[ G.R. No. 6027. April 01, 1911 ] 19 Phil. 265
[ G.R. No. 6027. April 01, 1911 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS BERNARDO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
TORRES, J.:
In November, 1907, Tomas Bernardo entered into amorous relations with Isadora Mesina, a minor 18 years of age, and on this account the said Tomas Bernardo frequented the house in which the girl lived; he succeeded in lying with her on the afternoon of March 1, 1909, through promise of marriage, while her father, Saturnino, and her sister, Juliana Mesina, were absent from the house and her mother was in another room attending her sick daughter. As a result of the said relations and of the coition that took place on the afternoon aforesaid, the girl became pregnant and later gave birth to a female child, one month and a half before the hearing in the present case. For the foregoing reasons, the father of the seduced girl filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court of Mariquina and, as a result of the trial, the accused was sentenced to four months of arresto mayor and to the accessory penalties. An appeal was taken to, the Court of First Instance, and the provincial fiscal, in view of the proceedings before the justice of the peace, filed a complaint, on June 17, 1909, charging Tomas Bernardo with the crime of estupro. The defendant excepted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the court overruled the demurrer and declared that it was competent in the matter at issue. The case thereupon came up for trial and, upon the evidence adduced therein, judgment was rendered on March 18, 1910, sentencing the accused to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to pay an indemnity of P400 to the offended party, to recognize as his daughter the female child born to the said Isidora Mesina, to pay to the latter P10 a month for the support of the child, and the costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed. While it is true that the crime of simple, unqualified, seduction is punishable under article 443 of the Penal Code with the penalty of arresto mayor, it is no less true that article 449 of the same code provides that -
“Those guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction shall be condemned also, by way of indemnification: (1) To endow the injured woman, if she were unmarried or a widow; (2) to acknowledge the offspring, if the character of its origin should not prevent it; (3) in all cases, to support the offspring.”
These declarations, necessarily required by statute, are not really, in a strict legal sense, accessories of the personal penalty imposed by the Penal Code upon the seducer, but are rather those which the penal law prescribes shall be made by the judge in passing final sentence in the cause, in order that it may be shown that, besides the personal penalty, the accused, in consequence of his crime, has incurred the obligations expressly stated by the said code. These obligations imposed upon the culprit ordinarily exceed the amount of the penalty fixed by the law as being within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court and comprise, moreover, by virtue of the forced recognition imposed by article 135 of the Civil Code, the special determination of the civil status of the offspring which resulted from the crime, consequently, although the said crime of seduction is only punished by the penalty of arresto mayor, a judgment of conviction can not be pronounced by a justice of the peace, on account of his lack of jurisdiction. But disregarding the amount of the indemnity, whatever it be, according to the conditions and circumstances of the offended party and of the one obliged to furnish the same, which amount might be greater than that fixed by law as within the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts, the acknowledgment of the resulting offspring, one of the findings which the sentence must contain, establishes by force of law the civil status of the child whose acknowledgment is necessarily imposed upon the guilty party; so with much less reason could the crime fall within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, inasmuch as, in accordance with specific legal provisions, only the judge of the Court of First Instance can make such pronouncements. Under this hypothesis, the justice of the peace of Mariquina was not competent and could not possibly have had jurisdiction to hear and try the case for the crime of seduction brought before him by Saturnino Mesina, the father of the offended girl, Isidora Mesina, as he did, rendering judgment on June 10, 1909, with the findings recorded on folio 7 of the trial record; and therefore, all the proceedings had in the said case, together with the judgment, are null and void, and the judge of the Court of First Instance, before whom the case came on appeal by the accused, should have dismissed the same, as it was an action that was null and unsustainable for the reasons aforementioned; hence he could not legally have considered the complaint filed by the provincial fiscal by reason of the said appeal of the accused, inasmuch as, in order to try the crime which was the subject of that complaint, the judge of the Court of First Instance had to act by virtue of his original jurisdiction; in the present case he could not lawfully do so because that complaint was founded on the action tried before the justice of the peace which had come to the Court of First Instance on appeal, and the judge of First Instance had to hear and try the case by virtue of the jurisdiction which he had acquired by reason of the appeal pending in second instance. It would be improper to conclude that the said judge exercised the attributes of both courts at the same time by virtue of his original jurisdiction and of the appeal. After the case had been dismissed, and the proceedings had before the justice of the peace, together with his decision in the matter, had been declared null and void, the judge of First Instance, in the exercise of his original jurisdiction, could have given, in accordance with the law, due course to the complaint which would then have been presented by the provincial fiscal independently of the aforesaid proceedings, which were improperly instituted owing to the absolute lack of jurisdiction on the part of the justice of the peace to hear and try causes for the crime of seduction, for the reasons herein before set forth. In the case of Carroll and Ballesteros vs. Paredes,[1] on the petition for a writ of certiorari, the judgment, dated September 26, 1910, contained the following statements:
