G.R. No. 11401

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GREGORIO CRISTOBAL ET AL., DEFENDANTS. GREGORIO CRISTOBAL, APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. 11401. August 23, 1916 ] 34 Phil. 825

[ G.R. No. 11401. August 23, 1916 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GREGORIO CRISTOBAL ET AL., DEFENDANTS. GREGORIO CRISTOBAL, APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N

JOHNSON, J.:

The question presented by this appeal is whether or not a municipal ordinance which prohibits persons engaged in fishing from closing up or obstructing in any way public navigable rivers, or esteros, or other watercourses or bodies of water located within the jurisdiction of the municipality, is constitutional. That is to say,  is such an ordinance within the powers, general or special, of a municipality?

It appears from the record, that in violation of the provisions of municipal ordinance No. 42, as amended by resolution No. 42, “on or about the 17th of September, 1914, in the barrio of Pamugsuc, municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, operating jointly and together, willfully, illegally, and feloniously, did build a dam, thus maliciously obstructing public navigation on the River Sugarul, in the municipality of Lubao, the said river being navigable and of public ownership; that the said dam was built for the purpose of converting the said river into a fishpond, to the prejudice of the municipality of Lubao.”

The lower court found that the appellant had committed the acts charged in the complaint and sentenced him to pay a fine of P30.

The record further shows that the defendant and appellant had first been charged with a violation of said ordinance and had been convicted by the justice of the peace, and that he had appealed to the Court of First Instance.

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.  We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary. (2 Cyc. PI. and Prac, p. 420; U. S. vs. Labial and Abuso, 27 Phil. Rep., 82; par. 14, sec. 334, Act No. 190.)

The appellant makes a feeble effort here to show that the land of the body of water in which the obstruction was placed by the appellant, belonged to him and that therefore the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to determine the questions presented. That contention we do not believe is seriously made by the appellant, for the reason that it is asserted that the body of water in which said obstruction was placed was public water and subject to the control of the municipality, for certain purposes, and therefore the land occupied by said water did not belong to the appellant. That contention of the appellant is frivolous and does not merit discussion here for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace over the question of the enforcement of said order.

Considering the general powers of municipal councils as defined in Act No. 82 and its amendments, we are of the opinion that the municipality in question was duly authorized to adopt the ordinance in question and the same is therefore constitutional.  (U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs. Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. Rep., 89; U. S. vs. Garing, 28 Phil. Rep., 199; U. S. vs. Tamparong, 31 Phil. Rep., 321; U. S. vs. Pads, 31 Phil. Rep., 524.)

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the cause be returned to the court from whence it came for an execution of the sentence heretofore ordered by the Court of First Instance, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., see dissenting opinion.