proceedings as required by law. With the purpose of hearing said petition the trial court issued an order whose dispositive and pertinent parts are:
“It is ordered, in accordance with section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that in this court the petition be heard at 10 o’clock in the forenoon of the 18th day of January, 1915. “It is ordered also that on the day and at the hour above named the Director of the San Lazaro Hospital appear before this court and if possible produce the said Jose R. de Inchausti. “Let this order be made known immediately. (Sgd.) “JAMES A. OSTRAND, “Judge. “Received copy of the foregoing notice, Manila, P. I., January 12, 1915. (Sgd.)“F. S. BECK. (Sgd.) “CROSSFIELD & O’BRIEN, “Attorneys for Maria de la Consolation Rico y Medina. (Sgd.) “A. S. CROSSFIELD as next friend of Jose R. de Inchausti.”
By an order of January 18, 1915, the court declared that the petitioner, Da. Maria de la Consolacion Rico y Medina viuda de Inchausti (accompanied by Mr. Crossfield, her counsel, and Dr. A. P. Goff), appeared at said hearing; that she duly proved the petition; that she was appointed guardian of the demented Jose R. de Inchausti; and that she was put under bond for one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000). The said guardian C. R. de Inchausti and Dr. Goff of San Lazaro Hospital were notified of this decree, and all the requisites for the filing of a bond as well as for the oath of office and letters of guardianship were duly complied with. On November 18, 1915, the Spanish Consul in Manila forwarded to the Court of First Instance of this city a requisitory letter (exhorto) together with a copy of the judgment from the judge of the Court of First Instance of the Northern District of Barcelona, (Spain). According to said judgment, in a Suit of Jose R. de Inchausti against Consolacion Medina, involving considerable property, Jose R. de Inchausti was held mentally sound (being restrained neither by insanity nor mental perturbation) and therefore possessed of his juridical personality, of his civil capacity and of the free administration of his property. Whei efore the court declared that Consolacion Rico was no longer guardian; that she should deliver to him his property; that as guardian she should present her accounts; and that she should abstain from all administrative acts over said property. In said requisitory letter the judge of the Court of First Instance of Barcelona requests fulfillment in this capital of the foregoing judgment, subject to the provisions of article 11 of the Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898, between Spain and the United Sates; of article 6 of the Treaty of July 3, 1902; and of sections 304 and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, said court in Manila refused in an order of April 15, 1916 (fol. 43), and for the reasons therein assigned, the aforementioned request of the judge of Barcelona. The aforementioned guardian presented first her accounts (fol. 65) and next her resignation. Both were duly approved. Afterwards another guardian was appointed but presented his resignation shortly after assuming the duties of his office. Having also approved this resignation, the court reinstated the petitioner, who then filed a supplementary petition (fol. 74) as follows: That said Inchausti & Co.’s refusal to deliver to her predecessor the part of the funds pertaining to Jose R. de Inchausti was because the guardianship proceedings were unlawful, the aforementioned Jose R. de Inchausti never having been notified of the hearing of the petition for the appointment of a guardian; that this reason is groundless because on January 12, 1915, Dr. Goff, the Director of San Lazaro Hospital, received notice of the date of the hearing of the aforesaid petition, because on that same day Dr. Goff informed Jose R. de Inchausti of said notice, and because on the following day, January 13, 1915, Jose R. de Inchausti being visited by A. S. Crossfield, informed and discussed with this friend said notification; that in the beginning Jose R. de Inchausti had opposed the appointment of a guardian but, learning the appointment was necessary for the proper administration of his property, had consented and requested his mother be appointed; that as Jose R. de Inchausti’s representative said A. S. Crossfield is a member of the lawfirm Crossfield & O’Brien; and that for these reasons the record should show the notification to Jose R. de Inchausti and the proceedings had were regular and in accordance with law. Before the hearing of the supplementary petition counsel for Jose R. de Inchausti prayed the court to declare all the proceedings null and Maria de la Consolacion’s petition of January 11, 1915, void as, the court having acquired no right or jurisdiction over Jose R. de Inchausti, his property can not be considered in “custodiae legis.” The court overruled this motion by order of May 9, 1918, (p. 83, bill of exceptions). Jose R. de Inchausti’s counsel excepted thereto, and, on May 14, 1918, appealed to his High Court alleging that the lower court erred:
On March 26, 1918, in overruling the motion of the supposed incompetent praying the proceedings had be declared null and void, and the original petition dismissed. In not declaring null and void all of said proceedings and in not dismissing the original petition giving rise to this controversy. In not reciting in said order the facts duly proven whereon the decision was based.
