[ G.R. No. 12354. March 17, 1917 ] 36 Phil. 483
[ G.R. No. 12354. March 17, 1917 ]
GREGORIO REMATA, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN JAVIER, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
TRENT, J.:
This is an action of quo warranto instituted by Gregorio Remata against Juan Javier for the purpose of ousting the latter from the office of municipal president of Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, and placing the plaintiff in possession of the same.
The grounds upon which the action is based, according to the complaint, are that Juan Javier was duly elected president, qualified and assumed the office in 1912, and that his term expired by operation of law on October 15, 1916. As a result of the general election held on June 6, 1916, Juan Javier was declared reflected by the municipal board of canvassers. Subsequent thereto, Ricardo Nadres, one of the candidates, contested Javier’s election. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance found and decreed that no one was legally elected president and so certified to the proper authorities. At the same general election of 1916, Gregorio Remata, the plaintiff, was elected vice-president and entered upon the duties of his office on October 16, 1916.
The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because the failure to elect a municipal president of Candelaria, did not create a vacancy which the vice-president has a right to fill.
In the consideration of this question, it must be borne in mind that this is not a case of a contest between parties as to the result of an election for an office for which they were opposing candidates before the people. When an election takes place and the will of the voters is expressed through the ballot box, the candidate receiving the number of votes necessary to elect him, is entitled to the possession of the office, its rights and emoluments. These are his property; his right to them is a private right which the law protects and the courts will enforce. A person who is entitled to fill a vacancy has the same rights and remedies.
Section 2123 of Act No. 2657, effective July 1, 1916, provides that the term of a municipal officer shall begin on the sixteenth day of October following the election and shall end on the fifteenth of the same month four years thereafter. The section further provides that if a successor be not inducted at the time appointed by law, the incumbent shall hold over until a successor shall be duly qualified.
Section 2126 of the same Code reads, in part, as follows:
“Vacancies in municipal office.—Vacancies occurring in elective municipal offices shall be filled as follows:
“(a) In case of the president, by the vice-president, or if there be no vice-president, by the council or who at the last general election received the highest number of votes.
* * * * * * *
“(d) In any case for which special provision is not made, by a qualified elector of the municipality to be thereunto designated by the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board, after recommendation by the municipal council.
“A person thus called to fill a vacancy shall hold for the unexpired term and until the qualification of a successor.”
If our inquiry as to the meaning of the words “vacancy” and “vacancies” is to be limited to section 2126, we would have to hold that the defendant’s contention to the effect that no vacancy occurred, is well founded and supported by the weight of authority in the United States. But, if the Legislature intended that the word “vacancy” should be given a double meaning so as to include the instant case, then the result will be different. That the Legislature so intended, clearly appears from other provisions of the Administrative Code.
Section 2000 of the Administrative Code provides in the first paragraph, that when a vacancy occurs in an elective provincial office by reason of the death, resignation or removal of the incumbent, the Governor-General shall appoint a suitable person thereto. In paragraph two, provisions are made for the calling of a special election in case the general election fails to take place or the election fails. Under paragraph three, the Governor-General is authorized to call a special election or fill the place by appointment where a provincial officer elect dies prior to taking office, or for any other reason fails to qualify. Paragraph 4 provides that in case a special election shall have been called and held and shall have resulted in a failure legally to elect the provincial officer, the Governor-General shall fill the place by appointment. And the last paragraph reads: “A person appointed or elected to fill a vacancy in an elective provincial office shall hold for the unexpired term and until the qualification of a successor.”
Again, section 2412, which applies to the city of Manila, provides that—“if any person so elected is ineligible to hold office, or if for any reason there should be a failure to elect one or more members, no special election shall be called, but the vacancy shall be filled for the term by the Governor-General with the consent of the Upper House of the Philippine Legislature. Vacancies in the office of member occurring after taking office shall be filled for the unexpired term in like manner.”
It will thus be seen that the Legislature in sections 2000 and 2412 provided for two kinds of vacancies. The first, where vacancies occur by the death, resignation, or removal of the incumbent, and the second is where vacancies occur by reason of the failure to elect. In both instances the office becomes vacant.
In enacting the provisions with reference to elective provincial offices, elective municipal offices for the city of Manila and elective municipal offices in general, the Legislature was dealing with the same subject-matter. And, in view of the fact that no provisions are made for the calling of special elections in cases where the election fails or no one is legally elected to a municipal office, we must conclude that it was intended that the words “vacancy” and “vacancies” occurring in section 2126 should be given the same meaning as those in sections 2000 and 2412, otherwise an incumbent of an elective municipal office might continue indefinitely.
For the foregoing reasons, the demurrer is overruled and the defendant is given five days after notice, within which to answer the complaint. If no answer is filed within this time, judgment will be entered in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, with costs against the defendant. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.