[ G.R. Nos. 7257 and 7258. October 08, 1913 ] 25 Phil. 414
[ G.R. Nos. 7257 and 7258. October 08, 1913 ]
LEONARDO LUCIDO AND ROMAN LUCIDO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ROMUALDO VITA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
JOHNSON, J.:
Each of these actions was originally commenced in the court of the justice of the peace of the pueblo of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna. The first (No. 7257) was an action of forcible entry and detainers The second (No. 7258) was an action to recover a sum of money due from the defendant to the plaintiffs for the use and occupation of the same lands involved in the first action (No. 7257). Each of said actions was commenced and prosecuted separately in the court of the said justice of the peace, as well as in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna. In each case the judgment of the justice of the peace upon a demurrer was in favor of the defendant. In each case the judgment of the Court of First Instance was in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant is the appellant in each of said causes in this court. In the Supreme Court said causes, by reason of their intimate relation, have been heard and discussed together. We can see no reason why, in view of the questions presented, the facts and the law relating to each cause may not be discussed in the same decision. It may be noted that the complaints which constituted the basis of the actions in the court of the justice of the peace also constituted the basis of the plaintiffs’ actions in the Court of First Instance. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint in the first cause (No. 7257) the following facts:
“I. Plaintiffs and defendant are both residents of the municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna, Philippine Islands. “II. The plaintiffs are the owners of each and all of the following parcels situated in said municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, P. I.:” [Here follows a technical description of the lands in question.] “III. The plaintiff has been in possession of each and all of said parcels of land as lessee from January 5, 1892, to date, under the condition expressly stipulated that he would pay therefor as semiannual rent the sum of 48 pesos three and a half reales Mexican currency, equal and equivalent to the sum of P48.44 Philippine currency, payable at the end of each half year. “IV. The defendant lessee has not paid the rent due on said parcels of land from February 5, 1892, to January 5, 1904, despite the demands made upon him, wherefore the plaintiff Leonardo Lucido instituted in this court an action for dispossession against the defendant in February of said year, said action having been terminated by and in virtue of a compromise between said parties, set forth in the records of the justice of the peace court as follows:
" ‘In the justice of the peace court of Nagcarlan, March 2, 1904; the parties to this suit being present, the justice of the peace called for the plaintiff, who stated that he affirmed the complaint in all its parts and begged the court to proceed to trial and to render judgment in his favor for the remedies requested in his complaint. Being informed thereof, the defendant answered that he had not refused to pay the corresponding rent, as to Manuel Lucido in his lifetime, part of the sum leased as also to Roman España other sums for the same reason and finally I paid once to Mariano Manas a sum of twenty-five pesos on account, said Manas being the authorized agent of the present plaintiff Leonardo Lucido and for this reason I beg the court, as well as the plaintiff, not to take away from me the lands I hold on lease, for whatever be the sum resulting from the settlement I am ready to have made, I promise to pay four hundred pesos until the 10th of the present month of March, 1904, and hereafter a hundred pesos at the end of each month in case I should owe a larger sum. The plaintiff agreed to all the defendant said and proposed to the court that for determination and examination of the instruments of payment mentioned by the defendant for calculation of the sum that he owed on account of the lease a commission be appointed of two persons, one for each party, naming Camilo Lirio, a resident of this town. Being informed thereof, the defendant on his part named Agripino Viriña. In such condition this case was declared closed, with the costs against both parties and they signed to which I certify.
(Sgd.) " ‘PEDRO SUEZA, " ‘Auxiliary Justice of the Peace.
" ‘For the plaintiff:
(Sgd.) " ‘FLORENCIO MANALO. (Sgd.) " ‘ROMUALDO VITA.’
