[ G.R. No. 4718. March 19, 1910 ] 16 Phil. 137
[ G.R. No. 4718. March 19, 1910 ]
SY JOC LIENG, SY YOC CHAY, SY JUI NIU AND SY CHUA NIU, PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES AND APPELLANTS, VS. PETRONILA ENCARNACION, GKEGORIO SY QUIA, PEDRO SY QUIA, JUAN SY QUIA AND GENEROSO MENDOZA SY QUIA, DEFENDANTS, APPELLANTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
TORRES, J.:
On the 4th day of December, 1905, the said Sy Joe Lieng, Sy Joe Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy Chua Niu filed an amended complaint against the said defendants, alleging: That in or about the year 1823 one Sy Quia, subsequently known in these Islands as Vicente Romero Sy Quia, was born in China, and in or about the year 1847 was married in the city of Amoy to Yap Puan Niu, of which marriage the following male children were born, to wit: Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, they being the only legitimate heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that in or about the year 1882 Sy By Bo died intestate in China, leaving as his only surviving children and legitimate heirs the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Jui Niu; that in or about the year 1880 the other child of Sy Quia, Sy By Guit, also died intestate in China, leaving as his only surviving children and legitimate heirs the other plaintiffs, Sy Joe Lieng and Sy Chua Niu; that in or about the year 1891 Yap Puan Niu died intestate in China, leaving her surviving husband, Sy Quia, and her grandchildren, who are the plaintiffs in this case; that in the year 1894 Vicente Romero Sy Quia died intestate in this city of Manila, leaving his surviving grandchildren, the plaintiffs, as his only legitimate heirs. That Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired during his life-time a large amount of property, consisting of personal and real property in the Philippine Islands, mostly located in the city of Manila, amounting to P1,000,000 Philippine currency; that on or about the 3d of August, 1900, the defendants illegally, without any rights, and in the absence of the plaintiffs herein, took possession of all the said personal and real property left by the said Sy Quia, deceased, and since then have managed and administered the same, alleging to be the owners thereof; that since the said 3d day of August, 1900, the defendants and each of them have converted and are converting part of the property of the said Sy Quia, deceased, to the use and benefit of each of them, and a large part of the said property, consisting of real and personal property unknown to the plaintiffs, they being in possession thereof as owners, exercising over them acts of ownership, and converting them to their own use; that it has been impossible for the plaintiffs to discover, ascertain, and have knowledge of each and all the items of real and personal property belonging to the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased, at the time of his death, nor the amount of personal and real property converted by the defendants, except such as is described in the accompanying document marked “Exhibit A,” which is a part of the complaint; that the property described in said document is a part of the estate left by the deceased Sy Quia at the time of his death, aside and apart from the personal and real property converted by the defendants, who are, and each one of them is, in possession and custody of all the deeds, instruments, contracts, books, and papers relating to the title and conversion of the said real and personal property, which titles and the descriptions thereof could not be proven without the sworn statements of the defendants and of each one of them; that the plaintiffs are informed and believe that the said real and personal property belonging to the estate of the said Sy Quia, and which is now held and controlled by the defendants, has a value of approximately P1,000,000, Philippine currency. That the plaintiffs are the only descendants and legitimate heirs of the deceased Sy Quia, they being entitled to the possession of all the property of his estate, as well as of the real and personal property converted as aforesaid, and the defendants having appropriated the same, with all the rents and profits thereof, it is impossible for the plaintiffs to ascertain and discover the true amount of the said rents and profits, which aggregate several thousand pesos, all of which said property is in danger of being lost, to the irreparable damage of the plaintiffs, unless and except a receiver is appointed to take charge of the preservation and custody of the same in order to protect the interests of the said plaintiffs, and enable the court to determine the actual value of the real and personal property of the estate at the time of the death of the said Sy Quia, as well as the value of the real and personal property subsequently converted by the defendants, together with the rents and profits of the whole estate, converted by the defendants to their own use and benefit; wherefore it is necessary that said defendants be required to render detailed accounts of the real and personal property and rents and profits of the estate, and that it be ascertained by the sworn statement of the said defendants what the actual value of the real and personal property of the said estate, with the rents and profits, thus converted and held by them, is. They accordingly prayed that defendants be directed to render under oath a complete and detailed account of all the property left by Sy Quia at the time of his death, of the administration, custody, control, conversion and disposal thereof, of the conversion of the same, and of the rents and profits of the original property, as well as of the property thus converted, including in the said accounting both such properties with the rents and profits; that, upon the giving of the necessary bond, a receiver be appointed to administer the original property, as well as the property converted, during the pendency of the present litigation, the said complete and detailed account under oath as aforesaid to be submitted to the court, covering the original property as well as the property converted, with all rents and profits, and that thereupon a receiver be appointed to take charge and control of the administration of the whole of said property. They further prayed that it be adjudged and decreed that the defendants are the only descendants and heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia from and since the time of his death, and that they are the only legitimate owners of the real and personal property left by him, and of the whole of said property converted by the defendants, and that they are entitled to the possession of the whole of the said property and the rents and profits accruing therefrom; that it be decreed that the defendants have not and never had any right, title or interest to the said property, nor to the rents and profits thereof, the same being held by them as mere trustees for the benefit of the plaintiffs and each of them, further praying for any other relief which the court may deem just and equitable, and for the costs of this action.
ANSWER.
The defendants, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia, answering the foregoing complaint, specifically deny paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint, which relate to the paternity and status of the plaintiffs, and to the death of their grandmother and parents, and also deny generally all and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the complaint, relating to the succession and actual condition of the estate of the deceased Sy Quia, except as otherwise expressly admitted as true in the said answer, As a special defense and in opposition to the complaint, the defendants allege that prior to the year 1852 Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia was an infidel known only by the name of Sy Quia, he having resided in the Philippine Islands for many years prior thereto; that on June 8, and made an integral part of the answer; that on June 9, 1853, the Christian Chinaman Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia contracted canonical marriage in accordance with the laws then in force in these Islands, with the defendant Petronila Encarnacion, a native of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, as shown by his certificate of marriage marked “Exhibit 2,” which is made an integral part of the answer; that the said Vicente Sy Quia and his wife, Petronila Encarnacion, fixed their residence and conjugal domicile in these Islands until the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of the husband on January 9, 1894; that at the time of their marriage Vicente Romero Sy Quia had no property, and brought no property into the marriage, but that the wife brought to the marriage a small capital which was the foundation of the subsequent fortune acquired by the spouses by their labor and industry, and by the labor and industry of the children, five in number, named Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, all of whom have always been in continuous possession of the status of legitimate children, in lawful wedlock begotten of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion, according to the copies of the certificates of baptism marked “Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7,” to be considered as an integral part of the answer. That on January 9, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died intestate in the city of Manila, and after the necessary legal proceedings under the legislation then in force, his surviving children, Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, and his grandchild Generoso Mendoza, representing his mother, Maria Romero Sy Quia, deceased, were declared by a decree of the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo, dated January 26 of the said year, to be the heirs abintestate of the said deceased, as shown by a copy of the said decree, marked “Exhibit 3,” as an integral part of the answer, Apolinaria Romero Sy Quia, one of the children recognized as heirs of their deceased father, having died on the 1st of May, 1900, leaving as her only legitimate heir her surviving mother, Petronila Encarnacion. That since January 9, 1894, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia died, the defendants have been in quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession as owners in good faith and with a just title, of the property which constitutes the estate of their deceased father, they never having been heretofore disturbed therein by the plaintiffs or any of them, notwithstanding the fact that the said plaintiffs were here in the Philippine Islands, and all the property included in the inventory made at the time of the partition of the estate of the deceased Sy Quia, was acquired by him subsequent to the year 1853, when he married the defendant Petronila Encarnacion; that a great portion of the real property included in the said inventory was acquired by Petronila Encarnacion after the death of her husband, and that in the title deeds of a considerable portion of the property bought during the lifetime of Sy Quia, Petronila Encarnacion appears as the vendee, wherefore the defendants Pedro Sy Quia, Juan Sy Quia, arid Petronila Encarnacion prayed the court that they be acquitted of the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs, and that they, the defendants, be granted such other and further relief as might be just and equitable. The other defendant, Gregorio Sy Quia, answering the complaint, denied all and each of the allegations therein contained, and further specifically denied that Sy Quia had married in or about the year 1847 at Amoy, China, the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu, and that the said Sy Bi Bo and Sy By Guit were the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Sy Quia, also that the plaintiffs Sy Joe Lieng, Sy Joe Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy Chua Niu were the grandchildren and legitimate heirs of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that as a special defense he alleged that the deceased Sy Quia, many years prior to 1852, while a non-Christian Chinese subject, definitely fixed his residence and domicile in the Philippine Islands, subjecting himself to the laws then therein in force; that in the year 1852 Sy Quia was baptized, having been converted to the Catholic faith, on the 11th of June of that year, the ceremony taking place at the parish church of San Vicente, he being then named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, and on June 9 of the following year he contracted marriage with Petronila Encarhacion in accordance with the rites of the Catholic Church, and in conformity with the laws then in force in the Philippine Islands, as shown by the church certificates marked “Exhibits A and B.” That Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion since their marriage continuously resided