[ G.R. No. 8235. March 19, 1914 ] 27 Phil. 209
[ G.R. No. 8235. March 19, 1914 ]
ISIDORO SANTOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LEANDRA MANARANG, ADMINISTRATRIX, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
TRENT, J.:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament, dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:
“I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.”
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidoro Santos; one due on April 14,1907, for P5,000, and various others described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27,1908. On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff, Isidoro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of the testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and he now appeals to this court.
In his first assignment of error, the appellant takes exception to the action of the court in denying his petition asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claim. In support of this alleged error counsel say that it does not appear in the committee’s report that the publications required by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been duly made. With reference to this point the record affirmatively shows that the committee did make the publications required by law. It is further alleged that at the time the appellant presented his petition the court had not approved the report of the committee. If this were necessary we might say that, although the record does not contain a formal approval of the committee’s report, such approval must undoubtedly have been made, as will appear from an inspection of the various orders of the court approving the annual accounts of the administratrix, in which claims allowed against the estate by the committee were written off in accordance with its report. This is shown very clearly from the court’s order of August 1, 1912, in which the account of the administratrix was approved after reducing the final payments on some of the claims against the estate to agree with the amounts allowed by the committee. It is further alleged that at the time this petition was presented the administration proceedings had not been terminated. This is correct.
In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid. The inference is that had plaintiffs claims not been mentioned in the will he would have presented them to the committee as a matter of course; that plaintiff was led to believe by this express mention of his claims in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them to the committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting them to the committee until after the committee had made its final report.
Under these facts and circumstances, did the court err in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff’s claims? The first step toward the solution of this question is to determine whether plaintiff’s claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against an estate is, by law, authorized to pass upon. Unless it was such a claim plaintiff’s argument has no foundation. Section 686 empowers the committee to try and decide claims which survive against executors and administrators, even though they be demandable at a future day “except claims for the possession of or title to real estate.“Section 700 provides that all actions commenced against the deceased person for the recovery of money, debt, or damages, pending at the time the committee is appointed, shall be discontinued, and the claims embraced within such actions presented to the committee. Section 703 provides that actions to recover title to or possession of real property, actions to recover damages for injury to person or property, real or personal, and actions to recover the possession of specified articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted against the executor or administrator; “but all other actions commenced against the deceased before his death shall be discontinued and the claims therein involved presented before the committee as herein provided/’ Section 708 provides that a claim secured by a mortgage or other collateral security may be abandoned and the claim prosecuted before the committee, or the mortgage may be foreclosed or the security be relied upon, and, in the event of a deficiency judgment, the creditor may, after the sale of the mortgage or upon the insufficiency of the security, prove such deficiency before the committee on claims. There are also certain provisions in section 746 et seq., with reference to the presentation of contingent claims to the committee after the expiration of the time allowed for the presentation of claims not contingent. Do plaintiff’s claims fall within any of these sections? They are described in the will as debts. There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are contingent claims, claims for the possession of or title to real property, damages for injury to person or property, real or personal, or for the possession of specified articles of personal propety. Nor is it asserted by the plaintiff that they do. The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be considered by the committee.
This being true, the next point to determine is, when and under what circumstances may the committee be recalled to consider belated claims? Section 689 provides:
“The court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the creditors to present their claims to the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months.”
It cannot be questioned that this section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against the estates of deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part, of the probate law of the United States. It is commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and. its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that the residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed.
“The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate into the hands of the persons entitled to receive it.” (Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil.Rep., 573.)
Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the ordinary statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision, more or less liberal, is annexed to the statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction where it is found. In this country its saving clause is found in section 690, which reads as follows:
“On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return of their doings to the court.”
If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the court. But, as stated above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six months after the time previously limited for the presentation of claims. In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. (Estate of De Dios, supra.) In other words, the court could extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the plaintiff’s claims against the estate if justice required it, at any time within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908. Plaintiff’s petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. The bar of the statute of nonclaims is as conclusive under these circumstances as the bar of the ordinary statute of limitations would be. It is generally held that claims are not barred as to property not included in the inventory. (Waughop vs. Bartlett, 165 111., 124; Estate of Reyes, 17 Phil. Rep., 188.) So also, as indicated by this court in the case last cited, fraud would undoubtedly have the same effect. These exceptions to the operation of the statute are, of course, founded upon the highest principles of equity. But what is the plea of the plaintiff in this case? Simply this: That he was laboring under a mistake of law—a mistake which could easily have been corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack of information as to the law governing the allowance of claims against estates of deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been remedied in ample time to present the claims to the committee. Plaintiff finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his rights when they have been lost through his own negligence. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that the learned trial court made no error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff’s claims against the estate.