“V. The defendant has not complied with his obligation to pay the sum of four hundred pesos (P400) on March 10, 1904, as he promised in the foregoing compromise, nor has he at any time and up to date paid it, in spite of the due demands that have been repeatedly made upon him. “VI. Settlement of the plaintiff’s debt for rent due from January 5, 1892, up to January 5, 1904, is still pending and will in any event be the subject of another action. “VII. Nor has the defendant paid, either wholly or partially, the rent due for lease of said nine parcels of land from January 5 of the present year, 1910, being twelve semiannual payments due amounting to five hundred and eighty-one pesos and twenty-eight centavos (P581.28) Philippine currency, in spite of the friendly and repeated demands made upon him and in spite of the fact that over three days have elapsed since the last demand duly made upon him. ‘VIII. In view of the foregoing facts, on the eleventh of the present month, the plaintiffs demanded of the defendant that he immediately vacate the nine parcels of land above described and deliver them without loss of time to the plaintiffs, considering the lease terminated from that time, if he had not already done so, with the notice that if he did not do this he would be sued for a thousand pesos (Pl,000) a year from January 5, 1910, in the corresponding action for continued occupation and for losses and damages, but still said defendant refused to do so. “IX. The plaintiffs will annually suffer losses and damages by the defendant’s retention of said nine parcels of land, until the same are finally delivered to them. “Therefore, the plaintiffs beg the court, after due proceedings, to render judgment in their favor and against the defendant: (1) Decreeing dispossession and removal from each and all of the nine parcels of land above described by the defendant and restitution of each and all of them to the plaintiffs, for failure in payment of rent due and also for illegal detainer thereof; (2) sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of four hundred pesos (P400) Philippine currency, to which he obligated himself in the compromise of March 4, 1904, with legal interest from the 11th of said month of March, 1904, when he became delinquent; (3) sentencing the defendant to pay the rent due for the twelve six-month periods that have passed since January 5, 1904, up to January 5, 1910, that is, the sum of five hundred and eighty-one pesos and twenty-eight centavos (P581.28) Philippine currency, with interest from the date of the filing of this complaint; (4) sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of a thousand pesos (P1,000) a year from January 5, 1910, until restitution be made to the plaintiffs, or the proportional part for the time elapsed, for losses and damages; and (5) sentencing the defendant to pay the costs of the present suit. “The plaintiff further asks the court for any other remedy in his favor that may be proper in equity and justice. “Manila, for Laguna, P. I., March 15, 1910.”
In the second cause (No. 7258) the plaintiffs alleged as the basis of their right the following facts:
“I. The plaintiffs and the defendant are both residents of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna, P. I. “II. The plaintiffs are the owners of nine (9) parcels of land, five situated in the barrio of Ibabang, Balinakon, and four on the barrio of Oples, of this Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, P. I., the respective descriptions whereof need not be entered in this complaint for the purposes of this suit, which the defendant has occupied and possessed as lessee from January 5, 1892, up to January 5,1904, under the expressly stipulated condition that he would pay as semiannual rent for the said nine parcels of land the sum of 48 pesos and three and a half reales Mexican currency, equal and equivalent to the sum of P48.44 Philippine currency. “III. The defendant has not paid the rent due during said lapse of time, amounting to the sum of P1,162.56 Philippine currency, with the exception of the sums of P25, P50, and P300, more or less, receipts having been issued to him, which he paid on account of his debt because of said rent, for which reason the plaintiff, Leonardo Lucido, for himself and on behalf of his brother, the other plaintiff, Roman Lucido, had to file suit for dispossession against the defendant in this court on February 13, 1904, the matter having been terminated by virtue of a compromise between the parties, drawn up in the following terms:” [Same as the compromise appearing in Clause IV of the complaint in case No. 7257, ante.] “IV. The defendant, although duly invited and requested by the plaintiffs and by the commission appointed in the compromise above quoted, refused to concur in the settlement of his debt, alleging that he had nothing to settle and that he had paid everything, when in fact he is still in debt to the plaintiffs for the rent of said nine parcels of land and said settlement is still pending, and because of this refusal of the defendant the commission resigned. “V. If a settlement should be made by the parties in the sense above set forth, the following result would appear:
Credit
Debit
Rent due for the six-month periods included between the dates January 5, 1892, and January 6, 1904, at M8.44 each.
P1,102.56
Payments on account, with receipts issued to the defendant
P25.00 50.00 300.00
Amount promised for March 10,1904, which is not yet paid but which is now the subject matter of a separate suit betwen the parties
400.00
775.00
Balance in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
387.56
“VI. The defendant has not paid said balance, or any part thereof, either in the form of monthly installments of P100, which he promised in the compromise above quoted, or in any other way, in spite of the friendly and repeated demands duly made. “Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully beg the court, after due proceedings, to render judgment in their favor and against the defendant, declaring an account and settlement between them and sentencing said defendant to pay the plaintiffs the balance of P387.561 Philippine currency, or the amount that appears against him, with legal interest from the date of the filing of this complaint, at one time or in monthly installments of P100, and the costs of the case. The plaintiffs further ask the court for any other remedy in equity and justice. “Nagcarlan, Laguna, P. I., April 5, 1910.
(Sgd.) “RAMON DIOKNO, “Attorney for the Plaintiffs.”
