[ G.R. No. 12235. December 08, 1916 ] 35 Phil. 643
[ G.R. No. 12235. December 08, 1916 ]
PROTASIO SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE MIRANDA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE PROVINCE OF TARLAC, AND GREGORIO CLEMENTS, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition presented in the Supreme Court for the writ of prohibition. Its purpose is to prohibit the respondent judge from proceeding with the hearing of a certain election contest, pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac, in which the petitioner herein is the protestee and the respondent herein, Gregorio Clemente, is the protestant.
The facts upon which the remedy prayed for is based may be stated as follows:
First. That on the 6th of June, 1916, an election was held in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, for the purpose of electing a president and other municipal officers.
Second. That on the 10th of June, 1916, the municipal board of said municipality declared that Protasio Santos had been duly elected as president of said municipality; that Gregorio Clemente had secured 493 votes and that Protasio Santos had received 572 votes.
Third. That on the 20th of June, 1916, the said Gregorio Clemente presented a protest against the election of Protasio Santos, alleging that certain frauds had been committed during the election, which rendered the same null and void.
Fourth. That later (the exact date not given) notice of said protest was given to Protasio Santos, Francisco Santos, and Melquiades Pagarigan.
Fifth. That on the 23d of August, 1916, the protestant, Gregorio Clemente, presented an “amended protest”, which, in addition to certain facts relating to the alleged frauds practiced during said election, alleged that the following persons had received votes at said election: Agaton Concepcion, Bernardo Perez, Cecilio Torres, Francisco Lanuza, Miguel Alvarez, Emesio Ebarra, Sofronio Serrano, Teofilo Aguilar, Timoteo Gulling, Valentin Gamalindo.
Sixth. That the additional persons named in the last preceding paragraph, while they had been voted for, were not, in fact, candidates for the office of president, and that they had been made parties to the amended protest simply to comply with the provisions of section 578 of the Administrative Code; that said amendment as to parties did not in any way change the original protest and was simply made for the purpose of including all the persons who had received votes for the office of president of said municipality at said election.
Seventh. That the said amended protest alleged that none of the persons named in the 5th paragraph above were candidates for president at the time of said election.
Eighth. That later (the exact date not given) the petitioner here (the protestee below) presented a motion to dismiss the protest for the reason that all of the “candidates voted for” had not been duly notified in accordance with the provisions of the law, and that, therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the same.
Ninth. That the court denied said motion to dismiss and ordered the hearing on said protest to continue.
It was because of the refusal of the lower court to grant said motion to dismiss that the present petition was presented here.
Upon the presentation of the petition, the respondents were ordered to show cause why the writ of prohibition should not issue as prayed for. The respondents, in compliance with said order to show cause, presented a demurrer and an answer. The respondents having demurred and answered at the same time, the answer only can be considered. The fact that they answered waived the demurrer.
The answer alleged: (a) That the only candidates voted for for the office of president of said municipality were: Gregorio Clemente, Protasio Santos, Francisco Santos, and Melquiades Pagarigan; (b) That said candidates had been duly notified of said protest; (c) That the additional persona named in the “amended protest” were not “candidates voted for” at said election; and (d) That said amended protest had been admitted without objection on the part of the protestee (the petitioner herein).
The theory of the petitioner is, inasmuch as the additional persons named in the amended protest had received votes for the office of president, that they were,, therefore, “candidates voted for” and must, under the law, be notified. That theory may or may not be correct, depending upon the facts presented in each particular case. Whether the particular person “voted for” was a candidate or not is a question of fact. Any citizen of a municipality eligible for election to any municipal office, may be elected thereto, even though he is not a candidate. Candidates for municipal offices are not required to make a pre announcement of their candidacy as provincial candidates are required to do, and for that reason it may be difficult at times to determine who are the real candidates at any municipal election for municipal officers. Whether the persons voted for were, in fact, “candidates voted for” is always subject to proof. In view of the fact that the municipal board of inspectors are required to make a certificate showing the names of “all the persons voted for,” and proclaim the persons elected, we are of the opinion that in the first instance all the “persons who received votes” for a particular office and who were eligible for election to said office, and whose names appeared in said certificate, must be considered for the purpose of any protest as “candidates voted for,” until the contrary is shown. That being true, they should, of course, be notified. If, however, the protestant should fail to notify any of said persons, for any excusable reason, or if the municipal board of inspectors should neglect to include in said certificate any of the persons voted for at the particular election, then, and in either of said cases, the court should hear proof upon the question whether said persons were or were not “candidates voted for,” and decide whether or not in fact, such persons were candidates.
