[ G.R. No. 12118. February 23, 1917 ] 36 Phil. 316
[ G.R. No. 12118. February 23, 1917 ]
CATALINO GALANG, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE MIRANDA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, AND GONZALO DE LEON, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TRENT, J.:
This is an original action in the Supreme Court, the object of which is to compel the respondent judge, by mandamus, to reinstate a certain election contest and to proceed with the trial thereof.
At the general election held on June 6, 1916, Catalino Galang received, according to the returns, 157 votes and Gonzalo de Leon received 162 votes for the office of municipal president for the municipality of Cabiao, Province of Nueva Ecija. On the 13th of June, 1916, Galang filed his motion in the Court of First Instance, contesting the election of De Leon. . On the 15th of that month the contestee appeared and answered the motion by general denial. When the case was called for hearing on the 19th of July, 1916, the contestant offered to prove by the municipal secretary that the contestee was duly proclaimed elected by the municipal board of canvassers. Counsel for the contestee objected to the introduction of this testimony upon the ground that there was no allegation in the motion to that effect. The objection was sustained and the motion of contest dismissed, with the costs against the contestant. Subsequent thereto, a petition was filed in this court, asking for the remedy indicated. The respondents demurred to the petition on the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After hearing, the demurrer was overruled and the respondents were given five days to answer. (Galang vs. Miranda and De Leon, 35 Phil. Rep., 269.) In their answer the respondents admitted the facts above stated and as a special defense allege that it is not true that the petitioner (the contestant in the court below) made a clerical error in alleging that the respondent De Leon was proclaimed elected municipal president by the election inspectors instead of alleging that De Leon was proclaimed elected by the municipal board of canvassers. A certified transcript of the proceedings in the court below is attached to and made a part of the record in the instant case. The following are the pertinent facts:
The contestant alleged in his motion that the contestee was duly declared elected by the board of election inspectors on the 7th of June, 1916. The municipal board of canvassers promulgated their proclamation on June 8, 1916. There is only one precinct in the municipality of Cabiao.
Counsel for the contestant asked his first witness, who was the municipal secretary, this question: “Have you received also the subpoena duces tecum to bring here the act of the municipal council of Cabiao, used on the day of the election for the provincial and municipal officers?” Sumulong, counsel for the contestee:
“I object to this question because an attempt is made to prove a fact which is not alleged in the protest, precisely the protest is defective because it is not alleged that the contestee was proclaimed (elected) by the municipal council acting as municipal board of canvassers and this defect is fatal, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Manalo vs. Sevilla, and Navarro vs. Veloso.”
Ledesma, for the contestant:
“It is true that it is alleged that the contestee was declared elected by the board of election inspectors. I do not know whether there was an error in the preparation of the protest or not, but, however this may be, there being but one precinct in the municipality of Cabiao and the functions of the municipal council being purely ministerial and not judicial, the municipal council must base its recount and proclamation upon the inspectors’ return. The allegation that the contestee was proclaimed elected by the board of inspectors is virtually a proclamation by the inspectors that the contestee was elected.”
Judge:
“The objection is sustained. The question cannot be admitted, and with reference to the petition to amend the protest, alleging this fact which is attempted to be proved,the court overrules the petition because it understands that it has not acquired jurisdiction to hear the case, because that essential fact which confers jurisdiction upon the court to hear this election protest is not alleged.”
After counsel for the contestant noted his exception to this ruling, Sumulong moved that the protest be dismissed, with costs. The Court:
“In conformity with the motion, for the reasons there instated and for the reasons stated upon which the former resolution of the court is based, the protest is dismissed, with costs against the contestant.”
The question submitted for determination is whether or not the court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest, because the contestant alleged that the contestee had been proclaimed elected by the board of inspectors instead of alleging that the contestee had been declared elected by the municipal council, acting as municipal board of canvassers. It is conceded that if the contestant had alleged the latter fact, the court would have had jurisdiction.
While the statute provides that election contests of this character must be instituted by motion, it is silent as to what allegations such motion must contain. From the very nature of the proceedings, whereby election contests are determined, it is apparent that there must be alleged in the motion the necessary jurisdictional facts. As to the form which the motion should take thereafter and the fulness and the particularity of its averments, [that] depends largely upon the statute and the established practice. It should state, of course, in a legal and logical form the facts constituting the grounds of complaint. The fact that the contestee or someone had been proclaimed duly elected, is jurisdictional and must be alleged (Navarro vs. Veloso, 23 Phil. Rep., 625) and the better practice requires that it be alleged that this act was done by the entity authorized to do so. The board of inspectors is not authorized to proclaim anyone elected. Section 24 of Act No. 1582, known as the Election Law and which was in force at the time the election in question was held, provides that upon the completion of the count, the inspectors shall make and sign a written statement in quadruplicate, showing the date of the election, the name of the municipality, and the number of the precinct in which it was held, the whole number of ballots cast for each person for each office, and that forthwith thereafter one copy thereof shall be filed with the municipal secretary, and the statements, ballot box, and unissued ballots shall be returned to the municipal secretary immediately. And section 26 provides that immediately after the election the municipal board shall meet in special session and shall proceed to act as a municipal board of canvassers, but such board shall not have the power to recount the votes or to inspect any of them. The section further provides that the municipal board shall proceed upon the statements rendered, as corrected, if corrections are necessary.
