[ G.R. No. 7211. August 25, 1913 ] 25 Phil. 116
[ G.R. No. 7211. August 25, 1913 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TAN YAK, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
CARSON, J.:
The appellant in this case was arrested upon a warrant based upon a sworn complaint filed by the collector of customs of the port of Zamboanga, charging that he is a Chinese laborer, “found within the Philippine Islands” without the certificate of registration prescribed for such persons under the provisions of Act No. 702 of the Philippine Commission. In pursuance of the proceedings for the deportation of Chinese laborers found without such certificate, as set forth in that Act, he was brought before the judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, who ordered his deportation. From the order of deportation this appeal was perfected, substantially in the manner prescribed for appeals in criminal cases, but the evidence upon which the trial judge based his order of deportation, if any such evidence was in fact submitted to him, does not appear to have been reduced to writing, and, whether it was or was not so reduced to writing, has not been brought here on appeal. Counsel for the appellant, who appears to think that the proceedings looking to the deportation of a Chinese laborer had under and by virtue of Act No. 702 constitute a criminal action, insist that throughout the proceedings the appellant was deprived of various constitutional rights enumerated in his brief. Doubtless counsel’s contentions would have to be sustained if his assumption that the appellant was entitled to the rights and privileges of an accused person in a criminal action was well founded. But it has frequently been decided that deportation proceedings are not criminal in their nature, so as to give to the defendant the rights and privileges of one accused of the commission of a crime. (U. S. vs. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil. Rep., 490; U. S. vs. Hung Chang, 134 Fed. Rep., 19, and cases there cited; Nishimura Ekiu vs. U. S., 142 U. S., 651; Fong Yue Ting vs. U. S., 149 U. S., 698; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S., 86.) There is, however, one defect in the proceedings, to which counsel invites our attention, which justifies and necessitates the reversal of the order issued by the trial judge, and the return of the record for a new trial. No record of the evidence submitted in the court below has been brought here, and it is impossible for us, therefore, to review the findings of the trial judge, or to render a judgment either affirming or reversing the judgment based thereon. Ordinarily, in accordance with the practice adopted in this court, we would, under such circumstances, issue appropriate orders for the completion of the record by uniting thereto a certified copy of the evidence taken at the hearing in the court below. But it is very clear that the issuance of such orders in the case at bar would be a vain formality, as the record clearly discloses that if any evidence was in fact submitted at the hearing, no written record thereof was preserved. The Solicitor-General in his brief admits or rather asserts “that no notes of the testimony were taken in the court below,” and we are satisfied not only from his admission, but from a careful review of the whole record brought before us, that if any testimony was in fact taken, it was not reduced to writing, and that it cannot therefore be certified to this court for review in accordance with the practice in this jurisdiction. In the discussion of this case in the body of the court, a number of questions were raised as to the proper procedure in appeals in cases of this kind. Questions arose as to the right of the defendant in deportation proceedings to an appeal to this court; as to whether if the right to appeal exists, the record should be brought here by bill of exceptions, or by an appeal perfected as was that in the case at bar; as to whose duty it is to bring up the written evidence in cases of this kind; and as to whether, in any event, this court is charged with the review of the evidence taken at the hearing in the court below, for the purpose of determining whether the facts as found by the trial judge are or are not supported by the evidence. We may admit at once that the provisions of Act No. 702 touching deportation proceedings are so incomplete as to render it necessary in determining the proper steps to be adopted in a given case to look for guidance to the general rules of practice and procedure as prescribed by law and followed in this jurisdiction, having in mind the nature of the proceedings and the purpose and object for which, under the law, these proceedings may be instituted. In the case of the United States vs. Lee Chiao (23 Phil. Rep., 543) we pointed out that while this Act (No. 702) provides for the making of the arrest of the persons who may be made parties defendant in deportation proceedings, “there is no provision whatever relating to the sworn complaint upon which the warrant of arrest may be issued” or as to the persons who may make, the sworn complaint. Nevertheless, this court, by a unanimous vote, declared that such a complaint must be presented, and at the same time, it definitely determined the persons who are authorized to present it. As will be seen by an examination of that decision, we arrived at our conclusions in that case from a consideration of the very nature of the proceedings, and of the purpose and intent of Congress in authorizing the local Legislature to make provision for such proceedings. In like manner, in the case at bar, it becomes necessary to supply the deficiencies or omissions of the Act, touching the manner in which the testimony is to be taken and appeals perfected from orders of deportation issued in the Courts of First Instance. Section 18 of Act No. 136, by virtue of which the courts in these Islands were organized, provides that:
“The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of all actions and special proceedings properly brought to it from Courts of First Instance, and from other tribunals from whose judgment the law shall specially provide an appeal to the Supreme Court.”
