[ G. R. NO. 6286. March 26, 1912 ] G. R. NO. 6286
[ G. R. NO. 6286. March 26, 1912 ]
GAVINA FERNANDEZ, AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED PEDRO PENA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EULOGIO TRIA, AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCA PENA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Clemente Pena at the time of his death was the owner of some real estate, cattle, and other personal property. Among his heirs he left a son named Pedro Pena. When the estate of Clemente Pena was divided, Pedro Pena had already died and his daughter, named Francisca Pena, received his portion of the inheritance. She was then a minor and a guardian, Ramon Ortiz, was appointed, and the latter took over and administered the property that had come to Francisca Pena, through her father, from the estate of the aforesaid Clemente Pena. Francisca Pena married Eulogio Tria and died March 2, 1902.
After the death of Francisca Pena, her surviving husband, Eulogio Tria, made application, on January 13, 1903, for the appointment of a judicial administrator for the intestate estate of his late wife, and was himself appointed. He presented an inventory of the property of the deceased, which inventory included seven parcels of land. But commissioners of appraisal were appointed and appraised thirty-four parcels, and there the proceedings of that administration terminated.
On January 18, 1907, Gavina Fernandez also made special application for the appointment of an administration for the property which Pedro Pefia had left at his decease, by a will executed and probated under the late sovereignty. and the petitioner herself, Gavina Fernandez, widow of the said Pedro Pena, was appointed. In the same instrument she asked for the partition of the estate of Pedro Pena, and there the proceedings terminated.
Later, on July 23, 1908, Gavina Fernandez, as such judicial administratrix, instituted the present suit praying for judgment in her favor and against the defendant for the ownership and possession of the property set forth in the complaint, for P2,000 damages and the costs.
The material facts of the complaint are: the third, wherein it is averred that the hereditary succession of the deceased Pedro Pena is the owner and is entitled to ownership and possession of the property which is then described, to wit, according to the fourth fact, seven parcels of rural land, and five horses, the condition of the latter being a matter of surmise (B. of e., 2 and 3); and the fifth, in which it is averred that the defendant Eulogio Tria, as judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Francisca Pena (second fact) illegally retains, in his possession the property described in the complaint and claims to have rights therein adverse to those of the plaintiff.
In his reply the defendant confines himself to a generaldenial.
From the evidence adduced, the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines, which tried the case, decided it “in favor of the plaintiff in her capacity as administratrix for the deceased Pedro Pena, declaring that she was entitled to possession during the probate proceedings with reference to the real property described in the complaint and ordering the defendant to deliver it to her.” (B. of e., 8 and 9).
The defendant prepared a bill of exceptions and appealed to this court, submitting the following assignments of error:
In having declared the plaintiff-administratrix owner of the land sought. In denying the request for a new trial on the ground that the judgment is not sustained by the evidence.
With reference to the first assignment, the trial court made no declaration of ownership. It merely stated the conclusion that the plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pena, was entitled to possession of the property described in the complaint so that she might act as administratrix during the probate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Pena, and that when the debts had been paid, if any existed, and said proceedings were terminated, the property remaining should be divided among the heirs; and judgment was rendered to this effect.
With reference to the second, no error was incurred in denying the request for a new trial, for the evidence adduced sufficiently sustains the conclusions in the judgment.
The trial court held the following facts to be proven:
That Pedro Pena was the son of Clemente Pena, and that the latter died before the former. A fact admitted by the defendant. That the land described in the complaint belonged to Clemente Pena and, according to his will, said land belonged to Pedro Pena as heir, and for this reason it was delivered first to Ramon Ortiz as guardian of Francisca Pena and later to her, aided by her husband Eulogio Tria, in whose possession it now is as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Francisca Pena. A fact not refuted by the defendant. That, according to the will of the deceased Pedro Pena, his widow Gavina Fernandez and his legitimate daughter Francisca Pena are his heirs
The clause in the will of Pedro Pena wherein this testamentary disposition of his is made reads thus: “Item. - I affirm that I have been married three times: The first time to Dona Maria Ramirez, by whom I had six children, all now dead; the second time to Dona Petrona Fernandez, also dead, from which marriage we have a minor daughter named Francisca; and the third time to Dona Gavina Fernandez, by whom I have another son, named Ambrosio, to whom I leave, as heirs by force of law, one-half of all my property to my daughter Francisca, and the other half to my wife Gavina Fernandez and son Ambrosio.” This son Ambrosio died after his father, and his rights of inheritance passed by operation of law to his mother Gavina Fernandez, a fact that does not appear to be contradicted by the oral evidence adduced. That the property described in the complaint is the same which appears in the inventory, presented by the appellant as remaining at the death of his wife Francisca Peiia, when he asked for the judicial administration of her intestate estate (Exhibit A of the plaintiff), the same which, together with other property, was enumerated in the inventory made by the commissioners of appraisal in said proceedings in the intestate succession of Francisca Pena (Exhibit B of the plaintiff), and finally the same which, together with other property, appears to have been turned over by the guardian of Francisca Peiia, Ramon Ortiz, to the attorney in fact of the married couple, Eulogio Tria and Francisca Pena (Exhibit C of the plaintiff). Therefore there is no justification for the request for a new trial on the ground that the judgment is not sustained by the evidence. It is. clearly established that Francisca Pena, instead of her father Pedro Pena, received all the property that the latter’s father had left him, and that this property did not all belong to Francisca Pena, but only a half of it, according to the express disposition of Pedro Pena. The other half belonged to Gavina Fernandez, and in order to secure it, she instituted special proceedings wherein she was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Pedro Pena, with the object and for the purpose the law fixes, in order to transmit the inheritance from the hands of him who leaves it at his death to those who, according to his wish or according to the provisions of law,.are entitled to receive it.