in the Philippine Islands until the 9th of January, 1894, when the husband died intestate, they having had since their marriage five children, among them Gregorio, who subscribes this answer, according to canonical certificate Exhibit C; that the deceased Sy Quia brought no property into the conjugal partnership, but Petronila Encamacion did bring with her the small capital of P5,000, with which, through their labor and industry at first, and subsequently by the labor and industry of their children, they had acquired the large amount of property existing at the time of the death of the husband, said property so acquired being located in the Philippine Islands; that on the 23d of January, 1894, by an order of the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo, the surviving children of Sy Quia, named Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, and Sy Quia’s grandchild, Generoso Mendoza, representing his (Generoso’s) deceased mother, Maria Romero Sy Quia, were declared to be the heirs abintestate of the said Sy Quia, as shown by a copy of the said decree, marked “Exhibit D,” the defendants having taken possession from that date of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia, they having continued so in possession in the quality of owners, with just title and good faith, adversely, publicly, quietly and peacefully, until the plaintiffs presented their complaint to the court; that on the 1st day of May, 1900, Apolinaria Romero Sy Quia died a spinster and intestate, leaving as her only legitimate heir her mother, Petronila Encarnacion; that the plaintiffs at the time of the death of Vicente Romero Sy Quia had knowledge of his demise, and had notice that the defendants had petitioned to the court for a declaration, which they obtained, to the effect that they were the heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased; and that at no time were the plaintiffs or their parents recognized or considered by the said Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia as his descendants, heirs or relatives; wherefore defendant prayed that judgment be entered declaring that the plaintiffs had no right or interest to or in the estate of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia, and that the defendants are the only legitimate heirs of the said Sy Quia, taxing the costs against the plaintiffs. The last of the defendants, Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, answering the complaint on the 18th of January, 1906, alleged that he denied all and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 16, inclusive, of the complaint, and. that he also specifically denied that the deceased Sy Quia, whose Christian name is Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, had married at Amoy, China, the woman Yap Puan Niu, in or about the year 1847, or at any time previous or subsequent thereto; that the said Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Sy Quia; that the plaintiffs Sy Joe Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Jui Niu, and Sy Chua Niu were the legitimate descendants or heirs of the deceased Sy Quia. As a special defense, defendant alleged that the Chinaman Sy Quia came to the Philippine Islands as an immigrant a long time prior to 1852, fixing his residence and domicile therein, and subjecting himself to the laws then in force in this country; that in the said year 1852, Sy Quia having been converted to Christianity, was baptized An the parish church of San Vicente, Ilocos Sur, and named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as shown by the canonical certificates exhibited by the defendants, and marked “Exhibits 1 and A,” which are made a part of this answer; that on June 9, Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia was married by the Church to Petronila Encarnacion in accordance with the canonical laws, as shown by the certified copies of the marriage certificate, marked “Exhibits 2 and B,” introduced by the other defendants; that Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion established themselves and fixed their conjugal domicile in the Philippine Islands, where they continued to reside until the 9th of January, 1894, when the marriage was dissolved by the death of the husband in Manila; that the said spouses since their marriage had five children, of whom Apolinaria died a spinster, and Maria, who had married, died leaving a child, the defendant Generoso Mendoza, the grandson of the deceased Sy Quia, the said Generoso Mendoza and the other children of the deceased Sy Quia, named Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, having survived; that Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his marriage owned no property, while Petronila Encarnacion brought to the conjugal partnership a small capital, amounting to P5,000, which was the foundation of the large fortune subsequently acquired by them through their labor and industry, subsequently augmented with the aid of their own children. That on the 9th of January, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died, and after the necessary legal proceedings under the law of civil procedure then in force in these Islands, the Court of First Instance by a decree dated the 26th of the said month and year, declared that the surviving children, Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, and his grandchild Generoso Mendoza, representing his mother Maria, deceased, were the heirs of the deceased Sy Quia, intestate, as shown by Exhibits 8 and D, introduced by the other defendants; that on May 1, 1900, the oldest daughter, Apolinaria, died intestate and single, leaving as her only heir her mother Petronila Encarnacion; that since the death of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia the defendants had been in quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia, having held the same adversely, with good faith and just title; and that they have never been disturbed by the plaintiffs in such possession, notwithstanding the fact that they, the plaintiffs, were in the Philippine Islands at the time of the death of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, and had knowledge of the fact that the defendants had applied to the Court of First Instance for and secured a declaration to the effect that they were the heirs of the deceased Sy Quia; and that neither the plaintiffs nor the said Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit had ever been recognized or considered by the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia as his descendants, heirs or relatives, they never having been in possession of the legal status of children or legitimate descendants of the said Sy Quia; wherefore this defendant prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of all the defendants, acquitting them of the complaint, and directing that the plaintiffs pay the costs.
AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT.
The plaintiffs on the 31st of January, 1906, presented by way of reply to the answers of the various defendants an amendment to the original complaint, denying generally and specifically all and each of the material allegations set out in the answers of the defendants and alleging that the pretended marriage between Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion was not a lawful marriage, but a false and fraudulent one, without any force, efficacy, or legal validity, the certificate of marriage presented by the defendants not being a true and correct certificate of marriage, the same being false, fraudulent, and without any force, efficacy, or legal validity, for the reason that on June 9, 1853, Vicente Romero Sy Quia was and thereafter continued to be the lawful husband of one Yap Puan Niu, until the year 1891, when she died, and that the marriage of Sy Quia with the said Yap Puan Niu, since 1847 and until her death in 1891, was continuously in full force and effect, Sy Quia not having married again after the death of the said wife; and that Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, the alleged legitimate children of Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion, were not and never had been the legitimate children of Sy Quia, and that they were not and never had been his legitimate heirs and descendants, the certificates of baptism produced by the defendants, and marked “Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7,” not being true nor proper, but false and fraudulent, and of no force, efficacy, or legal validity, the said children not being the legitimate descendants of the deceased Sy, Quia. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended complaint are a repetition of similar paragraphs contained in the original.
ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The defendants, Generoso Mendoza, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, Gregorio Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia, filed their answers to the amended complaint on the 7th and 13th of February, 1906, denying all and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the amended complaint, stating that they ratified each and all of the allegations, denials and defenses contained in their previous answer, which they reproduced therein, and that they renewed their prayer that judgment be rendered acquitting them of the said complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs. On June 19, 1906, counsel for Petronila Encarnacion notified the court in writing of the death of the said Petronila Encarnacion, who died in this city on the 6th of the said month, and as counsel for the other defendants, £edro and Juan Sy Quia, moved the court that in accordance with section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order be made directing that the action be proceeded with in the name of the administrator of her estate, Pedro Sy Quia, which motion was granted without any objection on the part of the plaintiffs’ attorney, on June 21, 1906. On August 20, 1906, it was stipulated between counsel for both parties that by order of the court the deposition of several witnesses then designated by the plaintiffs be taken at Amoy, China, before the consul, vice-consul, or a consular agent of the United States in the said city, during the days and in the manner agreed upon, in accordance with section 362 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendants being authorized to take the deposition of such witnesses as they might desire to present in the manner agreed upon. On November 8, 1906, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court of the death of one of the plaintiffs, Sy Jui Niu, at Amoy, China, on or about the 28th of July of the said year, and she having died intestate, the court on November 8, appointed C. W. O’Brien as special administrator of her estate, and said counsel thereupon asked the court to allow the action to be continued by him, and, by a subsequent petition filed on the 13th of the same month, the administrator C. W. O’Brien, appointed as aforesaid, filed a written appearance as such administrator of the estate of the deceased Sy Jui Niu. On a petition filed on the 17th of November, 1906, counsel for both parties informed the court that the documents presented by the defendants, and marked “Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and A, B, and C,” which are certificates of baptism, marriage, and burial, should be considered as original and authentic documents, so as to avoid the necessity of presenting the originals themselves, which were bound in book form, together with other documents relating to persons who had no connection with this litigation. On the 4th of January, 1907, the defendants presented a motion to the Court of First Instance, asking that the depositions taken before the consul of the United States at Amoy, China, as given by the witnesses for the plaintiffs, named Li Ung Bing, Sy Peng, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kay Tit, Yap Chong, Sy Boan, Sy Kong Len, and Sy Hong Oan, whose testimony the plaintiffs attempted to introduce in this action, be not admitted, defendants’ motion being based on the ground that the said depositions contained a formal defect concerning the manner in which the oath was administered to the witnesses. In a petition filed on the same date, January 4, the defendants reproduced their former motion, alleging as a further ground in support thereof that the certificates by the officer who took the said depositions did not comply with the essential requisites provided by law, and after due notice to the plaintiffs, a hearing was had upon the said petition on January 7, 1907. After the recital of the evidence introduced by both parties, and after the documents exhibited by them, together with the depositions taken at Vigan of various witnesses for the defendants, and of the depositions taken at Amoy, China, had been united to the record, the Court of First Instance on the 26th of February, 1908, rendered a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs