[ G.R. No. 13238. November 24, 1917 ] 37 Phil. 180
[ G.R. No. 13238. November 24, 1917 ]
MANUEL DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE NEPOMUCENO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC, AND SANTIAGO DE JESUS, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
CARSON, J.:
Judgment for costs was rendered in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in an election contest proceeding in the following terms:
“Las costas y gastos de la protesta se pagaran por el protestado y tercerista. (The costs and expenses of the contest will be paid by the protestee and the intervener.)”
The judgment entered in these contest proceedings was appealed to this court and in due course the judgment, including the provision for the payment of costs and expenses of the contest, was affirmed- The record was returned to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac and upon its return the judgment became final.
Petitioner, the protestee, alleges that the sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, with the express approval of the respondent judge of the court of first instance of that province, is proceeding to enforce the above-cited judgment against him as though it were a “joint and several” judgment for costs and expenses and not merely a “joint” judgment, and petitioner prays that the respondent be restrained from all further attempts to enforce the judgment for costs as a “joint and several” judgment. To the petitioner’s prayer for relief the respondents demur, and in the course of the argument in support of the demurrer various questions have been raised as to the nature and extent of the authority of the courts to tax costs and expenses in election contests. It is urged on the one hand that, when third persons are brought into election contest proceedings by notice, the court may tax costs against them in like manner to that in which costs are fixed against the losing parties in other actions. On the other hand, it is contended that, when third persons are brought into election contest proceedings by notice, the question of their liability for costs depends wholly upon their conduct thereafter; and it is said that if they decline to exercise their right to intervene, or if in fact they do not voluntarily take any part in the proceedings the court should not tax any part of the costs against them.
So also conflicting contentions have arisen in the course of the discussion as to whether, in the event that such third persons do in fact intervene and take an active part in the election contest, the court should tax the costs jointly and severally against all the losing parties, or in proportion to the costs and expenses resulting from their respective activities, or upon such other basis as the particular circumstances of the case would seem to require.
We are of opinion, however, that it is not necessary for us to consider or decide any of those contentions at this time. The only question before us is whether the judgment actually entered by the court below and affirmed upon appeal is or is not a “joint and several” judgment. If it is “joint and several” the petitioner has no cause of action in support of his prayer for relief from its enforcement by the levy of execution upon his goods. If it is not a “joint and several” judgment, and if, as the petitioner contends, it is merely a “joint” judgment, he is clearly entitled to relief from any attempt in the court below to enforce it as a “joint and several” judgment.
It is admitted by the demurrer, and clearly appears from the record that the judgment has become final and unappealable. The parties cannot, therefore, be heard at this time to urge that, under the law of the facts, some other judgment should have been entered than that which was in fact entered, and which has long since become final and unappealable. Contentions of this kind, if well founded, should have been advanced while the judgment was open for reconsideration in the court below, or while the record was before us on appeal. (Cf. Ruling upon supplemental motion in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Alano, 36 Phil. Rep., 500.)
Examining the language d¥ the judgment for costs, which is set out in the foregoing statement of facts, it is manifest that it is merely a joint judgment against the protestado y tercerista, and does not permit of construction or interpretation as a “joint and several” judgment. No argument is necessary. It is sufficient to cite here articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code as to the rule in this jurisdiction.
“Art. 1137. The concurrence of two or more creditors, or of two or more debtors, in a single obligation, does not imply that each one of the former has a right to ask, nor that each one of the latter is bound to comply in full with the things which are the objects of the same. This shall only take place when the obligation determines it expressly, being constituted as a joint and several obligation.
“Art. 1138. If from the context of the obligation referred to in the preceding article, any other thing does not appear, the credit or the debt shall be presumed as divided in as many equal parts as there are creditors or debtors, and shall be considered as credits or debts, each one different from the other.”
“A joint obligation under the law of Louisiana binds the parties thereto only for their proportion of the debt, whilst a solidary obligation, on the contrary, binds each of the obligors for the whole debt.” (Groves vs. Sentell, 14 Sup. Ct., 898, 901; 153 U. S., 465; 38 L. Ed., 785.)
From what has been said, it is manifest that the demurrer must be overruled, and that unless the respondents file an answer within ten days from the entry of this opinion (which we do not anticipate) judgment should be entered securing to petitioner the relief to which he is entitled upon the facts disclosed by the petition.
Unless an answer is filed within ten days from the entry of this order, let judgment be entered dissolving the preliminary injunction heretofore allowed in these proceedings, and directing the respondents to refrain from any further measures looking to the enforcement of the judgment for costs and expenses in the election contest proceedings had in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, wherein Ernesto Gardiner was protestant, and Manuel de Leon was protestee, and Cecilio Torres was cited to appear as intervener or tercerisia, as a “joint and several” judgment for costs and expenses, and directing the respondent judge to enter such orders as may be convenient or necessary to revoke and set aside any order or orders heretofore entered in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac looking to the enforcement of that judgment as a “joint and several” judgment. The costs of these proceedings will be taxed against the respondent sheriff, Santiago de Jesus. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.