[ G.R. No. 8223. March 04, 1914 ] 27 Phil. 18
[ G.R. No. 8223. March 04, 1914 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EVARISTO PAINAGA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by the Government from an order of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 1, and the sureties were notified on February 7 to produce the body of their principal. On February 28, the court issued the following order:
“The above-named defendant having been sentenced, and his sureties having been notified to produce his body before the court, and having failed to do so after due notice.
“It is ordered, That the defendant’s bond be forfeited and execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the defendant.”
Execution issued on March 5, property of the bondsmen was levied upon on March 13, and the sale was first advertised to take place on April 10, 1912. By various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally occurred on July 8, 1912, the Government being the purchaser. On July 10,1912, the principal was arrested by the secret service corps. Under date of July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties, set aside the order forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff & annul the sale of the property. It is these orders to which exceptions have been taken by the Government.
The question which first arises is, Did the execution sale occur on the date directed by the court? Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
“Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.”
The last postponement of the sale dated from June 24, 1912. If the court directed that the postponement be for two weeks, it is clear that the last day of the last extension of time was July 8, from 12 midnight to 12 midnight. (Art. 7, Civil Code.) So that, in order to allow a full two weeks from June 24, the sale should not have occurred until some time during July 9, at the earliest. The sale was postponed four times. The last two postponements were made by verbal orders of the court, the only evidence of the same in the record as to their import being the return of the sheriff. The return says:
“On June 21, 1912, under a verbal order of the court, the sale announced was suspended for another three days; wherefore, the sale was again announced for the 24th of said month of June at the same hour.
“On June 24, 1912, and under another verbal order of the court, the said sale was again suspended for some two weeks more, transferring it to the 8th of July, 1912, at 9 o’clock sharp in the morning.”
It is not here stated that the court allowed the sureties two weeks more of grace from June 24. Had it done so the sale, occurring as it did on July 8, occurred one day too soon. But it is distinctly said that the court appointed July 8 at 9 o’clock in the morning as the date of the sale. There is no question but that the court could grant an extension of time to the sureties of thirteen days or any other less period than two full weeks. We are of the opinion that the court in this last order, as in its first written order of postponement of the sale, dated May 24, merely fixed the new date of the sale at a future day, without attempting to compute the time thus allowed to the sureties; Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable where a given period of time must be added to a certain date in order to determine the date on which an act must be performed. But there is no necessity for such computation, and hence no room for the application of this section, when that date is fixed by name in the instrument directing the act to be performed. The court in the case at bar postponed the sale which was to have occurred on June 24. At the same time it directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. Section 4, has, therefore, no application to the present case, and the sale took place at the time designated by the order of the court.
“Upon a sale of real property, the purchaser shall be substituted to, and acquire all the right, interest, title, and claim of the judgment debtor thereto, subject to the right of redemption as hereinafter provided.” (Section 463, Code Civ. Proc.)
In this jurisdiction no confirmation of an ordinary execution sale of a judgment debtor’s property is required. Title vests in the purchaser when the sale is made, subject only to the right of redemption allowed under section 464. Thereafter, if the debtor would secure the return of his property, he must redeem it.
It is true that if there be some fatal defect in the proceedings the sale may be set aside. But unless some such defect be alleged and proven, it must stand. A judgment debtor cannot come into court and request nor can the court order without some valid reason, that the sale be set aside. In the case at bar, the court undertook to set the sale aside presumably because the principal had been arrested by the authorities on July 10, 1912. But his arrest on that date did not satisfy the conditions of the bond. If we look to the equities of the case, it will be seen that the court had already dealt most leniently with the sureties. Four times the court had postponed the execution sale. Whereas the bond allowed them thirty days after default to produce their principal, the sureties in this case were allowed more than four times that period. Clemency to the sureties must end somewhere if a bail bond is not to lose altogether its solemnity and become an object of derision. The arrest of the principal two days subsequent to the sale was no reason for setting the sale aside.
But it is said that the court had control over all of the proceedings in reference to the confiscation of the bond and the sale of the property, on July 13, when the orders appealed from were entered. The following paragraph in the order of August 19, denying the fiscal’s motion for a rehearing, is cited in support of this contention: Painaga “was eventually discovered in Manila and arrested for another offense. In the meantime the sale of property levied upon under execution had been made to the Government as a purchaser, and the suspension of the confiscation of the bond still existed, and the sureties asked that the sale be set aside as well as the confiscation of the bond.”
When the principal was arrested the property had been sold and the execution satisfied. Everything had then terminated except the right of the sureties to redeem the property within one year, if they desired to do so. The court seems to intimate in the above paragraph that the “suspension of the confiscation of the bond still existed” at the time the property was sold on July 8. But we find nothing in the record to support this theory. The order of confiscation was entered, as we have said, on February 28, after due notice to the sureties, and the sureties at no time asked that this order or judgment be disturbed. They only asked from time to time that the sale of the property be postponed, so there was no order in force on July 8 suspending either the sale or the enforcement of the judgment of February 28. Under these facts and circumstances, had the court lost control over its judgment of February 28, when it issued the orders appealed from on July 13? We think this question must be answered in the affirmative.
In the case of the United States vs. Bonoan (22 Phil. Rep., 1), it was held: “Under the provisions of section 76 of General Orders, No. 58, the following procedure in the forfeiture of bail bonds must be followed: (1) If the defendant fails or neglects to appear on any occasion when his presence is required by the court, or fails to surrender himself in execution of the judgment, an order forfeiting the bond or the deposit must be entered; (2) the court shall then notify the bondsmen and give them thirty days within which to present the body of their principal; (3) if the bondsmen do not present the defendant within the said thirty days and do not satisfactorily explain the reasons therefor, the court must then render judgment against the bondsmen for the amount represented in the bond.”
In the case at bar the procedure outlined in the above quotation was not strictly followed. The court in effect forfeited the bond and rendered judgment against the sureties at the same time, but this was not done until the lapse of twenty days after the sureties had been notified to present the body of their principal. The fact that the order of confiscation and judgment against the creditors were entered at the same time, and only twenty days after the sureties had been notified to present the body of their principal, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction of either the persons or the subject matter of the action. The sureties, at no time questioned the validity of the judgment or the procedure adopted. Neither did they note an exception or take any steps looking toward an appeal. In their motion asking the court to set aside the judgment and the sale of the property the sureties neither alleged fraud nor any irregularity or any matter which could /affect the validity of the proceedings. The only reason they gave was the fact that their principal had been arrested and was then in confinement serving the sentence, but his arrest did not take place until after the judgment had been satisfied by the sale of the property.
For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are reversed. The confiscation of the bond and the sale of the property must stand. No costs will be allowed in this instance.
Arellano, C. J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.