Sy Joe Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C. W. O’Brien, the latter as guardian of Sian Han, and the defendants Gregorio Sy Quia, Pedro Sy Quia, Juan Sy Quia, and Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, and the heirs of the deceased Petronila Encarnacion, represented by one of the defendants, Pedro Sy Quia, as the administrator of the property, were the heirs of the property of the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, now deceased, consisting of one-half of the property distributed by the order of the Court of’First Instance of the district of Quiapo of the 3d of August, 1900, in the following form: To Sy Joe Lieng, one-ninth; Sy Yoc Chay, one-ninth; Sy Chua Niu, one-ninth; C. W. O’Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, one-ninth; Pedro Sy Quia, one-ninth; Juan Sy Quia, one-ninth; Gregorio Sy Quia, one-ninth ; Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, one-ninth; and the heirs of Petronila Encarnacion, represented by Pedro Sy Quia as the administrator of the latter’s estate, one-ninth; the heirs of the said Petronila Encarnacion, represented by the administrator of her estate, being the owners with the right to possession of the other half of the property left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his death. That the defendants, Gregorio, Pedro, Juan, and Generoso, and Pedro Sy Quia as the administrator of the property of his mother Petronila Encarnacion and as a representative of the latter’s heirs, render a statement of the property which was distributed among them under and by virtue of the order of the Court of First Instance, of the 3d of August, 1900. That the said defendants and each of them render an accounting of the rents and profits of all the property respectively received by them from the dates when they were delivered to them, it being understood that if upon making the inventory of the property it appears that the portion thereof assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share does not exceed one-half of all the property left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia, at the time of his death, it will not be necessary to render an accounting of the rents anol profits of the portion to her thus assigned. That a receiver, to be selected later, be appointed upon the giving of a sufficient bond, the amount of which will be hereafter fixed, to take charge and possession of all the property known as aforesaid, it being understood that if upon making a list of the said property it appears that the part thereof assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share does not exceed one-half of all the property of the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his death, the said receiver shall only take possession of one-half of the property assigned to the other persons who have accounted for them. The Court of First Instance made no special order as to costs. To this decision of the trial court counsel for the defendants, Pedro Sy Quia, by himself and as administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion, Juan Sy Quia, Gregorio Sy Quia, and Generoso Mendoza, duly excepted, and by a motion presented to the court asked that the said judgment be set aside and a new trial granted, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and because the decision of the trial court was contrary to law, the findings of fact being plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Upon notice to counsel for plaintiffs, a hearing was had upon said motions, which were subsequently over-ruled by the court. Defendants having duly excepted to the order of the court overruling the same, and upon filing their bill of exceptions, asked the court to unite to the same all of the evidence taken and introduced by both parties, with the documents and pleadings presented during the course of the trial, the transcript of the stenographic notes containing the testimony of the witnesses, and the depositions taken at Vigan and Amoy, which said bill of exceptions defendants asked the court to approve and certify to the Supreme Court, with all of the said evidence which was made an integral part thereof. By an order entered on the 28th of March, 1908, the court upon certifying the bill of exceptions, directed that the execution of the judgment be not stayed in so far as it required the defendants to submit a statement showing the property received by them, and to render an account of all the rents and profits, upon giving a bond satisfactory to the court, to secure the fulfillment of the judgment in case the same be totally or partially affirmed by the Supreme Court. The trial court in deciding the motion for the appointment of a receiver, and after hearing both parties, made an order on the 17th of March, 1908, appointing Gregorio Sy Quia as receiver of the property in question, upon the giving of a bond in the sum of P400,000, to be approved by the court, and in case that the person thus appointed did not accept, the appointment would be set aside, and a stranger duly qualified substituted. To this order of the court the defendants Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia duly excepted, and on the 27th of March, 1908, there was united to the proper files the personal bond for P400,000 given by the receiver. By another order made on the said 17th day of March, the court in deciding the motion that a time be fixed within which the defendants should report to the court whatever property belonging to the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia was distributed among them, directed that the defendants Juan Sy Quia, Generoso Mendoza and Pedro Sy Quia, the latter by himself and as administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion, submit a statement of the property distributed among them under and by virtue of the order of the 3d of August, 190D, on or before the 23d day of March, 1908, and that Gregorio Sy Quia submit a similar statement on or before the 31st day of the said month and year. Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia excepted to this order of the court dated March 17 as aforesaid, requiring them to submit a statement of the property they had received, and asked the court to approve and to have united t The plaintiffs, upon being notified of the said judgment of the court, excepted thereto, and requested in writing that the court modify its decision and conclusions of law by declaring that the plaintiffs Sy Joe Lieng, Sy Yoc Ohay, Sy Chua Niu, and G. W. O’Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, were the only heirs of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased; that they were entitled to all the property left by the latter, and distributed under the order of the court of the 3d of August, 1900; that Petronila Encarnacion, deceased, and her children and heirs had no interest in the said estate of Sy Quia; that they were not the heirs of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that the receiver appointed by the court be authorized to take possession of all the property left by the said deceased, especially the property which was distributed by the decree of the court of the 3d of August, 1900, together with the rents and profits, and that the said judgment be modified, awarding the plaintiffs the costs of the action, and directing that defendants submit an accounting of the property in litigation. This action has for its purpose primarily to recover from the present possessors the property left at the time of his death in this city by the Christian Chinaman, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, the plaintiffs alleging that three of them are the grandchildren and one the great-grandson of the deceased Sy Quia by his lawful marriage in his own country with their deceased grandmother, Yap Puan Nzu. So that the marriage of the said Sy Quia with this woman in China is practically the fundamental basis of the action brought by the plaintiffs for the recovery of the inheritance against the defendants, who appear to be the children of the deceased Sy Quia by his marriage in these Islands with the native, Petronila Encarnacion. Does the record show that the Chinaman Sy Quia removed from Vigan, Philippine Islands, to his native town or village of Am Thau, Amoy, China, in 1847, and then married in accordance with the rites and ceremonies of his native country, Yap Puan Niu? Plaintiffs having failed to present at the trial the matrimonial letters which should have been exchanged between the contracting parties at the time the said marriage was performed, according to the ancient laws and customs of the Celestial Kingdom, and there being no allegation in the complaint as to the day and month of the common calendar year, or of the Chinese calendar year, when the said marriage took place, there is no ground on which to base the conclusion that such an important act in the life of Sy Quia has been duly established by authentic documents, nor is his alleged voyage to China from the port of Manila for the purpose of contracting such marriage, satisfactorily proven thereby, for the plaintiffs have likewise failed to introduce in evidence the passport, required by the legislation then in force, which should and would have been then issued to Sy Quia in order to enable him to leave this country and return to his own. (See superior decree of December 20,1849.) Seven witnesses, named Sy Peng, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kai Tit, Yap Chong, and Sy Botm, whose respective ages are not less than 71 nor more than 80 years, in their testimony or depositions before the vice-consul of the United States at Amoy, having promised to tell the truth, affirmed through an interpreter that they were present at the ceremony of the wedding of the said Sy Quia with the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Quia, who was in these Islands, having been expressly called to China by his father for the purpose of marrying the said Yap Puan Niu, accordingly returned to his native town or village of Am Thau, and, after being married to Yap Puan Niu, remained in the said village three of four years with his wife, by whom he had two children, Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the latter having been bom one year after the birth of the former. To overcome the testimony pi the witnesses for the plaintiffs, the defendants presented nine witnesses, to wit: Felix Millan, Aniceto Singson, Norberta Feril, Remigio Tongson, Estefania Crisologo, Alexandra Singson, Benita Encarnacion, Paulino Revilla, and Silveria Damian, whose respective ages were not less than 71 nor more than 87 years, except Aniceto Singson, who was only 66 years of age, who testified, some of them in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the others before the justice of the peace of Vigan by virtue of a commission, that they knew Sy Quia when he was an unmarried resident of the city of Vigan, for six or seven years according to most of the said witnesses, and for five years according to others, prior to his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, they having known him when he was a clerk and dry goods salesman for another Chinaman by the name of Jose Gloria Lecaroz, a resident of Manila, the witness Revilla stating that he was gobernadorcillo in 1852, when Sy Quia, after being converted to the Christian religion, was baptized in the church of San Vicente, the priest of which, who was his (Revilla’s) uncle, being frequently visited by the said Sy Quia for the purpose of the Iatter’s instruction in the new religion, and that Sy Quia upon being baptized was named Vicente Ruperto Romero, after his godfather Romero, who was at that time the clerk of the court; and Silveria Damian further testified that to the best of her recollection Sy Quia arrived in Vigan in the year 1848, stopping at her house, Sy Quia being a friend and countryman of her husband, who was also a Chinaman, and that she knew that Sy Quia was then a bachelor, that he was baptized some years later, and on the following year was married to Petronila Encarnacion. Silveria Damian, her husband and other witnesses in the case attended the wedding. It will be seen therefore that the record contains strikingly conflicting evidence, that is to say, the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs is directly in conflict with that adduced by the defendants for while the witnesses for the plaintiffs asserted that Sy Quia was at Am Thau, Amoy, in 1847, and contracted marriage in that year with Yap Puan Niu, with whom be continued to live for about three or four years thereafter, during which time the children Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were born; the witnesses for the defendants on the other hand affirmed that Sy Quia was at the time in Vigan, and that he did not leave that city during the six or seven years, according to most of the witnesses, and during tfre five years, according to the others, which immediately preceded