Said assignment is bassed on the fact that appellant was neither notified of the first order issued by the lower court fixing the hearing of the petition, nor of the others affecting directly his person and property; that the order of June 16, 1917, was the first that the court had command be forthwith notified to the appellant; that the appealed order partakes of the nature of a definite judgment; that in same the court ought to have recited facts considered proven and a base for his conclusions; and that by not having so done, the court rendered said order defective and revocable. In his turn the appellee alleges that Dr. Goff, Director of the San Lazaro Hospital, being notified of the aforesaid order and following the custom in said hospital, transmitted said notification through its employees to Jose R. de Inchausti. This allegation is corroborated both by Dr. GofFs certificate (page 130, record) stating that, according to his true belief Jose R. de Inchausti was notified in accordance with the custom of the hospitalm analogous cases, and by an affidavit (page 132, record) of A. S. Crossfield who testified to having visited Jose R. de Inchausti in San Lazaro Hospital on January 13, 1915; to being told by Dr. Goff that said Jose R. de Inchausti had been notified of the order of January 18, 1915, fixing the hearing of the petition for the appointment of a guardian, and to Jose R. de Inchausti himself having acknowledged the receipt of said notice. The first and principal question that arises from all these allegations is whether, if the officer of the court, charged with the notification of all order and decrees, had failed to notify personally Jose-R. de Inchausti, this fact does or does not constitute sufficient ground for declaring null and void all the proceedings had in this cause, in spite of the fact that the appellant, as an insane patient, was, in accordance with custom, notified by the director of said government institution, San Lazaro Hospital. Section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
“When it is represented to a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, by petition verified by oath of any relative or friend, that any person who is an inhabitant or resident of the province, is insane or is a spendthrift, incompetent to manage his estate, praying that a guardian may be appointed for such person, such court or judge must cause a notice to be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of !he time and place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced on the hearing.”
According to this statutory provision, the notice of time and place of hearing ought to be given personally to the supposed demented or spendthrift, so, for example, in the case of Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila and Yangco (29 Phil. Rep., 183), the court declared null and void all the proceedings had in said case for the reason that said notice was not given personally to the person alleged to be a spendthrift and incompetent to manage his property. However, in order to resolve definitely the present suit, it is necessary to examine the provision of Act No. 2122, which establishes another procedure, whereby a person may be declared insane, ordered confined in a hospital or an institution for the insane and provided with guardian of his person. Section 4 of the foregoing Act No. 2122 provides:
“The Director of Health, in all cases where in his opinion it is for the public welfare or for the welfare of any person who in his judgment is insane, and when such person or the person having charged of the patient is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other place for the insane, shall present, or cause to be presented, a petition to the Court of First Instance of the district wherein the person alleged to be insane is found, alleging that such person is insane, that it is for the welfare of the public or of the patient that he be taken to a suitable place for treatment, and praying the court to commit such person to a hospital or other place for the insane. “The judge of the Court of First Instance shall cause not less than five days’ notice to be given of the date of the hearing of the petition to such alleged insane person or to the person having care of such alleged insane person, and to such of his relatives residing in the province or the city of Manila as the judge may deem proper, and shall order the sheriff to produce the alleged insane person if able to attend on the hearing. If the judge finds, after due hearing, that the person in question is insane, and that his relatives are unable for any reason to take proper custody and care of the patient, he shall order his commitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health, and when it appears necessary or convenient he may appoint a guardian for him as provided in section five hundred and sixty of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled ‘An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands.’” * * *