“* * * Appealed criminal cases ‘shall be tried in all respects anew.’ De novo, over again. The nature of the action can not be changed in the Court of First Instance, but must be tried de novo upon its merits on the same process and pleadings; that is, the process and proceedings must be of the same nature as those in the justice of the peace court. The prosecuting officer, however, can substitute his own complaint for that filed in the justice of the peace court, provided the nature of the action is not changed. In this jurisdiction no provision is made for an appeal from justice of the peace courts upon the law only, but all appeals are taken for a new trial, and the defendant is entitled to interpose the same objections as he could have interposed in the justice of the peace courts. “If the sentence imposed upon him by the justice of the peace is void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, the defendant, on appeal, has a right to have the appellate court so determine, or he may elect to have the Court of First Instance try the case upon its merits, without raising the question of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace: If he raises no objection with reference to the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and submits himself to be retried for the crime for which he was charged, then he will be presumed to have waived all questions as to jurisdiction, and he can not thereafter raise this question of jurisdiction, provided the appellate, court had jurisdiction of his person and the subject matter. But should he make a timely objection in the appellate court as to the want or excess of jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, and should the court find such objection well founded, then it acquires jurisdiction only for the purpose of dismissing the same, without prejudice however to the institution of a new proceeding for the same criminal acts in the proper tribunal. But in order to take advantage of these rights the appellant must by proper objection call the attention of the court to these facts and give the court an opportunity to pass upon the validity of such sentence; otherwise he will be, as we have said, presumed to have waived the question of jurisdiction. No agreement of the parties, or waiver of objection, can confer jurisdiction on an appellate court which has no jurisdiction of the subject matter. * * * “In 24 Cyc, 641, it is said: " ‘On appeal from a justice of the peace, the appellate court has only such jurisdiction as the justice had, and if he had no jurisdiction, the appellate court acquires none; and it is immaterial that such court has original jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.’ “A number of cases from various States in the American Union are cited in support of this proposition. It must be noted that this rule is based upon the theory that the appellate court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. “On page 643 of the same volume (24 Cyc.) it is said: " ‘While it has been held that, where the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, the parties can not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court by consent, the better view seems to be that where the appellate court has original as well as appellate jurisdiction of the cause, jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the person may be conferred upon it by waiver or consent.’ (Citing cases from Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio.) " ‘The question of want of jurisdiction may be raised by motion to dismiss the proceedings, or by objecting at the trial to the introduction of any evidence on behalf of plaintiff.’ Id.
* * * * * * *
“2. That in a criminal case where a justice of the peace renders a judgment wherein he does not have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject matter of the action, and an appeal is taken to the Court of First Instance, and no objection is interposed in the said Court of First Instance as to the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, then the defendant will be presumed to have waived all objections to such jurisdiction and the case can be tried upon its merits: Provided, however, That the nature of the action is not changed and that the said Court of First Instance had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action; but when a timely objection is made to the jurisdiction of the appellate court (Court of First Instance) to try such case on its merits, the said court only acquires jurisdiction to dismiss the case; * * *” (p. 108).
For the reasons herein before stated and those contained in the above citations it has been demonstrated that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, could not validly take cognizance of a crime which was the subject matter of an action and judgment in the justice of the peace court that were null and void for want of jurisdiction, by virtue of a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal in the said Court of First Instance in view of said action, before the latter had dismissed the appeal interposed by the accused on the ground of the manifest nullity of the trial. All the proceedings had in the present cause, together with the sentence therein pronounced, are declared to be null and void, and the Court of First Instance shall act in accordance with the law with respect to the proceedings of the justice of the peace court of Mariquina. The costs are declared de oficio. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur. Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.