his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in 1853. In order to determine whether the weight and preponderance of the evidence is with the plaintiffs or in favor of the defendants, in accordance with the provisions of section 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes necessary to examine and analyze each of the declarations of the respective witnesses presented at the trial, and ascertain the result of their various declarations taken as a whole, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, the probability or improbability of their testimony, with due regard to the nature of the facts as to which they testified, their degree of intelligence, and the manner in which they testified. The presence of Sy Quia in Vigan, and his presence at the same time at Am Thau, Province of Amoy, China, for a period of four years, to wit, from 1847 to 1850, two facts which are directly inconsistent with each other, might have been satisfactorily established by the testimony of witnesses, but the only proof of the fact of the marriage alleged to have been contracted by Sy Quia at the said Chinese town in 1847 could only have consisted of the matrimonial letters or cards which should have been exchanged between the families of the two contracting parties in the manner referred to by the witness Li Ung Bing, the interpreter of the American Consulate, who was called by the plaintiffs themselves, and whose testimony in this respect is uniformly corroborated by Nicolay in his book entitled “Historia de las Creencias,” by Ratzel in his book entitled “Las Razas Humanas,” by Cantu in his work entitled “Historia Universal,” and by the authors of the “Spanish American Encyclopedic Dictionary.” These matrimonial letters, once they have been mutually exchanged by the contracting parties, constitute the essential requisite required by the laws of that country in order that a Chinese marriage may be considered duly solemnized, and at the same time are the best proof of its having actually taken place. The party obliged to exhibit these letters can only be relieved from the necessity of so doing by proving that the same have been lost or disappeared, for in the absence of such proof (there being none of this character in the record), they must be produced at the trial in order to establish the fact of the marriage alleged to have taken place, and only in the cases expressly excepted by law can any other proof, such as the testimony of witnesses, be allowed, but the letters themselves must be produced as evidence of the contract to which they relate, in accordance with the provisions of section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The failure to produce the said matrimonial letters which, according to some of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, were exchanged between both families prior to the celebration of the marriage of Sy Quia with Yap Puan Niu, and the lack of proof that they had been destroyed or lost, give rise to the legal presumption that the marriage was not performed; and such presumption can not be overcome by the testimony of witnesses, some of them incompetent, while the testimony of others is conflicting, not to say contradictory, in itself, as well as highly improbable; for this is a most important contract, which, according to the ancient laws and customs of China, must be evidenced by such letters or cards, and the fact that these letters have not been produced shows that the marriage never took place; if they actually exist they should be exhibited, for it is a well-known rule that where evidence is wilfully suppressed, it is presumed that it would be adverse to the party presenting the same, if produced. (Sec. 334, par. 5, Code of Civil Procedure.) Entering upon an analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, it will be noticed that Sy Peng stated that upon the death of Sy Quia, the women of his house extended their sympathy, as customary, to his widow in China. This, however, is not true, because it appears in the record as a proved fact that Yap Puan Niu died in 1891, while Sy Quia died in this city in 1894, Lim Chio affirmed that Sy By Bo, the alleged son of Sy Quia, had two children by his wife, one of them being Sy Yoc Chay. This is not true, because Sy Yoc Chay was only an adopted son. The witness Yap Si Tan testified that Yap Puan Niu lost a natural child, whose name she did not remember, and in his place adopted Sy Yoc Chay as her son. This fact is not testified to by any of the other witnesses, who simply said that the adoption had been made by Sy By Bo. The witness Yap Chio, 72 years of age, who testified that he had been present at the wedding of Sy Quia with Yap Puan Niu, must have been 8 years old at the time. The other witness, Sy Kai Tit, who was 71 years of age, and who, according to himself, was about 12 years old at the time, stated that he had taken part in the investigation made as to the status and condition of the bride, Yap Puan Niu, having assisted Sy Quia’s parents and the mediator in the investigation. Another witness by the name of Sy Boan testified that Sy Quia, when he died in this city, was survived by his wife, Yap Puan Niu, who was still living in China, this being in direct contradiction with the established fact that Yap Puan Niu died before Sy Quia. This witness further said that when Sy Quia returned for the second time to China, in order to attend his parents’ funeral, his alleged wife, Yap Puan Niu, was still living, his testimony in this respect being in contradiction with that of the other witnesses, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chio and Sy Kai Tit. The testimony of these witnesses, most of whom have seriously contradicted themselves upon important points in the course of their examination, and some of them, considering the fact that they were very young in 1847, having told a very improbable story, claiming that they had assisted Sy Quia’s parents in bringing about the latter’s marriage, can be given no credence by the courts to sustain a finding that Sy Quia actually married Yap Puan Niu, much less so the marriages of Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit who are alleged to be the legitimate children of the said Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu, and the marriage of Sy Jui Niu, the mother of Sian Han, a grandson of Sy By Bo and a great-grandson of Sy Quia, for the reason that there were not introduced in evidence at the trial the matrimonial letters that must have been exchanged before the celebration of these marriages, all of these witnesses having simply said that they attended the wedding of Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu, that their said sons were also subsequently married and each had two children, and that Sy By Bo adopted Sy Yoc Chay in place of one of his deceased children. From the testimony of these witnesses, taken as a whole, it is impossible to arrive at the truth and to lay the foundation of a just judgment in accordance with the law. The witness Sy Hien, who claims to be a younger brother of Sy Quia, and was a witness for the plaintiffs, among the many conflicting statements made by him, as may be seen from his testimony, said that his certificates of marriage, which presumably consisted of similar matrimonial letters or cards, were kept in his own town, and that he was unable to state the difference in age between himself, who was 59 years old, and his brother Sy Quia, who, had he lived, would today be about 80 years old, unless he was permitted to examine a certain book kept in his own home in China (p. 116 of the record). His testimony clearly shows that such matrimonial letters are duly preserved and that the date of birth of the members of a family is noted or entered in a book kept in the paternal residence, in like manner as the death of such members of the family is recorded by mortuary inscriptions on tablets, a practice which is very natural among people who live in civilized communities and cities with a civilization of their own and who, like the Chinese, notwithstanding their remarkable backwardness with reference to more advanced and cultured races, generally speaking are not barbarians and do not live a nomad or savage life. The mortuary inscriptions upon one of the tablets presented in evidence at the time of taking the evidence of some of the witnesses who were called by the plaintiffs for the purpose of establishing that the deceased, Sy Quia, had in his lifetime married Yap Puan Niu, an English translation of which appears in the records, are not conclusive or supplementary proof of the said marriage, because they are absolutely false and contrary to the actual facts with reference to Sy Quia, for the latter was still alive in 1891, when he was presumed to be dead according to the said inscriptions, he having actually died in January, 1894; therefore the said mortuary tablet, and the inscriptions appearing thereon, can not serve to corroborate the testimony of the witnesses who testified to the celebration of the marriage, because such tablet and inscriptions are glaringly false, the fact that the witness Sy Peng said that Jthis tablet, together with others, was taken by him from the temple or sanctuary of Sy Quia’s family at Am Thau, to be introduced as evidence in this action, to the contrary notwithstanding. The falsity of the inscription of Sy Quia’s death, when he was still alive, made upon a tablet which was evidently prepared with remarkable haste and temerity, is borne out by the witness Li Ung Bing, the interpreter of the American consulate, who claimed to be familiar with the laws and customs of his country, for, according to him, where Chinese die out of China no inscription is made at the place of their former residence in China, upon such tablets, of the fact of their death; and as it is a fact, admitted by the plaintiffs, that Sy Quia died in Manila and was buried in La Loma cemetery, there is no doubt that the tablet in question was fraudulently prepared and fabricated to supply the lack of documentary proof as to the so much talked about marriage in China which is the fundamental basis of plaintiffs’ claim. In the administrative proceedings that Sy Quia must have instituted for the purpose of securing the necessary permission to marry Petronila Encarnacion, and at the investigation which, after the obtaining of such permission, must have been conducted by the ecclesiastical court of the ^bishopric of Vigan, he, Sy Quia, necessarily must have declared that he was single, as evidently he did, according to the testimony of the witness Roman Gray, 72 years of age, then a clerk of that court, whose testimony under oath is supported by that of other witnesses, two of them being of the same race as Sy Quia, and in view of the result of the said proceedings and investigation, conducted as aforesaid, the parish priest of the said city of Vigan was authorized to marry Vicente Sy Quia to Petronila Encarnacion, the certificate of marriage reciting the fact that there was no impediment whatever to the performance of the marriage. Without the aforesaid permission of the Governor-General, sought and obtained in accordance with sections 34 and 35 of the superior decree of the 20th of December, 1849, the vicar-general of the bishopric of Vigan would not have admitted the testimony given by the witnesses in the investigation for the purpose of proving that Vicente Sy Quia was single and free to marry, nor could the parish priest have performed the marriage ceremony without first securing the necessary authority from the court of the vicar-general in the name of the bishop. Therefore the result of those proceedings and the canonical certificate, evidencing the marriage of Vicente Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion, corroborate the testimony of the witnesses for the defendants to the effect that Sy Quia was single and had resided for many years in that city before he married Petronila Encarnacion, and that he could not have spent four years at Am Thau, province of Amoy, China, during that period, as alleged. With reference to the validity and efficacy of the canonical certificates and the certified copies thereof introduced here in evidence, we adhere to and follow the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of the United States vs, Nicolas Arceo (11 Phil. Rep., 530), No. 4539, wherein this court said:
“The canonical entries in parochial books have not lost the character of public documents for the purpose of proving such acts as are therein related, inasmuch as, since the change of sovereignty in these Islands, no legal provision has been promulgated to destroy the official and public character that the said entries had under the former regime. “Parish priests continue in the legal custody of the parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such legal custodians they may issue literal copies in the form of certificates of the entries contained therein, in like manner as custodians of archives.”