According to the provisions of the foregoing section an individual may be declared insane and a guardian for his person and property may be appointed without service of personal notice of the date of hearing of the petition for a judicial declaration of juridical incapacity and for the appointment of a guardian of his person and property, as the aforesaid law provides for notice to the person having care of such alleged insane person, thereby considering same sufficient. Whereas, according to section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such notice must be served personally upon the alleged insane person, thereby considering as insufficient null and void all other proceedings outside. Act No. 2122 was enacted after the Code of Civil Procedure for it was approved on February 1, 1912, and if these laws are incompatible, Act No. 2122 must necessarily be followed. Said Act No. 2122 does not absolutely and expressly repeal section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but, regarding the transmittal of notice to a supposed demented, these two Acts are clearly and manifestly incompatible and contradictory. While section 559 of Act No. 190 requires the service of a personal notice upon the insane, section 4 of Act No. 2122 requires the service of a personal notice either upon the insane person or upon the person having charge of such incompetent insane. The Director of Health’s intervention in the case of the demented who requires an urgent and quick administrative action may be preliminary but is entirely independent and forms no part of the judicial proceedings in Chapter XXVII of said Act No. 190 modified, as far as guardians of insane persons are concerned, by the aforementioned Act No. 2122. (See sections 1043 to 1050 of the Administrative Code ot 1917.) On account of the urgency of the case—Jose R. de Inchausti having been attacked so suddenly by insanity—his mother had no time to call upon the Director of Health and she had even difficulty in securing the assistance of the Director of San Lazaro Hospital for the care of her son who was in need of immediate vigilance for his own welfare and for the benefit of her family and of the public. However, in the Court of First Instance her counsel filed a petition setting forth that which had taken place and praying the appointment of a guardian for the incompetent. The court, after hearing said petition, issued the order of January 18, 1915, which was served upon Dr. A. P. Goff, director of the aforesaid hospital, and the mother-guardian. If, according to section 4 of Act No. 2122 {supra), service of notice upon the person in charg’e of the insane is sufficient and if the aforementioned order of January 18 was duly served upon the Director of the San Lazaro Hospital where Inchausti was confined, then clearly the motion to declare null and void all proceedings had, upon the ground of the trial judge having acted without his jurisdiction, has no legal foundation. Act No. 2122, amending (by implication) section 559 of Act No. 190, does not require absolutely the personal service of notice to the insane, but either to the insane or to the person in charge of him. The case of Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila and Yang-co (29 Phil. Rep., 183) above mentioned deals with the appointment of a guardian for an alleged spendthrift, a proposition, quite different from the appointment of a guardian for an alleged insane person who in the ordinary course of human events cannot possibly be given a notice. True, the mere fact that a person is alleged insane is not conclusive of insanity. However, if this principle be observed in theory for effecting judicial intervention, in many instances, to follow same in practice would be impossible, useless, prejudicial and even dangerous. On the other hand, the right of the insane is not prejudiced by service of notice upon either the person or relative having in charge. When section 559 of Act No. 190 was amended by Act No. 2122, establishing a different practice for service upon an incompetent, the legislator had this in mind. Therefore, the service upon the Director of the San Lazaro Hospital of the notice of the order appointing a guardian for Jose R. de Inchausti is beyond a doubt sufficient, and the provisions of the law now in force was thereby complied with, and the trial judge acquired jurisdiction in the premises. In fact it appears in the record, admitted by the appellant, that the order, fixing the date of the hearing of the petition giving rise to this suit, was served upon the Director of the San Lazaro Hospital wherein Jose R. de Inchausti was then confined suffering from insanity. It also appears from said Director’s certificate and Attorney Crossfield’s affidavit, at no time impugned by the appellant, that the aforementioned notice immediately delivered to said appellant who made no effort to deny or contradict it. The Director of San Lazaro Hospital being the person having charge of the appellant, then it is obvious that the law was duly complied with. Nevertheless, the appellant alleges that the petition, being verified by Attorney A. S. Crossfield and not by a relative or a friend, was not verified by oath as required by law. But in same oath of A. S. Crossfield it appears that he is a friend of the appellant alleged to be incompetent just what is required by the provision of section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over, the appellant’s person and committed no error both in dismissing the motion to declare null and void all proceedings had and in declaring of no effect said petition, the origin of this suit. True, the facts and conclusion upon which the court’s decision was based do not appear in the order of May 9, 1918. But we have considered just the recital in this opinion of what said court failed to do, in order to show the legality of the decree appealed from, because said order, a resolution of a motion, has in effect judicially decided all the proceedings had in this case, the previous decrees and orders of January 18 and July 6, 1915, of April 15, 1916, and on February 16, 1918. Further, if a return to the court of origin for the amendment of said judicial decree so as to recite the facts and conclusions upon which same was based, were made, this case, begun in January, 1915, would be unduly and unnecessarily prolonged; the amended decree would be written upon the same consideration; and a decree, whose dispositive parts are in harmony with the merits of the case and of the law similar to the one now appealed, would result. For the foregoing reasons, the order of May 9, 1918, is hereby affirmed with costs. Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Moir, JJ., concur.