[ G.R. No. 12817. October 25, 1917 ] 37 Phil. 42
[ G.R. No. 12817. October 25, 1917 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EMILIO BAYONA VITOG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal by the Government from an order by the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the defendant’s plea of autrofois acquit, requires consideration once more of the subject of double jeopardy.
On the 9th of June 1916, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila charging Emilio Bayona Vitog, the present defendant and appelle, and three other with the crime of theft, committed follows:
“That, on or about the 12th day of May, 1916, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Emilio Bayona Vitog, Biao (a Chinaman), Dionisio Sy y Seco, and Candido Reyes Y Perez, did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally — with intent of unlawful gain and without the consent of the owner, conspiring among themselves and mutually aiding one another— steal and carry away with them the following articles belonging to The Pacific Commercial Co., a duly registered corporation engaged in business in said city, to wit: Four hundred sacks of sugar of the total value of P4,800, Philippine currency, to the injury and prejudice of said corporation, The Pacific Commercial Co. in said of P4,800, Philippine currency, equivalent to 24,000 pesetas.”
In this case No. 14134, the Honorable George R. Harvey, judge of First Instance of Manila, rendered judgment on October 11, 1916, acquitting the defendant Emilio Bayona Vitoh of the crime of theft “without prejudice to the right of the fiscal to proceed against said defendant for any offense, of which the said Emilio Bayona may be considered guilty.”
On December 11, 1916, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Emilio Bayona Vitog charging him with the crime of estafa alleged to have been committed as follows:
“That, on or about the 12th day of May 1916, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands [said accused] having received in barge Milagros, from Angel Jose and from The Pacific Commercial Co., and incorporated company engaged in business and registered in the city of Manila under the laws of said Islands, two thousand three hundred (2,300) sacks of sugar belonging to said company, under the obligation to transport them from the Muelle de la Industria to the steamer Kaifunesan Maru, then anchored in Manila Bay, and to deliver them to the officer or officers of said steamer charged to receive cargo, did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, and with intent to defraud said The Pacific Commercial Co., appropriate to himself and dispose of to his benefit four hundred sacks said amount of sugar, which sack sugar, at the rate of P12.50 per sack, were worth the sum of P4,800 equivalent to 24,000 pesetas.”
It was in this case No. 14731 that the special defense of autrofois acquit was interposed with the result in defendant’s favor as above indicated.
The constitutional inhibition in our Bill of Rights is “That no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment.” (See, also secs. 26, 27 and 28, Code of Crim. Proc.) Numerous of the courts have emphasized the words “same offense” Thus, in Kepner vs. United States ([1904], 195 U. S., 100) MR. Justice Day said that, “the protection is * * * against being again tried for the offense.”
In Gavieres vs. United States ([1911], 220 U. S., 338). the same Justice said that the protection intended and specifically given against second jeopardy for the same offense, * * * (Italics those of court)
The court then quotes from Morey vs. Commonwealth ([1871], 108 Mass., 433, 4350, in which Judge Gray held:
“A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may be an offense against two statues; and if each statue does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.” (See also U.S. vs. Ching Po (1912), 23 Phil., 578 citing numerous authorities.)
As a corollary to these propositions, it is only equitable as held in United States vs. Gustilp ([1911], 19 Phil., 208), that the constitutional protection should be made to cover as nearly as possible every result which flows from a single criminal act born of a single criminal intent.
It is undisputed that the facts giving rise to the present prosecution for estafa are substantially identical with those which gave rise to the previous prosecution for theft. This being admitted, the prosecuting officer, by varying slightly the terminology of the allegations, can not subject the defendant to a second trial. The basic act complained of in the first information was that of unlawfully acquiring possession of sugar theft. The basic act complained of in the second information was failure to deliver sugar lawfully received by this appellee— estafa. Of course, as counsel for appellee truly says, the mere qualification given in the information by the fiscal does not determine the nature of the crime constituted by a given set of acts. But here the captions selected and used by the fiscal are in harmony with the facts alleged in the informations. In other words, while the defendant was placed in jeopardy in case No. 14134 in respect to the crime of theft, he was not placed in jeopardy for the crime of estafa. Under the information in case No. 14134 the court could not have convicted this defendant of the crime charged in case No. 14731. While theft and estafa are both crimes against property, the essential elements of the two crimes are different.
The accused has not been placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The authorities cited by the Attorney-General do no more than to corroborate the brief principles here set out. The plea of autrfois acquit should not have been sustained.
The order of the lower court, dismissing the case, is reversed, and the record is returned to the court from which it came, with instructions to proceed to trial, without special finding as to costs in bot instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.
Order reversed; case remanded for further proceedings.