To strengthen the proof introduced by the plaintiffs as to Sy Quia’s marriage to Yap Puan Niu, an attempt was made to establish that the said Yap Puan Niu had been twice in Manila, the last time in 1886; that on these two occasions she stopped for five or six months at the house of Sy Tay, Sy Quia’s brother, and that Sy Quia frequently called on her at the said house; but, notwithstanding the testimony of some witnesses who testified to this effect, particularly Sy Hien, who claimed to be one of Sy Quia’s brothers, and who testified long after Sy Quia’s death, we have in the record the sworn statement to the contrary by the Chinese woman, Ana Quang Su, the wife of the said Sy Tay, who positively testified that upon the two occasions that the said Yap Puan Niu stopped as a guest at the house of her husband for a period of five or six months, she had never seen Sy Quia call on her, Yap Puan Niu, and that the said Yap Puan Niu never went out of the house but remained at home as was customary with Chinese women, adding that she would have known if it had been otherwise, because said Yap Puan Niu occupied a room adjoining hers in the same house, the witness being always at home, further saying that her husband Sy Tay supported the said guest, Yap Puan Niu, and paid for her transportation both ways between Manila and China, and that Sy Joe Lien and Sy Yoc Chay, who on successive dates came to Manila from China, also stopped at her, the witness’s house, where they lived at the expense and under the orders of her husband Sy Tay. The testimony of this witness is of the utmost importance, and has not been impugned or discredited in any way in this case. The witness, Roman Gray, above referred to, affirmed that while he was clerk of the ecclesiastical court of Vigan, which position he had held since 1850, he met the Chinaman Sy Quia when the latter went to his court for the purpose of being baptized as a Christian, stating that the said Sy Quia several years thereafter, in 1853, presented a petition for permission to marry, whereupon the necessary proceedings were instituted, in which said proceedings two Chinese witnesses and Sy Quia himself stated under oath that Sy Quia was single and free to marry, and a decree was subsequently entered authorizing the performance of the marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, the witness further stating that he had read the proceedings but that in 1898 the papers were destroyed by the insurgents, who removed everything from the place where the archives were kept and occupied the premises for some length of time. Aside from what has been said before, there is no other evidence in the record to show that the plaintiffs, particularly Sy Chua Niu, Sy Joe Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay, were ever recognized as legitimate grandchildren and adopted grandchild, respectively, and that Sian Han is the greatgrandchild of the said Sy Quia, nor is there any proof to show that the plaintiffs Sy Joe Lieng and Sy Chua Niu have been continuously in possession of the legal status of children of the said Sy By Guit, and the said Sy Yoc Chay as the adopted child of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han as the grandchild of the said Sy By Bo, who, as well as Sy By Guit, is said to be the legitimate son of Sy Quia by his wife, Yap Puan Niu. Further, there is no evidence to the effect that Sy Quia had ever provided for the support of Yap Puan Niu, nor that Petronila Encarnacion at any time delivered money, as alleged, to Sy Joe Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay by reason of their hereditary income, inasmuch as the delivery of the sum of ?4,000 to the said Sy Joe Lieng, entered in a book kept by Sy Tay, as per the copy of the entries appearing on page 300 of the book marked “A. S.,” is no proof of the payment of a part of the inheritance, and without any express declaration on the part of Petronila Encarnacion, an entry in a book kept by the firm ‘of Sy Tay could not be binding upon the said Encarnacion, this, aside from the fact that the entries do not show the reason why this sum of P4,000 was charged to the account of Petronila Encarnacion and credited to Sy Joe Lieng; and, even if we admit as true the statement of the witness Emilio Medina that in his presence, the said Sy Joe Lieng received an additional sum of P2,000 from Petronila Encarnacion there is no evidence to show why this sum was paid to and received by the said Sy Joe Lieng; the witness himself said that the receipt made out at the time set forth that the money was for commercial purposes. It likewise appears from the record that the plaintiffs, who now seek to be recognized as the grandchildren, and Sian Han as the great-grandchild of the deceased Sy Quia, incidentally attempting to recover the property which the said Sy Quia left at the time of his death, have not shown by competent documentary proof that Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were in fact the children of Sy Quia by his wife Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Yoc Lieng and Sy Chua Niu are the children of Sy By Guit; that Sy Yoc Chay is the adopted child of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han the son of Sy Jui Niu, who was the daughter of the said Sy By Bo, for the parentage and affiliation of the said parties, as well as the marriage of Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay, and the marriage of Sy Jui Niu, should have been established by means of the documents in which such facts are customarily recorded, as stated by Sy Hien, one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs and who also was alleged to be a brother of Sy Quia; the testimony of witnesses, the most dangerous and risky of evidence, not being sufficient to sustain a finding that the court erred in its estimation of the facts, since the preponderance of the evidence must be fixed precisely where the judge believes the truth lies, taking into consideration the facts which were sought to be established, together with the nature of the same and the circumstances of the case; and it should be noted that for the lack of documentary evidence it is impossible to determine on what date Sy Quia was actually married, if he was married at all, to Yap Puan Niu; and considering as a whole the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs as to the stay and residence of the said Sy Quia in the city of Vigan, Philippine Islands, during the three or four years when it is alleged he was at Amoy and there married, it can not be said that the preponderance of the evidence lies with the plaintiffs. It further appears from the record that while the body of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia was lying in state at the house where he died, in January, 1894, for the purpose of performing the ceremony of robing a descendant of the deceased with the nine silk suits which had been prepared for the corpse in accordance with the Chinese custom, and although Sy Hien, a brother of the deceased, was in charge of the ceremonies, it did not occur to him to dress Sy Yoc Chay in these garments, he, Sy Yoc Chay, being the son of By By Bo, and if the said Sy Hien thought that this would not be proper for the reason that Sy Yoc Chay was merely an adopted son, it is significant that Sy Joe Lieng, who was also present or at least in the house, was not dressed in the said nine suits, but the same were worn by Tomas Sy Quia, the eldest son of Gregorio, who for this purpose was expressly taken out of the college where he was at the time, as testified to by several witnesses, among them Macario Pavila, a resident merchant of Pangasinan, who chanced to be at the house on that occasion. The statement of Sy Hien to the effect that he did not remember the said ceremony, is not worthy of credit in view of the positive testimony of the defendants Pedro and Juan and of the witness Pavila, who, together with several Chinese, among them Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joe Lieng, witnessed the same. The latter’s statement that he was not present at the ceremony on account of his having temporarily left the house in order to carry out certain instructions received by him, can not be believed, for, if it is a fact that he was the proper person to wear the said nine silk suits according to the customs of his country, the master of the ceremonies would have suspended the same until he, Sy Joe Lieng, returned to the house; but instead of this the eldest son of Gregorio Sy Quia was brought, it is alleged, from the college where he was, his father Gregorio being at the time in Vigan, for the investiture of the nine robes before they were placed upon the corpse. From all this it may be inferred that Sy Yoc Chay, who denied that the said ceremony took place, and Sy Joe Lieng, were not, as a matter of fact, the grandsons of Sy Quia, as Sy Hien, a brother of the deceased, who conducted the ceremony well knew, and that the only descendant to be designated in accordance with traditional customs of the Chinese was Gregorio Sy Quia, the eldest son of the deceased, and, in his absence, the latter’s eldest son, Tomas Sy Quia, which designation was accordingly made. In addition to the foregoing considerations it should be stated that the sworn statement by Vicente Romero Sy Quia before the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of the city of Vigan in the proceedings which were instituted in 1853 in connection with his marriage in the parish church of that city, the continued possession for a period of many years of the status of a single man enjoyed by him and recognized and accepted by the whole community of the capital of the Province of Ilocos Sur, the belief on the part of his townsmen and neighbors that he was in fact a single man, all these facts being corroborated, as they are, by the uniform testimony of the witnesses for the defendants, and the unexplained silence on the part of his alleged wife, Yap Puan Niu, who might have asserted Whatever rights she may have had as the legitimate wife of Sy Quia before the tribunals of this country, if she reafty had any, completely overcome and destroy the improvised parol evidence as to the pretended marriage of Sy Quia in China, the performance of which was for the first time alleged in December, 1905, after Sy Quia’s death and the demise of the latter’s brother, Joaquin Martinez Sy Tiong Tay, who, having sheltered in his house the woman Yap Puan Niu on the two occasions aforesaid, as well as the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joe Lieng since these latter landed in the Philippines, might have testified to the existence of the marriage, thus supporting the plaintiff’s claim to the Sy Quia estate. It is admitted by the plaintiffs in this case that two of them, Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joe Lieng, and the woman Yap Puan Niu, when they came to this country stopped at the house of the said Sy Tiong Tay, who provided for their support and maintenance, gave employment to the first two in his own business and paid for the transportation