The proceedings had in deportation cases are special proceedings in Courts of First Instance, and since there is no provision giving to those courts exclusive jurisdiction and expressly denying the right of appeal, there can be no doubt that this court has appellate jurisdiction over all such proceedings when properly brought before it. There is nothing in the statute (Act No. 702) which would indicate the intention of the Legislature to deprive this court of appellate jurisdiction in proceedings of this nature. It is true that the statute does not specifically prescribe the form in which the appeal should be perfected; but in the absence of clear and unmistakable language, such as that used in connection with election contest proceedings in the statute providing therefor, such an omission falls far short of being sufficient to deprive this court of its general appellate jurisdiction, conferred in general terms in the Organic Act, No. 136. Having arrived at the conclusion that this court has appellate jurisdiction over these proceedings (which, indeed is not seriously questioned), the next question for consideration is the mode whereby they are to be brought to this court for review. The cases which have been brought before us heretofore, both on appeal by the defendants and by the Government, have come here substantially in the manner prescribed in criminal cases, that is to say by the certification of the whole record in the court below to this court for review. But it is contended that since these deportation proceedings are not in fact criminal proceedings, they should be brought here by bills of exception in the manner and form prescribed for civil actions in the Code of Civil Procedure. We cannot agree with this contention. While it is true that it has been repeatedly held by the Federal courts of the United States and by this court that deportation proceedings are not criminal actions, it must also be remembered that they are not ordinary civil actions in the sense in which that word is used in those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribing the procedure in the court below and the steps whereby such actions are brought to this court for review by bills of exception. They are rather in the nature of special administrative investigations instituted and conducted by the Government with a view to ascertain whether under the law one alleged to be a Chinese laborer, residing within the Islands, is or is not entitled to remain there under the law, wherein a judicial hearing is provided for the ascertainment of certain facts, upon which under the Act of Congress an order of deportation may be based. And while the submission of the proceedings in this manner to the judicial power has all the essential “elements of a civil case—a complainant, a defendant, and a judge—actor, reus et judex” nevertheless it is very clear that under the statute, the hearing may be had without regard to the technical formalities prescribed in the case of the actions and special proceedings contemplated in the code. (Fong Yue Ting vs. U. S., 149 U. S., 698, 730, 731.) Act No. 702 provides only the merest skeleton of a form of procedure, and provided an opportunity to be heard is furnished the defendant and provided a trial is had according to some form of judicial proceeding capable of developing the facts so that judgment can be rendered thereon in the court below and so that the proceedings can be reviewed by this court on appeal, it is very evident that the legislator did not intend that the trial judge should be hampered with the rules of procedure laid down in the Civil Code for the conduct of ordinary civil actions. (The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S., 86.) It follows, we think, that it could not have been and was not the intention of the legislator to require appeals in these proceedings to follow the course prescribed in ordinary civil actions, since the mode prescribed in the code for the bringing of such actions to this court on bills of exception would necessarily involve the strict or at least a substantial adherence in the course of the hearing to the procedure laid down in the code in ordinary actions. Holding as we do that this court has appellate jurisdiction over hearings of this nature, and the method prescribed in the code whereby ordinary civil actions are brought to this court not being applicable, it would be our duty, under the authority of section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to prescribe if necessary the method whereby our appellate jurisdiction may be invoked in these cases; and no simpler or more direct method could well be devised than that actually adopted in this case, that is to say, the certification by the clerks of the Courts of First Instance of the whole record to his court in any case wherein one or other of the parties announces his desire to appeal. But we do not deem it necessary formally to prescribe a rule for these cases, because (1) the method adopted in the case at bar is the uniform method heretofore adopted, both by the Government and the defendants, in all cases of this character which have come before us heretofore, so that the procedure may be practically regarded as settled in practice, and because (2) we are well satisfied that it was the intention of the legislator that these cases should come up to this court in the form adopted in the case at bar, which is the form prescribed in criminal actions, and, we may add, substantially the form whereby all judicial proceedings were required by law to be brought up on appeal (en ambos efectos) under the law in force prior to the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, At the time when Act No. 702 was enacted, judicial proceedings in Courts of First Instance were brought here for review either in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or in accordance with the provisions of General Orders, No. 58, prescribing the procedure on appeal in criminal cases. As we have seen, the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable to the deportation proceedings authorized in Act No. 702. It would seem, therefore, that the legislator either wholly neglected to provide an appropriate mode of procedure on appeal in such cases or that he anticipated and expected that the form prescribed in criminal cases would be adopted. We are satisfied, as we have said, that the legislator did not intend to deprive this court of its appellate jurisdiction in these cases, and we think we may fairly conclude that he intended that the appellate procedure prescribed in criminal cases would be followed. The procedure adopted in deportation proceedings is strikingly similar in general outline to the procedure