[ G.R. No. 5724. February 02, 1911 ] 18 Phil. 578
[ G.R. No. 5724. February 02, 1911 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JESUS BALMORI AND CECILIO APOSTOL, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
MORELAND, J.:
The defendants in this case were convicted of the crime of having maliciously and criminally set fire to a quantity of personal property located in a room in a house occupied by and in possession of other persons, and thereby having damaged or destroyed the same. They were found guilty of the crime charged, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Charles S. Lobingier presiding, and sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, to indemnify the injured party for the value of the property damaged or destroyed, and to pay the costs of the trial. The questions involved in this case are very largely of fact. The learned trial judge in his opinion, which forms the basis of his judgment of conviction, presents the facts with clearness and force. He says:
“The following are established by the undisputed evidence as facts in this case: “On the afternoon of July 6, last, the two accused after spending several hours together and drinking freely of intoxicating liquors (p. 48) entered a house of prostitution on Calle Balic-Balic in the District of Sampaloc, each occupying a room with one of the inmates (pp. 24, 44). The accused remained in the house at least a quarter of an hour and were the only men there (p. 32). As they were leaving, an alarm of fire was given and the defendant Balmori ran from the house arid was pursued and later overtaken and apprehended by one of the women employed in the house who then and there charged the said accused with causing the fire (p. 49). The other accused, Apostol, disappeared and was not seen after Balmori left him (p. 51). The fire for which the alarm was given was in a room occupied at the time by one Agapita Rivera. A policeman (Woodward) who arrived soon after found the walls and roof scorched and the bedding, bed-trimmings and a quantity of woman’s apparel partially burned and the bed itself ruined (p. 41). “The only real points in dispute are the identification of the incendiaries and the extent of the damage. Agapita Rivera, who was in the room where the fire occurred, testifies (pp. 23, 24, 29, 30) that the two accused entered there from the other rooms where they had been staying, that Balmori lit a cigarette and then struck a match which he applied to a bundle of skirts hanging on the wall and handed it to Apostol who applied it to the bed-trimmings, and that both accused then started to run down the stairs. A rigid cross-examination leaves this testimony unshaken. “Pilar Fajardo, who was below and pursued and apprehended Balmori, testifies (pp. 33, 35) that she did so because Agapita Rivera called out to her from the room in question which she was just leaving, to pursue the accused as the incendiaries. Petra Angeles also testifies (p. 3) that she heard the cries to detain the accused and that she saw them descending the staircase. Agapita Rivera’s cries. at the moment the fire broke out are part of the res gestae with all the weight which belongs to such evidence and her identification of the accused is thus corroborated to a certain extent by two other witnesses. It is only contradicted by the testimony of one of the accused, Balmori, who says that he did not enter the room in question. Either his testimony or that of the women and especially that of Agapita Rivera must be rejected on this point and we think that the surrounding circumstances render the testimony of the women more trustworthy. In the first place it is doubtful if the only accused who testified was in a position to remember what he actually did at the time in question. As already stated he had been drinking freely and he himself admits (p. 46) that his mind was not entirely clear until the next morning after a night in jail. We are disposed also to agree with the prosecuting attorney that the act which is charged is just such a one as would be committed by men in the initial stages of intoxication. The person or persons who started the fire evidently did not intend to burn the building, else they would have applied the match to some more inflammable portion. Their purpose apparently was malicious, though less serious, mischief with a possible view of enjoying the scare which the act would cause to the inmates. “In the second place the defendants’ theory would leave no reasonable explanation as to the cause of the fire, which, it is conceded, occurred. It is unreasonable to suppose that the inmates themselves would cause the destruction of their own property and it is shown by the defense (p. 32) that the accused were the only men in the house at the time. The testimony offered by the prosecution affords an adequate explanation of the cause of the fire. The testimony for the defense leaves this wholly unexplained. “Finally, no motive is suggested on the part of these women for falsely imputing the crime to the accused. The latter were patrons of the house, the injured woman’s testimony (p. 31) is undisputed, that there was no preceding trouble and, if the conduct of the accused was not different than as described by defendant Balmori, such a concerted effort on the part of the inmates against the accused as Balmori testifies to would be unnatural and inexplicable. “Counsel for the defense lays stress upon certain alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimony of the women, but we do not find anything of this sort which materially affects the essential elements of the case made by the prosecution. If the witnesses do not all agree on the minor points it at least negatives the idea of collusion and if the principal witness for the prosecution is not entirely clear as to the details of the occurrence it must be remembered that the latter was an occasion of much confusion. But on the whole we can find no sufficient reason to doubt the correctness of the main points related by these witnesses and we accordingly find the accused guilty of the offense defined in article 557 of the Penal Code.