of the woman to Manila and back to China on the two occasions when she came to this country; and, notwithstanding the truth and certainty of these facts, the plaintiffs, nevertheless, did not even endeavor to show that the said Sy Tiong Tay had defrayed all these expenses by order and on account of his brother Sy Quia, a fact which would appear from the entries in the books kept by him as a merchant, if such payments were really made in behalf of the said Sy Quia. The plaintiffs introduced in evidence a certain book alleged to belong to the firm of Sy Tay for the purpose of establishing a certain payment made by Petronila Encarnacion to the said plaintiffs. They, however, were unable to produce any book to show that the expenses incurred by the said Sy Tay for the maintenance and support of the said plaintiffs and of the woman, Yap Puan Niu, as well as the latter’s traveling expenses were paid by and on account of Sy Quia. They were unable to explain the reason for these disbursements made by Sy Tay for the benefit of two of the plaintiffs and their alleged grandmother, notwithstanding the fact that death had forever stilled the lips of the two brothers, Sy Tay and Sy Quia, plaintiffs having confined themselves to attributing to him whom they believed to be the wealthier of the two brothers, who unfortunately can not now speak, the paternity and parentage of a family which is not proved to be his. This court, in the strictest administration of justice and in conformity with the law, can not admit that plaintiffs have proved four marriages and three generations, since the evidence introduced by them in support of these facts only consists of the testimony of witnesses, most of whom have made conflicting statements and some have contradicted themselves, as for instance the brother of Sy Quia, Sy Hien, whose testimony is absolutely unworthy of credence, and other witnesses have told improbable stories and testified as to things which are not likely to occur in the natural and ordinary course of human events. Even assuming that Sy Quia before he became a Christian actually married Yap Puan Niu in 1847, as alleged, and that his second marriage in 1853 with a Christian woman, by whom he had five children and with whom he lived cotentedly in these Islands since the marriage until he died, covering a period of forty-one years, while the first marriage was still in full force and effect, was null and void, he, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having therefore married twice in violation of the law, the plaintiffs, nevertheless, would not be entitled to the relief sought by them in their complaint. There is not the slightest evidence in the record which even tends to indicate that Sy Quia, at the time of his marriage at Vigan in 1853 with Petronila Encaraacion, brought any property or money into the conjugal partnership. The fact that he did not is not surprising, as he was then a mere clerk in the employment of another Chinaman by the name of Jose Gloria, who was a resident of this city, with a salary of P200 per annum, as per the testimony of Silveria Damian, an aged woman, whose husband was also a Chinaman and worked for the same man that Sy Quia did and for the same salary; while, on the other hand, there is evidence in the record to the effect that Petronila Encarnacion, who belonged to a wealthy family of Vigan, brought to the marriage, as a gift from her parents, the sum of P5,000, which, together with their common labor and industry, was the basis of the fortune accumulated by both husband and wife in the course of years. Therefore, even assuming that the second marriage which was contracted by Sy Quia at Vigan was void, while a former marriage alleged to have been performed at Amoy, China, was still in full force and effect, and upon which the plaintiffs in this case base their contention, the second marriage, however, produced civil effects under the laws here in force in 1853, the time when it was performed. These laws are as follows: Law 3, title 3, Partida 4, provides in part as follows:
“Further, if people marry advisably, knowing that such impediment existed, and that for this reason they should not have married, the children which may be born will not be legitimate; but if only one of the contracting parties, and not both, was cognizant of the existence of such impediment, the children will be legitimate, for the ignorance of one of the contracting parties excuses them, and no one can say that they are not legitimate children.”
Law 1, title 13, Partida 4, provides in part as follows:
“And even if it should happen that between those who are married manifestly in facie ecclesia such impediment exists which would require that the marriage be set aside, the children which may be born to them before the contracting parties knew that the impediment existed, will be legitimate. And this would also be the case if neither of the contracting parties knew that the impediment existed, as well as if only one of them had knowledge thereof, for the ignorance on the part of one of them would make the children legitimate. But if after knowing with certainty that the impediment existed between them, they should have children, any that should be born subsequent thereto will not be legitimate. But, if while such impediment exists without the knowledge of both parties or of either of them, they should be accused before the judges of the Holy Church, and before the impediment is duly established and final judgment entered, children be born to them, such children as may be born while the doubt exists, will be legitimate.”
The Civil Code has merely reproduced with certain modifications the provisions of the old legislation in force in 1853 as to the civil effects of a void marriage where both parties married in good faith, as well as where only one of them acted in good faith, for whether one or both married in good faith, the marriage will produce civil effects only in favor of the innocent spouse, and of the children born of this void marriage. If in all the acts of life good faith is to be presumed unless the contrary is proven, it can not be denied that Petronila Encarnacion acted in good faith when she married Vicente Romero Sy Quia in 1853, since there is no evidence in the record to the effect that she knew before or after her marriage that the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia was married in China to another woman. The marriage contracted by a Christian Chinese at the time when Sy Quia was married in the Philippines, was preceded by such formalities, and so many requisites had first to be complied with, that it was difficult, not to say impossible, that in the natural and ordinary course of things the marriage could have been performed if there were any impediment at all thereto. In the case of Sy Quia, not only for many years was he considered in the city of Vigan by the community at large as a bachelor, his name appearing as such in the municipal census, but it must be fairly assumed that when he instituted the proceedings before the civil authorities, and ecclesiastical proceedings in the ecclesiastical court of Vigan, in order to secure permission and authority to marry in accordance with the various decrees then in force, among them the decree of the 20th of December, 1849, he must have positively said then that he was a bachelor, and this fact must have appeared from the summary investigation conducted by the ecclesiastical authorities of Vigan for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he was a bachelor and free to marry, and when at last the parish priest of Vigan was authorized to proceed with the marriage ceremony, there is little room for doubt that Petronila Encarnacion, as well as her family, relying upon the result of both proceedings, and upon the license or authority granted by the government, and the authority given by the vicar general in the name of the bishop, for the performance of the marriage, they consented thereto in the best of good faith, particularly Petronila Encarnacion, to the latter’s union to Vicente Romero Sy Quia in lawful wedlock. If, on the contrary, it were true that Sy Quia had married in China many years before, there is no doubt that he acted in bad faith by deceiving his wife Petronila Encarnacion, as well as the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of this country, perjuring himself. And upon the assumption that the marriage with Petronila Encarnacion was void by reason of the existence of a prior undissolved marriage, the second marriage, nevertheless, produced its civil effects in favor of the deceived spouse, and of the children born to them, who, notwithstanding the nullity of the second marriage, are in the eyes of the law legitimate, as though they had been born of parents lawfully married. Therefore, assuming that Vicente Romero Sy Quia acted in bad faith by concealing the fact of his first marriage at the investigation made by the authorities for the purpose of determining whether or not he was a bachelor and free to marry, one of the civil effects produced by the marriage thus rendered void was that Sy Quia thereby absolutely forfeited all his rights and interest to one-half of the conjugal property appearing in the instrument of partition, Exhibit A. F., and by operation of law all the property which would otherwise have belonged to him, became the property of his wife, Petronila Encarnacion,” in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code applicable to the case in conformity with rule 3 of the transitory provisions. Law 16, title 17, Partida 7, with reference to this subject, provides:
“Notorious wickedness is committed by men who knowingly marry twice while their first wife is living, and the same may be said of women who marry twice knowing that their first husband is still alive. Because such marriages give offense to God, and bring about great damages and dishonor to those who are deceived, and they should be careful to marry well and properly, as directed by the holy Church, for they would otherwise be married to persons with whom they would later live in sin, and while they endeavor to be happy in their marriage, and have children, the first wife or first husband appears when least expected, and disrupts the marriage, and on account of this rupture many women are dishonored and ruined forever, and men are disgraced in many ways. We therefore command that everyone who should knowingly enter into such a marriage, in any of the manners specified in this law, be hence banished to some island for five years, and that he forfeit whatever he may own at the place where the marriage was performed, and that it be given to his children or his grandchildren, if he has any, and if he has no children or grandchildren, one-half of such property should go to the person deceived, and the other half to the king’s chamber ; and if both parties knew that one of them was married, and wilfully married him or her, then both shall be banished, each to a separate island, and the property of either of them who may have no children should go to the king’s chamber.”