in ordinary criminal cases. They are instituted on a sworn complaint filed by certain specified Government officials. This is followed by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the arrest and detention of the defendant. Then follows the judicial hearing and the judgment of the court ordering the deportation of the defendant. True, the proceeding is essentially a civil case in its nature, and the defendant is not entitled to the constitutional safeguards thrown around one who is charged with the commission of a crime (save only that the facts must be ascertained in the course of an orderly judicial hearing, wherein he has the right to an opportunity to be heard before judgment is pronounced); but it is molded in a form so nearly assimilated in its skeleton outline to that prescribed in criminal cases that we think we may fairly hold (in the absence of any other prescribed form of procedure on appeal) that the appropriate procedure in bringing the case to this court on appeal, and the procedure contemplated by the Legislature, is the procedure prescribed in criminal cases. And that procedure having been adopted in practice, and no other procedure suitable to the nature of the proceedings having been prescribed, we conclude that we would not be justified in dismissing this appeal on the ground that it has not been properly brought before us. In regard to the question as to whether it is the duty of the trial courts to take in writing the evidence on which their findings of fact are based in deportation proceedings we think there can be no doubt. In all other proceedings in the Courts of First Instance the evidence is required to be taken in writing, and no reason can be suggested for the adoption of a different rule in deportation proceedings. Indeed, it is absolutely essential that the testimony should be taken in writing, because unless it is so taken, it would be impossible for this court to review the evidence in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Under no mode of procedure authorized or adopted in practice in these Islands is it possible for this court to review the findings of fact made by the trial judge, unless the evidence is taken in writing in the court below. To hold that the trial judge in proceedings of this nature may go forward hearing testimony, without having such testimony reduced to writing either in longhand or in stenographic notes, would be tantamount to placing it in his power to deprive this court of the appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in the court below, which is secured to it in Act No. 136. It may be proper to add, however, that of course this rule has no application in a case where, under the terms of the statute, judgment is rendered in default when the defendant admits the jurisdictional facts and offers no evidence in rebuttal of the presumption that he is a Chinese laborer. We think that the duty of bringing up the evidence in cases of this kind clearly rests upon the Government. The proceedings are instituted and conducted by the Government. At the very outset, the defendant is arrested and he is held in detention awaiting the final action of the court. The hearing had in the Court of First Instance is summary in the extreme. These courts are all provided with official stenographers, who receive a fixed monthly salary. In practice, these stenographers are required to take down in shorthand the testimony of all witnesses called to testify in those courts. It would seem that under such circumstances, the duty of certifying the evidence together with the rest of the record up to this court, upon appeal, would normally and naturally fall upon the clerk. In appeals in criminal cases this is the uniform practice, and no reason suggests itself why it should not be followed in proceedings of this nature. Strong and indeed compelling reasons forbid the imposition upon the defendant of the burden of expense which he would be compelled to bear were he required to bring the evidence up on appeal. The imposition of such a burden would practically amount in many if not in most cases of this kind to a denial of the right of appeal. In the absence of express statutory requirement to the contrary, we think that sound practice and the natural course of procedure in the courts of these Islands impose the duty on the Government, through its clerks and official stenographers, to preserve in writing and to certify the testimony taken in deportation cases to this court for review in any case where an appeal is duly perfected. What has been said practically disposes of the question of the duty and the jurisdiction of this court to review the evidence taken in the court below. Under the procedural system in force in these Islands, which does not contemplate or provide for jury trials, an appeal wherein the appellant could be denied the right to have the findings upon the evidence reviewed by this court would be an anomaly indeed. Having arrived at the conclusion that the defendant in deportation cases is entitled as of right to an appeal, it follows as of course, that if he so desires, this court will review the evidence upon which the findings of fact by the trial judge are based. In conclusion, it may be well to point out that nothing we have said in this opinion should be understood as a denial on our part of the right of the legislator to deny, or to qualify in any way he sees fit, the right of appeal in deportation proceedings. Indeed, we do not question the power of the legislator, should he see fit so to do, to place the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts involved in deportation cases in boards specially constituted for that purpose (similar to those charged with like duties under the immigration laws where an alien is seeking.to enter the country), and thus altogether to deny jurisdiction over such cases to the ordinary courts of the country. (Nishimura Ekiu vs. U. S., 142 U. S., 651.) Our rulings in this case go no further in this regard than to hold that the legislator having seen fit to intrust the determination of the facts in deportation cases to the Courts of First Instance, the proceedings had at the judicial hearings thus provided for must be adequate and appropriate to secure to the defendants in such cases an opportunity to be heard before judgment, and to have the proceedings conducted under such conditions that the parties, if they so desire, can secure a review of those proceedings upon appeal to this court. The order directing the deportation of the defendant and appellant should be and is hereby reversed, and a new trial should be and is hereby ordered, with the costs of this instance de oficio. Arellano, C J., Torres and Trent,. JJ., concur.