The law provides that, when a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he accepts the trust and gives the bond required by law. The term “executor” in this Act shall include an administrator with the will annexed. (Code of Civ. Proc, sec. 641.) If no executor is named’in the will, or if a person dies intestate, the administration shall first be granted to the surviving husband or wife. (Ibid., 642.) In appointing as administratrix for the estate of the deceased, Pedro Pefia his widow Gavina Fernandez the court acted in conformity with these legal provisions. The law further provides that “every executor or administrator, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the bond prescribed for the residuary legatee, shall, within three months after his appointment, return to the court a true inventory of the real estate and all the gootls, chattels, rights and credits of the deceased which come into his possession or knowledge. (Ibid., 668.)
“An executor or administrator may commence, prosecute, or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions which survive to such executor or administrator, and are necessary for the recovery and protection of the property or rights of the deceased, and may prosecute or defend such actions or suits commenced in the lifetime of the deceased. (Ibid., 702.) “Actions to recover the title or possession of real estate, buildings, or any interest therein, actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, and actions to recover the possession of specific articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or administrator.” (Ibid., 703.)
In conformity with these provisions and in accordance with general principles of law, the plaintiff Gavina Fernandez, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pena has been able to say justly in her complaint that the hereditary succession of this deceased is the owner and is entitled to ownership and possession of the property, which is withheld by the defendant, Eulogio Tria, in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Francisca Pena, property the identity of which, according to the copy of the inventories made of said intestate estate, is set forth by the trial judge, against which statement and finding this Supreme Court finds no error to have been committed, and property which, as was properly asked in the complaint and as ordered in the judgment appealed from, should be in the possession and under the administration of the plaintiff. Once in possession, there should be applied the principle which this Supreme Court has laid down in interpreting the law:
‘By section 641, when a will is proved it is obligatory upon the court to appoint an executor or administrator. By virtue of other provisions of the code this executor or administrator has, under the direction of the court, the full administration and control of the deceased’s property, real and personal, until a final decree is made in accordance with section 753. During the period of administration the heirs, devisees, and legatees have no right to interfere with the administrator or executor in the.discharge of his duties. They have no right, without his consent, to the possession of any part of the estate, real or personal. The theory of the present system is that the property is all in the hands of the court, and must stay there until the affairs of the deceased are adjusted and liquidated, and then the net balance is turned over to the persons by law entitled to it. * * * After the estate is fully settled, and all the debts and expenses of administration are paid, the law contemplates that there shall be a hearing or trial in this proceeding in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of determining who the parties are that are entitled to the estate in the hands of the executor or administrator for distribution, and after such hearing or trial it is made the duty of the court to enter a decree or final judgment, in which decree, according to section 753, the court ‘shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and proportions or parts to which each is entitled/ " (Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 439, 440.) Until this time comes, therefore, it can not be determined which is the property or, which is the part thereof that belongs to the intestate estate of Francisca Pena, and until such time there is no property belonging to Francisca Pena or to Gavina Fernandez, but only property belonging to the intestate estate of Pedro Pena. To assert rights of ownership and possession in favor of Francisca Pena, before determining what the property is which may fall to her from the estate of Pedro Pena, seems to be a plain absurdity that does not require demonstration, just as there is no need for demonstrating that an effect can not precede its cause. Francisca Pena and Gavina Fernandez are the successors in interest of the estate of Pedro Pena, their predecessor in interest, and Francisca Pena can hardly have private property derived from Pedro Pena’s estate before such estate has been divided and before Francisca Pena and Gavina Fernandez have been legally assigned their respective portions.
So the judgment appealed from could not be more in accordance with law, with strict justice and with the dictates of reason, and it is therefore hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.