Article 1417 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“The conjugal partnership expires on the dissolution of the marriage or when it is declared void. “The spouse who, by reason of his or her bad faith, caused the annulment, shall not receive any share of the property of the partnership.”
This article embodies and reproduces under different aspects the provisions contained in articles 72, 1333, subsection 3, 1373, 1378, and 1429 of the same code, and a mere reading of this article, together with the provisions of law 16 of the Partidas above quoted, will show the difference between the two. It will be noticed that the code contains more favorable and less strict provisions on this subject than the law of the Partidas, wherefore, in accordance with rule 3 of the transitory provisions of the said code, the intestate succession of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia should be governed and regulated by the new code, which was in force on January 9, 1894, the date of Sy Quia’s death. True, article 72 of the said code is included in title 4, the application and enforcement of which in these Islands was suspended under the former sovereignty; but there is no doubt that article 1417 and the other sections cited are now in force, said article 1417 providing that the spouse who by reason of his or her bad faith causes the annulment of the marriage, shall not receive any share of the property of the conjugal partnership. It should be borne in mind that on account of the unexplained silence of Yap Puan Niu during her lifetime, and the silence of the plaintiffs during Sy Quia’s lifetime, the conjugal partnership constituted in 1853 between Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion was dissolved in 1894 by the death of the husband, and only then, when the Civil Code was already in operation, would their presumptive heirs have acquired a right to claim the inheritance, for the right to inherit while the deceased was still living is a mere right in expectancy, and not until after the decease of the person whose succession is in concern can such a right be said to exist or to be duly acquired. See the preamble to the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain on the subject in its judgment of the 24th of June, 1897, wherein the court said:
“That upon the settlement and distribution of the estate of a person who dies subsequent to the promulgation of the Civil Code, any action for the recovery of the property of the estate should be governed by the provisions of the said code, in conformity with the first rule and the one preceding the last, of the transitory provisions, because the rule as to the nonretroactivity of the new law only applies to rights acquired under the former legislation; and it is a well-known fact that hereditary rights exist only after the demise of the decedent; and the trial court having so decided, it did not infringe the provisions of laws 11 ancf 12, title 13, Partida 6, and the general provision of the transitory rules for the application of the Civil Code.”
However, as a matter of fact the action instituted by plaintiffs in 1905, claiming the property left by Sy Quia at the time of his death, is based especially upon the alleged nullity of the second marriage on account of the existence of the former performed in China. Therefore, the rights claimed by the plaintiffs should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code which has been in operation since 1889 and under which the rights now asserted by the plaintiffs might have sprung and been acquired by them, this assuming that the alleged first marriage was actually performed in China and that the claimants were in fact the issue of the said pretended marriage of Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu. Since the 9th of June, 1853, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia married Petronila Encarnacion, the conjugal partnership commenced to exist between the two spouses. All the property acquired by them up to the time of the dissolution of the said partnership on account of the death of Sy Quia on January 9, 1894, belonged to this partnership. (Law 1, title 3, of the Fuero Real; laws 1, 3 and 4, title 4, book 10, of the Novisima Recopilacion; and arts. 1393, 1401, 1403-1407, Civil Code.) During Sy Quia’s lifetime the validity of his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, as has been said before, was never questioned, no one having indicated any defect which rendered the same void. It was only afterJus^death that the plaintiffs ventured to attack the validity of the same by claiming that they were his legitimate heirs and as such entitled to his estate. The Laws of the Partidas above cited, as well as the Civil Code, both recognize as a fact that a marriage contracted in good faith, by one at least of the parties to the same, produces the same civil effects as a valid marriage with reference to the innocent spouse and the children born of such marriage, even though the same be subsequently declared null and void. It can not be denied that Petronila Encarnacion married Sy Quia in the best of good faith, there being not the slightest proof to the contrary so far as the record shows. Therefore, being innocent, she must be held to have acquired all the rights to which a wife is ordinarily entitled, and neither she nor her children can be made to suffer the consequences of the nullity of such marriage, this, assuming that the marriage was void; nor can they in any event be made to suffer the consequences of the bad faith of her husband Sy Quia. The nullity of the marriage, once declared by the courts, may deprive the partnership created by the marriage of the alleged spouses of its otherwise legal character, but can not destroy the legal consequences of the marital union while it existed. Consequently the children are considered legitimate, and the innocent spouse is unquestionably entitled to one-half of the conjugal property acquired during the marriage. From the legal provisions above cited, especially the sections of the Civil Code referred to, it necessarily follows that the half of the conjugal property to which Vicente Romero Sy Quia would have been otherwise entitled, on account of the alleged nullity of his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion and of his bad faith in contracting the same, was forfeited by him and by operation of the law passed to the other spouse, Encarnacion; and the plaintiffs, in their alleged capacity as legitimate descendants of the said Sy Quia, deceased, can not now claim the said property, as the decedent, by the express provisions of the law, absolutely forfeited his right to the said half of the property acquired during the marriage. Such marriage must be considered null and void if it is true, as alleged by the plaintiffs, that Sy Quia’s marriage with Yap Puan Niu was still in full force and effect when he married Petronila Encarnacion. Counsel for plaintiffs now ask this court to modify the judgment appealed from and to declare that the said plaintiffs are the only legitimate heirs of Sy Quia and consequently entitled to his entire estate, together with all rents and profits, for which judgment should be entered in their favor with costs. In support of their contention they have assigned various errors as committed by the trial court, among them that the court erred in finding as a conclusion of law that the said Sy Quia was a subject of the Chinese Empire and that his estate should be distributed in accordance with the laws of China. It is an admitted fact that Sy Quia was a native Chinaman and therefore a foreigner; that he came to this country in 1839 or 1840, when he was 12 years of age. He having resided in these Islands since then and until January, 1894, when he died, that is to say, for a period of more than 53 years, having obtained for this purpose the necessary license or permission, and having been converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a native woman in the city of Vigan and establishing his domicile first in the Province of Ilocos and later in this city of Manila, with the intention of residing here permanently, engaging in business generally and acquiring real estate, it is unquestionable that by virtue of all these acts he acquired a residence and became definitely domiciled in these Islands with the same rights as any nationalized citizen in accordance with the laws in force in these Islands while he lived here and until his death. It should be noticed that, as the laws have no retroactive effect, in order to determine what rights Sy Quia had actually acquired since he removed to the Philippines in 1839 or 1840, it will be necessary to resort to the laws in force at that time; and the provisions of the Civil Code promulgated in November, 1889, could not affect in the least rights thus acquired by virtue of his long residence in these Islands. Article 3 of the Civil Code is as follows: “Laws shall not have retroactive effect unless otherwise prescribed therein.” This provision is in accordance with the provisions ofiaw 15, title 14, Partida 3. The legislation then in force on the subject of naturalization and residence of foreigners in the Philippine Islands will be found in the following laws. Law 1, title 11, book 6 of the Novisima Recopilacion, is as follows:
“We permit that the subjects of other kingdoms (provided they are Catholics and friendly to our Crown) who may desire to come here to practice their trade or profession may do so, and we command that if they do now practice some trade or profession and live twenty leagues inland from any port, they shall be forever exempt from the payment of taxes, and shall be likewise exempt, for a period of six years, from the payment of municipal taxes and from the performance of any ordinary or extraordinary services, as well as from holding office as members of municipal councils at the place where they may reside; and they, like other residents, shall be permitted to use the common pastures and enjoy all the privileges accorded to the latter: and we hereby command the authorities to provide them with house and lands, if necessary. And other foreigners, whether they have any trade or profession, provided they have lived in this kingdom for a period of ten years in a home of their own, and have been married to native women for a period of six years, shall be admitted to all the offices of the republic except to those of magistrate, governor, mayor, alderman, warden, treasurer, revenue collector, secretary of city council, or any other government position of trust. As to these latter offices, as well as to all ecclesiastical offices, all existing laws shall continue in full force and effect, etc.”
And law 3 of the same title and book of the Novisima Recopilacion provides:
“There shall be considered as denizens, in the first place. all foreigners who obtain the privilege of naturalization and those who are born in these kingdoms; those who residing therein may be converted to our holy Catholic faith; those who, being self-supporting, establish their domicile therein; those who ask for and obtain residence in any town thereof; those who marry a native woman of the said kingdoms and are domiciled therein; and in the case of a foreign woman who marries a native man, she thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acquires the same domicile as her husband; those who establish themselves in the country by acquiring real property; those who have a trade or profession and go there to practice the same; also those who practice some mechanical trade therein or keep a retail store; those who hold public or honorary offices or any such position whatsoever which can only be held by natives; those who enjoy the privilege of the common pastures and other privileges usually accorded to other residents; those who shall reside in the said kingdoms for a period of ten years in a home of their own; and also those foreigners who, in accordance with the common law, royal orders and other laws of the kingdoms, may have become naturalized or acquired residence therein, they being obliged to pay the same taxes as the natives for the legal and fundamental reason that they also participate in their privileges, etc.”