In his second assignment of error the appellant insists that the court erred in dismissing his petition filed on November 21, 1910/ wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him. We concede all that is implied in the maxim, dicat testor et erit lex. But the law imposes certain restrictions upon the testator, not only as to the disposition of his estate, but also as to the manner in which he may make such disposition. As stated in Rood on Wills, sec. 412: “Some general rules have been irrevocably established by the policy of the law, which cannot be exceeded or transgressed by any intention of the testator, be it ever so clearly expressed.”
It may be safely asserted that no respectable authority can be found which holds that the will of the testator may override positive provisions of law and imperative requirements of public policy. (Page on Wills, sec; 461.)
“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law and good morals shall be considered as not imposed, * * *” (Art. 792, Civil Code.)
Conceding for the moment that it was the testator’s desire in the present case that the debts listed by him in his will should be paid without referring them to a committee appointed by the court, can such a provision be enforced? May the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the settlement of claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be superseded by the contents of a will?
It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code, of Civil Procedure has established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. There are at least two restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro tanto restrict the maxim that “the will of the testator is law:” (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law.
The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ. Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec. 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent’s will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over other debtsi But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?
If it is unnecessary to present such a claim to the committee, the statute of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years, according1 to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing limitations upon actions. Under such circumstances, when may the legal portion be determined ? If, in the meantime, the estate has been distributed, what security have the distributees against the interruption of their possession? Is the administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate. But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the dual roIe of a claimant and judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized arid continued in force by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt expressly recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under the guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.
We are aware that in some jurisdictions executors and administrators are, by law, obligated to perform the duties which, in this jurisdiction, are. assigned to the committee on claims; that in some other jurisdictions it is the probate court itself that performs these duties; that in some jurisdictions the limitation upon the presentment of claims for allowance is longer and, possibly, in some shorter; and that there is a great divergence in the classification of actions which survive and actions which do not survive the death of the testator. It must be further remembered that there are but few of the United States which provide for heirs by force of law. These differences render useless as authorities in this jurisdiction many of the cases coming from the United States. The restriction imposed upon the testator’s power to dispose of his property when there are heirs by force of law is especially important. The rights of these heirs by force of law pass immediately upon the death of the testator. (Art. 657, Civil Code.) The state intervenes and guarantees their rights by many stringent provisions of law to the extent mentioned in article 818 of the Civil Code. Having undertaken the responsibility to deliver the legal portion of the net assets of the estate to the heirs by force of law, it is idle to talk of substituting for the procedure provided by law for determining the legal portion, some other procedure provided in the will of the testator. The state cannot afford to allow the performance of its obligations to be directed by the will of an individual. There is but one instance in which the settlement of the estate according to the probate procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, may be dispensed with, and it applies only to intestate estates. (Sec. 596, Code Civ. Proc.) A partial exemption from the lawful procedure is also contained in section 644, when the executor or administrator is the sole residuary legatee. Even in such case, and although the testator directs that no bond be given, the executor is required to give a bond for the payment of the debts of the testator. The facts of the present case do not bring it within either of these sections. We conclude that the claims against the estate in the case at bar were enforceable only when the prescribed legal procedure was followed. But we are not disposed to rest our conclusion upon this phase of the case entirely upon legal grounds. On the contrary we are strongly of the opinion that the application of the maxim, “The will of the testator is the law of the case,” but strengthens our position so far as the present case is concerned.
“It will ordinarily be presumed in construing a will that the testator is acquainted with the rules of law, and that he intended to comply with them accordingly. If two constructions of a will or a part thereof are possible, and one of these constructions is consistent with the law, and the other is inconsistent, the presumption that the testator intended to comply with the law will compel that construction which is consistent with the law to be adopted.” (Page on Wills, sec, 465.)
