[ G.R. No. 8200. March 17, 1914 ] 27 Phil. 148
[ G.R. No. 8200. March 17, 1914 ]
LEONARDO LUCIDO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GELASIO CALUPITAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
TRENT, J.:
In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly sold at an execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the next day transferred a one-half interest in the property to Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed and signed by all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights and obligations pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan for the amount of the purchase price together with 1 per cent per month interest thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687 Mexican dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest. It will be observed that the computation of the transfer price is in accordance with section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and Calupitan executed the following: document:
“I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered this instrument to Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to witness that his lands, which appear in the instrument I hold from the deputy sheriff and for which he has accepted money from me, I have ceded to him all the irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase all said lands from me (not only the irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the five-lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two wall tables, and a marble table; no coconut tree on said irrigated land is included. Apart from this, our real agreement is to permit three (3) whole years to elapse, reckoned from the date of this instrument, which has been drawn up in duplicate, before he may redeem or repurchase them from me.”
The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to conventional redemption set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code. The present action not having been instituted until February 17, 1910, the further question arose as to whether the redemption period had expired, which the lower court decided in the negative. The lower court further found as a fact that Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the redemption price to the defendant, who refused it, and that this offer was a sufficient compliance with article 1518 of the Civil Code. The decision of the lower court was that the property in question should be returned to the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed, and all three of the above rulings of the court are assigned as errors.
- Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court upon the first question, if the document executed by the execution purchasers and the parties to this action stood alone. In that document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and obligations are denned in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the property sold, subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the judgment debtor or a redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale. (Sees. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of the transaction between the parties, however, the intervention of Lucido in the transfer would be wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as an interested party is at least some indication that the parties intended something more or different by the document in question than a simple assignment of the rights and obligations of the execution purchasers to a third person.
Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transact tion is removed by the agreement entered into between Lucido and Calupitan on the same day. In this document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem the property is preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The right to repurchase must necessarily imply a former ownership of the property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right to conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was at the time acting as his own attorney.
Jones on Evidence (sees. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were not in harmony on the point, says:
“Many of the cases holding that pleadings were inadmissible ad admissions were based on the theory that most of the allegations were merely pleader’s matter—fiction statedly counsel and sanctioned by the courts; The whole modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has authorized it.
“On the same principle where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in evidence.”
In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he furnished $120 Mexican of the amount necessary to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. It therefore appears beyond dispute that the redemption of the property from the execution purchasers was made by the plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant Calupitan, who took possesion of the major portion of the land as his security for its redemption, The ruling of the lower court that the transaction between Lucido and Calupitan was one of purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore correct.
By the terms of his agreement with Calupitan the plaintiff could not exercise his right to redeem the property within three years from March 30, 1903; and the lower court arrived at the date upon which the right to redeem expired by computing four years from March 30, 1906, on the ground that there was no express agreement as to how long the right to repurchase, once available, should continue. Counsel for the appellant admits in his brief that the complaint was filed forty-three days before the expiration of this period. In accordance with our decision in Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), we hold that this ruling of the court was correct.
The court Held that the plaintiff had actually tendered the redemption price to the defendant Calupitan. After an examination of the evidence of record as to-this finding of fact, we concur therein. We discussed the legal sufficiency of such a tender in the above-cited case of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza, and held that it was sufficient. This assignment of error must therefore be held to be unfounded.
The defendants Oreta and Bueno have no interest in the subject matter of this action. It appears that the defendant Dorado purchased the land from his codefendant Calupitan subsequent to the tender of the redemption price to the latter by the plaintiff. It does not appear that the property was ever registered by any one, nor was the document of sale with the right to repurchase registered by either Calupitan or Lucido. No evidence of the purchase of the land from Calupitan by Dorado is of record with the exception of the oral testimony although it may be taken as established that such a sale actually took place, since all the parties interested agree on this point. Dorado himself testified that he purchased the property with the knowledge that Calupitan had purchased the property from Lucido subject to the right of redemption, and insists that he purchased with the knowledge and consent of Lucido. Lucido denies that he was aware of the sale to Dorado until after it had taken place. Upon this state of facts, it is clear that the following provisions of article 1510 of the Civil Code are applicable:
“The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose right arises from that of the vendee, even though in the second contract no mention should have been made of the conventional redemption; without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons.”
The provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons are clearly not applicable to Dorado. (Manresa, vol. 10, p. 317.)
- The lower court ordered the redelivery of the land to the plaintiff upon his payment to Calupitan of P1,600, plus the costs entailed in the execution of the document of repurchase. The amount paid to the purchasers at the execution sale for the redemption of the property was $1,720.74 Mexican. Of this amount the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan the balance of $1,600.74 Mexican. No amount is fixed in the document of purchase and sale above set forth, but the amount borrowed from Calupitan to redeem the land from the execution sale being thus clearly established no objection can be or is made to the plaintiff’s paying this amount. In ordering the payment of this amount to the defendant the lower court failed to reduce it to Philippine currency. On this appeal plaintiff alleges that this amount in Mexican currency exceeds the amount he actually owes to the. defendant by about P100, but that rather than spend the time and incur the expense attendant to a new trial for the purpose of determining the equivalent of this amount in Philippine currency he is agreeable to pay the defendant P1,600.74 Philippine currency, as the redemption price of the property. In view of this offer and in case it is accepted by the defendant it will be unnecessary to go through the formality of a new trial for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the redemption price in Philippine currency. In view of the fact that it is claimed that Calupitan has sold the land in question to his codefendant, Macario Dorado, and it not clearly appearing to whom the plaintiff should pay the P1,600.74, we think this amount should be turned over to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna to be held by him until it is determined in the proper manner who is the owner of this amount, Calupitan or Dorado.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants Calupitan and Dorado to deliver the possession of the land in question to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff’s depositing with the clerk of the court the sum of P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner above set forth. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellants Calupitan and Dorado.
Arellano, C. J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.