To the first complaint (No. 7257) the defendant demurred, alleging that the justice of the peace was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions involved in said complaint. To the complaint in the second cause (No. 7258) the defendant demurred, alleging that there was another action pending between the same parties, for the same cause. Each of the said demurrers was sustained by the justice of the peace. The first was sustained upon the ground that more than one year had elapsed since the alleged illegal detention of the property in question had begun, and that, therefore, the question presented was one over which the Court of First Instance had original jurisdiction. The second was sustained upon the ground that another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause. The justice of the peace dismissed each of said causes, without giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints. From said decisions the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs again used as the basis of their right to recover against the defendant the complaints which had been presented in the court of the justice of the peace. In the Court of First Instance the defendant again renewed his demurrers to said complaints, basing them upon substantially the same ground as in the court of the justice of the peace. Upon a consideration of said demurrers, the Honorable Vicente Jocson, judge, overruled each of them and ordered the defendant to answer, within a period of five days. Within the time fixed, the defendant presented his answer, and the respective causes were set down for hearing upon their merits. After hearing the proof, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, judge, rendered a decision substantially granting the prayer of the plaintiffs in each complaint. From each of said decisions the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and made the following assignments of error:
“I. The Court of First Instance lacks jurisdiction to try this case on appeal. “II. The contention raised in this case has previously been decided and consequently the plaintiffs and appellants cannot again raise it herein. “III. The contracts set forth in Exhibits A and B of the plaintiffs, while they do partake of the form of a sale with right to repurchase, with a lease annexed, in reality express nothing more than a loan with guaranty. “IV. The court erred in not declaring that the appellant had wholly paid the P500, with interest, the amount of the loan made to him by Manuel Lucido, father of the appellees. “V. The court erred in declaring in its judgment that the appellant cannot allege and prove that the lease set forth in Exhibit A is simulated, because the estoppels in Nos. 1 and 2 of section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure operate against it.”
The appellant, in his first assignment of error, contends that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try said actions on appeal. The appellant, in a very interesting argument, contends that the action should have been originally commenced in the Court of First Instance; that the Court of First Instance had original jurisdiction over the questions presented in the complaints; that the illegal detention had continued for more than one year; that the justice of the peace was without jurisdiction; that the Court of First Instance could acquire no jurisdiction on appeal of an action originally commenced in the court of the justice of the peace, when the latter had no jurisdiction to try the questions presented and when the question of jurisdiction had been properly and timely raised in the lower court and continued on appeal. In other words, the appellant contends that inasmuch as the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction over the questions presented and an objection had been timely made to his jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance could acquire no jurisdiction, on appeal, to try said causes upon their merits, if the question of jurisdiction was properly raised in the latter court. The following propositions have been settled by this court: That courts of justices of the peace have no jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in forcible entry and detainer when more than one year has expired from the commencement of the illegal detention. See section 80 of Act No. 190, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1778; Alonso vs. Municipality of Placer (5 Phil. Rep., 71); Ledesma vs. Marcos (9 Phil. Rep., 618); Roman Catholic Church vs. Familiar (11 Phil. Rep., 310); Gutierrez vs. Rosario (15 Phil. Rep., 116). That Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction in actions to recover the possession of real property illegally detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of ownership of such property is also involved. In other words, if the party illegally dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal dispossession, as well as that of the ownership over the property, he may commence such action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he desires to raise the question of illegal possession only, Courts of First Instance do not have original jurisdiction in such a case until after the expiration of one year from the date of the illegal dispossession. The courts of justices of the peace have exclusive original jurisdiction in such cases until after one year has expired after the illegal detention. See section 80 of Act No. 190, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1778; Alonso vs. Municipality of Placer (5 Phil. Rep., 71); Ledesma vs. Marcos (9 Phil. Rep., 618). If an action is commenced in the court of the justice of the peace and that court has no jurisdiction over such action, and the question of jurisdiction is properly and timely raised, the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over such an action on appeal, except to determine whether or not the court of the justice of the peace had jurisdiction, provided the question of jurisdiction is properly raised. (U. S. vs. Ang Suyco, 17 Phil. Rep., 92; Carroll vs. Paredes, 17 Phil. Rep., 94; Davis vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. Rep., 168; U. S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. Rep., 265.) On appeal from the justice of the peace, the appellate court has only such jurisdiction as the justice of the peace had. If the latter had no jurisdiction, the appellate court acquires none by the appeal, provided the jurisdiction of the lower court is put in question in both the lower court and on appeal. (U. S. vs. Bernardo, supra.)In view of the foregoing propositions it becomes necessary, with reference to the first assignment of error, to determine, whether or not the justice of the peace had jurisdiction to try and determine the questions presented by the complaints. The question of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace was properly and timely raised