If upon said hearing the proof shows that the persons voted for, and not notified nor included in the certificate, were, in fact, not “candidates voted for,” then the hearing upon the protest should continue without further delay. If, upon the other hand, the protestant has, in fact, failed to notify, without just cause, all of the “candidates voted for,” and the court so finds upon the hearing, then the protest should be dismissed without delay. The court has no jurisdiction to hear the protest until “all of the candidates voted for” have been notified. There may be cases, however, where the protestant, for reasons beyond his control, or by reasonable diligence, was unable to ascertain at the time of the presentation of his protest, who were, in fact, “all of the persons voted for,” and has failed, for that reason, to notify some of them. In such cases, in our opinion, justice and equity require that the protestant should be permitted to notify such additional candidates or persons voted for. The protestant, under such circumstances, should not be deprived of his day in court. The law does not require the “motion” or protest to contain or mention the names of all the candidates. The law simply requires that all candidates voted for should be notified.
As was said above, it will be presumed that all of the persons voted for, as appears from the certificate of the municipal board of inspectors, were “candidates voted for” until the contrary is shown, and must be given notice of the protest. That presumption, however, is a rebuttable one. When the question is properly presented to the court whether or not such persons voted for were or were not, in fact, “candidates voted for,” it is the duty of the court to hear proof upon that question. It might be that some of the persons voted for were not candidates and would not, under any condition, accept the particular office, even though elected. Therefore the court should give the parties a hearing upon the question who were, in fact, candidates voted for. In order that said notice must be given, two conditions are required by law; first, the particular person must have been a candidate; and, second, he must have been voted for or must have received some votes. If he has been voted for, the presumption is that he was a candidate and must be given notice of the protest. If the protestant, however, knows, as a matter of fact, that the particular person was not a candidate, there is no reason for going through the empty formula of giving him notice. The protestant, however, in such a case, assumes the responsibility of his failure to give the notice required by law and if, perchance, it should develop that the particular person was a candidate, then, of course, the protest must fail, for the reason that the court did not obtain jurisdiction to hear the protest, all of the candidates voted for not having been given notice.
The question, who are candidates, has been defined many times by the courts. Bouvier, in his valuable law dictionary, defines a candidate as “one who offers himself or is offered by others, for an office. One who seeks office is a candidate; it is not necessary that he should have been nominated for it.” Webster defines a candidate as “one who offers himself or is put forward by others as a suitable person, or an aspirant, or a contestant for an office, privilege, or honor.” Escriche defines a candidate as El que pretende alguna dignidad o empleo honorifico (one who runs for a certain office or honorary position). The term “candidate” is used to designate the person voted for at an election. (State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L. R. A., 107.)
The protestant must give notice to all of the persons voted for whose names appear in the certificate of the municipal board of inspectors or be prepared to show that those who were not notified were not candidates, and this at his peril, because if it turns out that some of them were candidates and were not notified, without just reason, the protestant must fail for the reason that the court would not have jurisdiction.
In the present case the additional persons named in the amended protest were given simply as a precaution, the protestant alleging at the same time that none of them were candidates. The court, having found that none of them were candidates, did not exceed his jurisdiction in allowing said amendment. The notification to the parties who were not candidates can not prejudice the right of the protestant. It is the failure to notify those who were candidates which prejudices the right of the protestant. The error, if any, in the present case, did not prejudice the rights of any of the parties. The lower court must have found that the additional persons named in the amended protest were not candidates and that the persons named in the original protest, who had been notified, were the only candidates voted for. That being true, the lower court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions presented by the protest.
Therefore, the petition for the writ of prohibition herein prayed for is hereby denied, and without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., see dissenting opinion.