“THE PENALTY.
“For this offense depends upon the amount of the damage caused. At the trial this question appears to have been confused with that of the value of the property destroyed but the two questions are not necessarily identical. We take it that the owner of the property was “damaged” in an amount which would be needed in order to replace the articles although these might not have sold in the open market for the same amount. The list of articles with the value of each as detailed by her (pp. 4, 5, 6) is as follows: Eight skirts……………………………………………………….
P16.00
Two blankets…………………………………………………..
8.00
One colgadura ………………………………………………..
4.00
Three pillows…………………………………………………….
9.00
Pour camisas (waists) ………………………………………..
28.00
Twelve camisas…………………………………………………
36.00
Total………………………………………………….
101.00
“There is no contrary testimony on the question of the value. This witness says that she based her estimates on the cost price and she also states, (p. 17) what is notoriously true, that the prices of such articles were formerly lower than at present. So that we can not fairly presume that if she had gone into the open market to replace these articles they could have been purchased for any less than the original cost, especially as some of them were practically new (p. 14). None of them were unserviceable and for those, like the skirts, which were partially worn a deduction was made from the cost price (pp. 2, 13). “It is not necessary to call an expert to prove the value of wearing apparel in common use (12 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.) 478 n 9; Parmalee vs. Raymund, 43 111. App., 609; State vs. Finch, 70 la., 316; 59 Am. Rep., 443). In this case the witness testifies (p. 17) that she has resided some fifteen years in Manila and during that time has been purchasing articles of this class. Under these circumstances and the fact that she purchased these identical goods, we think her testimony, undisputed as it is, regarding their value, must be accepted. But we repeat that the question is not so much one of value as of damage and in the absence of any showing on the part of any of the defendants that the complaining witness could replace the destroyed or injured articles for a sum less than that testified to by her we must find that such is her damage and that the penalty falls within paragraph 2 of article 557. “As to the attending circumstances we find that the offense was committed by the accused in a state of intoxication, not shown to be habitual, which is therefore an extenuating circumstance under Penal Code article 9 (6). On the other hand the offense was committed in the dwelling of the aggrieved party which is an aggravating circumstance under article 10 (20). By virtue of article 81 (4) we are authorized to counterbalance one of these circumstance against the other, and it not being shown that either of the accused had committed a previous offense we shall apply the penalty in its medium degree, giving the accused also the benefit of the lower medium. “Each of the accused is therefore sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, to indemnify the injured party, Agapita Rivera, in the sum of 252 pesetas with subsidiary imprisonment according to law in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this prosecution.”
We have made a careful study of the evidence and have given careful attention to the very elaborate printed briefs and arguments of the appellants. We are unable, after diligent inquiry, to find any reasons upon which we could base ourselves in reversing the judgment of the court below. The question before us is very largely one of fact. The court below saw the witnesses testify, observed their manner upon the stand, and drew his conclusions as to the weight which ought to be given to the testimony which they gave. We have many times laid it down as a rule, that we will not interfere with the conclusions of the court below based upon the relative credibility of witnesses who give conflict- ing testimony, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight or influence which has either been overlooked by the court or has been misinterpreted by him, or has not been given its due weight and significance. We have searched this record in vain for such error. We are painfully aware of the effect which a conviction may have upon the future of these two young men and have given the matter thorough and deliberate consideration. We are also aware that property of individuals must be protected, and that when their rights therein have been invaded, maliciously and criminally, the only redress is in justice. We believe, however, that the judgment should be modified. The facts as presented by the evidence do not warrant the finding of the aggravating circumstance of morada. (Supreme court of Spain, decision of June 16,1884.) Eliminating this, the penalty must be imposed in its minimum degree. With the modification, that each of the accused is sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Torres and Trent, JJ., concur.