by demurrer. The justice of the peace reached the conclusion that he did not have jurisdiction to try said causes. He held that the first action (7257) had not been commenced within one year after the alleged illegal possession and that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. He held with reference to the second (7258) that the illegal possession of a tenant begins from the date of his failure to pay the stipulated rents, and that, inasmuch as a number of years had expired without the payment of the stipulated rents, he had no jurisdiction over said cause. With that conclusion of the justice of the peace we cannot agree. It is true that the landlord might, upon the failure of the tenant to pay the stipulated rents, consider the contract broken and demand immediate possession of the rented property, thus converting a legal possession into an illegal possession. Upon the other hand, however, the landlord might conclude to give the tenant credit for the payment of the rents and allow him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the property. In other words, the landlord might choose to give the tenant credit from month to month or from year to year for the payment of the rent, relying upon his honesty or his financial ability to pay the same. During such period the tenant.would not be in illegal possession of the property and the landlord could not maintain an action of desahucio until after he had taken steps to convert the legal possession into an illegal possession. A mere failure to pay the rent in accordance with the contract would justify the landlord, after the legal notice, in bringing an action of desahucio. The landlord might, however, elect to recognize the contract as still in force and sue for the sums due under it. It would seem to be clear that the landlord might sue for the rents due and unpaid, without electing to terminate the contract of tenancy. Whether he can declare the contract of tenancy broken and sue in an action of desahucio for the possession of the property and in a separate action for the rents due and damages, etc., Quaere. (Secs. 80 and 84, Act No. 190, amended by Act No. 1778.) In the present cases it appears that the defendant had been in possession of the property under a contract since the year 1892. In the month of March, 1904, the plaintiffs commenced an action to eject the defendant from the possession of said property. By said action the plaintiffs evidently intended to treat the possession of the defendant as an illegal possession. It did not have that effect, however, for the reason that said parties entered into a compromise agreement, by virtue of which the defendant continued in the legal possession of said property. So far as the allegations in the complaints are concerned, there is nothing which shows that the defendant was in the illegal possession of the property, until on or about the 11th day of March 1910, when the plaintiffs, by virtue of the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 1778, gave the defendant the notice required by law, toturn over to them the immediate possession of the property. So far as the complaints show the defendant had been in the legal possession of the property up to and including the time of the notice of March 11, 1910. The action of desahucio was commenced by the plaintiffs on the 15th of March, 1910. The illegal possession of the defendant commenced at the time of the notice of March 11, 1910. It is clear, therefore, that the year provided by law within which the action must be brought, if brought before the justice of the peace, had not expired and the justice of the peace had jurisdiction to try the questions presented. The justice of the peace committed an error in sustaining the demurrer and in holding that he was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions presented by the complaints. From the judgment of the justice of the peace the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the same complaints were presented which had been presented in the court of the justice of the peace and the question of jurisdiction was again raised. Upon the issue thus presented, the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction only to determine whether or not the justice of the peace had jurisdiction in said cause. Instead of determining that question alone, the Court of First Instance decided that it had jurisdiction and ordered the defendant to answer, and proceeded to hear the causes upon their merits. From the final judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed. Section 16 of Act No. 1627 provides that a judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance, on an appeal from a judgment of the justice of the peace, shall be final and conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or a municipal ordinance. Notwithstanding the separate provisions made for an appeal in desahucio cases in section 2 of Act No. 1778, we have decided in the cases of Priolo vs. Priolo (9 Phil. Rep., 566) and Aragon vs. Araullo (11 Phil. Rep., 7) that appeals in the third instance can no longer be resorted to, except in the cases expressly provided for in section 16 of Act No. 1627. Said appeals to this court constitute the third instance. No question of the validity or constitutionality of a statute or a municipal ordinance is presented. Our conclusions are, therefore: That the justice of the peace committed an error in holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the questions presented in the complaint, in cause No. 7257. One year had not elapsed after the illegal detention began. That the Court of First Instance committed an error, after determining that the justice of the. peace had jurisdiction, in not returning the cause for trial upon its merits. The plaintiffs, under the law, had a right to have the question tried by the justice of the peace. That this Court is without authority to decide the cases upon their merits.In view of the conclusions which we have reached under the first assignment of error, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the others or to analyze the very interesting argument presented by the appellee in his brief. Considering, therefore, that the justice of the peace has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the questions presented in the present case, and considering that the parties have a right, under the law, to have the present case tried upon its merits by the justice of the peace, it is hereby ordered that the present appeal be dismissed, without any finding as to costs in any of the instances, with direction that the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance and that said court is hereby directed to issue an order directing the return of the present cause to the justice of the peace, and that said justice of the peace be directed to proceed to try the cause upon its merits. Arellano, C. J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.