It will thus be seen that the duties of the municipal council, acting as municipal board of canvassers, is purely mechanical. It can only compile the returns from the various precincts, in so far as municipal officers are concerned. It cannot open the ballot boxes or recount the votes. It must depend exclusively upon the statements or returns made by the various precinct election inspectors. It is authorized, however, to correct clerical errors in addition and other errors of a like character. It, therefore, necessarily follows that in the absence of clerical errors, and there were none in the instant case, the result of the municipal board of canvassers’ operations must be exactly the same as the proclamation publicly pronounced by the chairman of the board of election inspectors of Cabiao, both proclamations containing the same information. That of the chairman of the board of inspectors was more extensive because it was announced publicly immediately after the termination of the counting of the ballots.
If the contestant had alleged that the contestee had been duly proclaimed elected without stating by whom, the motion would have been sufficient in order to give the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The service of notice upon the contestee in due form and within the time prescribed by law gives the court jurisdiction of the person of the contestee. That Gonzalo de Leon was duly served, there can be no question. He appeared and answered on the 15th of June, which was within a few days after the election. To hold that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the contestant alleged that the contestee was duly declared elected by the board of election inspectors instead of by the municipal board of canvassers is entirely without foundation and is technical in the highest degree. In speaking of technicalities, which do not go to, the jurisdiction of the court and which do not in any way prejudice the rights of litigants, this court, in Alonso vs. Villamor (16 Phil. Rep., 315), said:
“The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff’s case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.”
The observations here made by Justice Moreland are perfectly applicable to the case under consideration. The contestee De Leon knew that his election was being contested and it could make no difference to him whether the contestant alleged that he was duly declared elected by the board of election inspectors or by the municipal board of canvassers. There being only one precinct, the result, as we have indicated, was the same. The action of the court in dismissing the contest upon this immaterial technicality deprived the contestant of his day in court.
In De Castro vs. Salas and Santiago (34 Phil. Rep., 818) we said:
“No rule of law is better established than the one that provides that mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court, when honestly exercised and when such power and authority is not abused. A distinction however must be made between a case where the writ of mandamus is sought to control the decision of a court upon the merits of the cause, and cases where the court has refused to go into the merits of the action, upon an erroneous view of the law or practice. If the court has erroneously dismissed an action upon a preliminary objection and upon an erroneous construction of the law, then mandamus is the proper remedy to compel it to reinstate the action and to proceed to hear it upon its merits, (High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies 3d. ed., section 151; Castello vs. St. Louis Circuit Court, 28 Mo., 259; State ex: rel Chism & Boyd vs. Judge of 26th District Court, 34 La. An., 1177; State ex rel Citizens’ Bank vs. Judge of 7th District Court, 38 La. An., 499.) Dr. High, in commenting upon the rule laid down by the court, says:
" ‘For example, when, in statutory proceedings instituted to test the election of an officer, the court below refuses to try the case upon its merits, and quashes the proceedings, upon the ground that the contestant has not given the notice required by statute, if such court has erred in its construction of the statute, as to the notice required, the writ (mandamus) will be granted to compel it to reinstate the case and proceed to a hearing.’ "
We will now examine the two cases relied upon by the contestee. The first, Navarro vs. Veloso (23 Phil. Rep., 625), was a contest for the office of provincial governor. The contestant alleged that the contestee had been declared elected by the various municipal boards of inspectors. The trial court dismissed the contest upon two grounds: (1) Because it was not alleged that the contestee had been duly proclaimed governor of the Province of Leyte, and (2) because it was not alleged that all the candidates voted for had been notified. In disposing of the first ground, this court said:
“Of course, one of the fundamental facts necessary to appear before a contest can be maintained is the election of the person against whom the protest is made. If there is no election there can be no protest. The best evidence, in fact, the primary evidence of such election is, under the law, the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers. It is nowhere alleged in the protest that such board proclaimed the election of the protestee. On the contrary, it affirmatively appears that such board did not do so, the protestant alleging that the protestee was declared elected by the various municipal boards of inspectors.”
It is quite clear that the rule here announced is not applicable to the case under consideration, because in that case there were various municipal boards of inspectors. In the present case there was only one board of inspectors. In the former it was the duty of the provincial board to canvass the returns from all the precincts and then proclaim someone elected. The municipal boards of inspectors could not do this for the reason that they did not have the requisite information. One board, of inspectors did not know the result of the other precincts. And, furthermore, we did not hold in the case just cited that if the contestant had alleged that the contestee had been duly proclaimed elected, without alleging by whom the proclamation was made, that the contestant could not have proved this fact under such an allegation.
The second case, Manalo vs. Sevilla (24 Phil. Rep., 609), was also a contest involving the office of provincial governor. In this case the court said:
“We, therefore, see that the protestant must not only morally know that respondent was elected, but he must legally know it—that is to say, he must know it in such a way that he can communicate that knowledge effectively to the court. * * * We repeat, in this connection, that we must bear always in mind the imperative necessity of alleging and proving the election of the respondent, that is, the loss of the election by the protestant.”
In the instant case the contestant knew that according to the returns from the one precinct that the contestee had been elected. He communicated this information to the court when he alleged that the board of election inspectors from this precinct had declared the contestee elected municipal president. The court knew that, in the absence of clerical errors, the result of the operations of the municipal canvassing board must necessarily be the same as that proclaimed by the chairman of the board of election inspectors.
For the foregoing reasons judgment will be entered in favor of the petitioner, granting the writ of mandamus directing the respondent judge to reinstate the election contest and to proceed with the trial thereof. With costs against the respondent, Gonzalo de Leon. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ. concur.