Aside from this legal presumption, which we believe should apply in the present case as against any construction of the will tending to show an intention of the testator that the ordinary legal method of probating claims should be dispensed with, it must be remembered that the testator knows that the execution of his will in no way affects his control over his property. The dates of his will and of his death may be separated by a period of time more or less appreciable. In the meantime, as the testator well knows, he may acquire or dispose of property, pay or assume additional debts, etc. In the absence of anything to the contrary, it is only proper to presume that the testator, in his will, is treating of his estate at the time and in the condition it is in at his death. Especially is this true of his debts. Debts may accrue and be paid in whole or in part between the time the will is made and the death of the testator. To allow a debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the ground that such was the desire of the testator, when, in fact, the debt had been wholly or partly paid, would be not only unjust to the residuary heirs, but a reflection upon the good sense of the testator himself. Take the present case for example. It would be absurd to say that the testator knew what the amount of his just debts would be at a future and uncertain date. A mere comparison of the list of creditors of the testator and the amounts due them as described in his will, with the same list and the amounts allowed by the committee on claims, shows that the testator had creditors at the time of his death not mentioned in the will at all. In other instances the amounts due these creditors were either greater or less than the amounts mentioned as due them in the will. In fact, of those debts listed in the will, not a single one was allowed by the committee in the amount named in the will. This shows that the testator either failed to list in his will all his creditors and that, as to those he did include, he set down an erroneous amount opposite their names; or else, which is the only reasonable view of the matter, he overlooked some debts or contracted new ones after the will was made and that as to others he did include he made partial payments on some and incurred additional indebtedness as to others.
While the testator expresses the desire that his debts be paid, he also expressly leaves the residue of his estate, in equal parts, to his children. Is it to be presumed that he desired to overpay some of his creditors notwithstanding his express instructions that his own children should enjoy the net assets of his estate after the debts were paid? Again, is the net statement of the amount due some of his creditors and the omission altogether of some of his other creditors compatible with his honorable and commendable desire, so clearly expressed in his will, that all his debts be punctually paid? We cannot conceive that such conflicting ideas were present in the testator’s mind when he made his will.
Again, suppose the testator erroneously charged himself with a debt which he was under no legal or even moral obligation to pay. The present case suggests, if it does not actually present, such a state of affairs. Among the assets of the estate mentioned in the will is a parcel of land valued at P6,500; while in the inventory of the administratrix the right to repurchase this land from one Isidoro Santos is listed as an asset. Counsel for the administratrix alleges that he is prepared to prove that this is the identical plaintiff in the case at bar; that the testator erroneously claimed the fee of this land in his last will and stated Santos’ rights in the same as a mere debt due him of P5,000; that, in reality, the only asset of the testator in regard to this land was the value of the right to repurchase, while the ownership of the land, subject only to that right of redemption, belonged to Santos; that the right to repurchase this land expired in 1907, after the testator’s death. Assuming, without in the least asserting, that such are the underlying facts of this case, the unjust consequences of holding that a debt expressly mentioned in the will may be recovered without being presented to the committee on claims, is at once apparent. In this supposed case, plaintiff needed only wait until the time for redemption of the land had expired, when he would have acquired an absolute title to the land, and could also have exacted the redemption price. Upon such a state of facts, the one item of ?5,000 would be a mere fictitious debt, and as the total net value of the estate was less than p15,000, the legal portion of the testator’s children would be consumed in part in the payment of this item. Such a case cannot occur if the prescribed procedure is followed of requiring that such claims be visaed by the committee on claims.
“The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not mean that he shall pay them without probate. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the testator intended that his estate should be administered in any other than the regular way under the statute, which requires ‘all demands against the estates of deceased persons,’ ‘all such demands as may be exhibited,’ etc. The statute provides the very means for ascertaining whether the claims against the estate are just debts.” (Kaufman vs. Redwine, 97 Ark., 546.)
See also Collamore vs. Wilder (19 Kan., 67); O’Neil vs. Freeman (45 N. J. L., 208).
The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of personal property.
“When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the estate; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him.” (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
The sum of money prayed for in the complaint must be due the plaintiff either as a debt or a legacy. If it is a debt, the action was erroneously instituted against the administratrix. Is it a legacy? Plaintiff’s argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of error he alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is an asset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a testator’s leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as a legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.
Was it the intention of the testator to leave the plaintiff a legacy of P7,454? We have already touched upon this question. Plaintiff’s claim is described by the testator as a debt. It must be presumed that he used this expression in its ordinary and common acceptation; that is, a legal liability existing in favor of the plaintiff at the time the will was made, and demandable and payable in legal tender. Had the testator desired to leave a legacy to the plaintiff, he would have done so in appropriate language instead of including it in a statement of what he owed the plaintiff, the decedent’s purpose in listing his debts in his will is set forth in the fourth clause of the will, quoted above. There is nothing contained in that clause which indicates, even remotely, a desire to pay his creditors more than was legally due them.
“A construction leading to a legal, just and sensible result is presumed to be correct, as against one leading to an illegal, unnatural, or absurd effect.” (Rood on Wills, sec. 426.)
The testator, in so many words, left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to any other person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave plaintiff anything by way of a legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
But it is said that the plaintiff’s claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be correct then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all the debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.