Article 18 of the Code of Commerce of May 30, 1829, which was in operation until 1888, is as follows:
“Foreigners who have become naturalized or have acquired residence in Spain in the manner provided by law may freely engage in commerce with the same rights and under the same conditions as natives of the kingdom.”
Although the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was not extended to the colonies, with the exception of section 28 thereof, nevertheless, it is only proper to call attention to the provisions of the said decree in so far as they have any bearing upon the case at bar, in view of the provisions of laws 1 and 2, title 1, book 2, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies, which direct that the laws of Castile shall be observed in all cases not otherwise covered by said laws. Section 2 of the said royal decree of 1852 is as follows:
“Foreigners who have gained or obtained a residence, in accordance with the laws, shall be considered Spanish subjects.”
Section 3 provides that all other foreigners who reside in Spain without having taken out naturalization papers, or otherwise gained a residence therein, shall continue to be foreigners. And section 12 provides:
“Those persons shall not be legally considered as foreigners, under any circumstances, who have failed to register as such in the registry of transients or domiciled persons kept by the civil authorities of the provinces or with the consuls of the respective nations.”
It is a proven and undeniable fact that Sy Quia resided in the Philippines for more than fifty years, he having only absented himself occasionally for a short time with the intention of immediately returning to the Islands; and it is also a fact that in various documents and public instruments executed before notaries public, which have been introduced in evidence marked as “Exhibits 1, 2, and 3,” said Vicente Romero Sy Quia has uniformly stated that he was a resident of the district of Binondo, having declared in one of the said documents that he was a freeholder. If the Chinaman Vicente Romero Sy Quia on account of his continuous residence in these Islands for a period of more than fifty years, and by virtue of the fact that he had permanently established himself in this country, living in a house of his own, with his wife and children, and having acquired real estate therein, did become a domiciled denizen under the laws then in force, even if it be held that the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was applicable to these Islands by virtue of the provision contained in the Laws of the Indies, the legal status of Vicente Romero Sy Quia has not changed, because the provisions of the said decree do not in any way affect the rights acquired by him; and the supreme court of Spain in a judgment of the 30th of April, 1861, in construing this provision of the law, declared and held that the purpose of the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was not to promulgate a new law, but merely to condense and embody in one single act the various provisions then in force with reference to foreigners, and to preserve the fuero de extranjeria (the rights which foreigners had in certain cases to invoke their own laws) in the same manner as it existed before. In another judgment of the 29th of August of the same year the said supreme court of Spain held that under the provisions of law 3, title 11, book 6, of the Novisima Recopilacion, there should be considered as domiciled denizens of Spain all foreigners who, being self-supporting, established their domicile in the country; the double inscription in the registry, as required by the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, being no obstacle thereto. Many years prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code in these Islands, there was published in the Official Gazette of this city on September 18, 1870, the decretal law of the 4th of July of the said year relating to foreigners, section 2 of which provides:
“Foreigners who, in accordance with the laws, shall become naturalized or gain residence in any town of the Spanish provinces beyond the seas, shall be considered as Spanish subjects.”
After dividing into three different classes the foreigners who should come into and establish themselves in the provinces beyond the seas, classifying them respectively as domiciled, transient, and immigrant foreigners, the said section provided that “Domiciled foreigners are those who have a regular residence and have lived for three years in any province or who may have registered as such residents in the registry of domiciled, persons kept for this purpose,” etc. Section 7 of the said decree provides as follows:
“Any foreigner residing in the provinces beyond the seas, in order to be considered as such foreigner under the laws of the country, shall register in the registry of foreigners to be kept for this purpose by the civil supreme authorities and by the consuls of their respective nations.”
The above-quoted sections of the said decree are in harmony with similar sections contained in the decree of the 17th of November, 1852, which, as has been said, was never extended to these Islands - with the exception of section 28 thereof relating to the settlement of the estates of deceased foreigners. The doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain with reference to the interpretation and proper construction of the said decree is not, therefore, inconsistent with the provisions of the decree or law of 1870, also relating to foreigners. True that prior to 1870 there existed in these Islands no registry of foreigners and that even the civil registry was not then in operation, the provisions of titles 4 and 12 of the Civil Code relating thereto having been suspended by telegraphic order of the 29th of December, 1889. It is also true that no registry was kept by the foreign consulates and that there was no Chinese consul here at that time. However, if the Chinaman By Quia Kad really intended to preserve his nationality and the protection of the laws of this country, he would have registered in the registry which was kept by the Government here after the publication in these Islands of the said decree of 1870; and under the theory of the law a foreigner, in order to have the right to invoke the laws of his own country, must register in the proper registries as such foreigner; if Sy Quia did not see fit to so register at any time prior to his death in 1894, we must presume that he did not do so because he desired to, preserve the rights which he had acquired as a resident of Manila. Continuous and permanent residence in the country for a period of years, and the rights thereby acquired as a denizen of any town, were always taken into consideration by the Spanish legislators in determining the rights of a foreigner residing: in Spanish territory. The constitution of 1812 provides in section 5 that there shall be considered as Spanish subjects:
“2. Foreigners who have obtained from the cortes a certificate of naturalization; and, 3. Those who have otherwise gained residence in accordance with the laws of the country and lived as such residents for a period of ten years in any town of the kingdom.”
A similar provision is contained in section 1 of the constitution of 1845, paragraph 4 of which is as follows:
“Spanish subjects are those who, not having otherwise obtained a certificate of naturalization, have, nevertheless, gained residence in any town of the kingdom.”
It becomes necessary to refer to the Spanish laws which were applicable or in operation in these Islands at the time that Vicente Romero Sy Quia gained residence and acquired the status of a domiciled denizen of the municipality of Vigan and subsequently of this city of Manila, for the reason that they were the only laws regulating his personal rights. In addition to what has been said for the purpose of demonstrating that Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired the legal status of a domiciled resident of these Islands, we should not forget to say that the Chinese residents of these Islands under the former sovereignty, and particularly at the time that Sy Quia gained a residence in this Archipelago, were governed by the Laws of the Indies and other special laws, some of them quite ancient; although they had no consul or any other representative of the Chinese Government, they, nevertheless, had a gobernadorcillo who was elected by their most prominent citizens, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. They were governed by laws different from the general laws of the country and paid a tax different from that which was paid by the natives and foreigners, and, upon their landing for the purpose of establishing themselves in the Islands, they had to obtain what was known as a resident’s license and secure passports and permits whenever they desired to leave the Islands, and not only had they to obtain such permission from the Government, but also from their native wife, if they were married. It should be noticed also that they were not permitted to land in Manila without first obtaining a permit from the Government, and that they had to state before the Chinese immigration authorities whether they came here as mere transients, or visitors for a period of three months, which could be extended if they really intended to establish themselves in the country. For this purpose certain proceedings were instituted before the immigrant was given the said resident’s license. This license entitled them to more liberty and privileges in their business journeys and excursions through the provinces than the other transients who merely had permission to stay here three months. All this may be verified by reference to the decrees of the 31st of August, 1839; 16th of September, 1840; 13th of December, 1843; and 20th of December, 1849. It should be noticed further that section 19 of the said decree of the 16th of September, 1840, provided that the children always follow the status of their father and pay the same taxes, except the children of Chinese, who, according to the decree of the 2d of May, 1786, were considered as Chinese mestizos. These decrees may be found in the work entitled “Legislacion Ultra Marina,” by Rodriguez San Pedro, vol. 2, pp. 471-483, and vol. 8, p. 401. The foregoing will clearly show that Vicente Romero Sy Quia gained residence in these Islands under the laws of the Novisima Recopilacion. Therefore the questions raised by those who now claim to be his descendants should be decided in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines to which Sy Quia submitted himself from the time he applied for a resident’s license and abstained from registering in 1870 as a foreigner. Most of the property left by him being real, the same is subject to the laws of the country in which it is located. In support of what has been said with reference to the special laws governing in the Philippines concerning Chinese, we will cite the decision in a case where a Chinese Christian by the name of Bonifacio Lim Tuaco requested that the children of Chinese married to native women, whether pure natives or half-castes, pay the same taxes as their father and be permitted to wear the same costume as the latter up to the age of 25. The Spanish Government, inspired by the traditional spirit of the ancient special laws relating to Chinese residents in these Islands, after consulting various heads of departments and obtaining the opinion of the Philippine council, denied the said petition in a royal order of the 24th of February, 1880, which was communicated to the Governor-General of these Islands and published in the Official Gazette April 17, 1880. The plaintiffs in this case have invoked certain provisions of the Chinese laws as one of the grounds of the action by them instituted and now contend that the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased, should be distributed in accordance with the laws of that country. Even disregarding the fact that the plaintiffs should have, but have not, alleged in their complaint, as one of the facts constituting their cause of action, the existence of a law passed and promulgated in China, the existence of which law, being foreign, should have been alleged in the complaint, the fact remains that there is absolutely no evidence in the record as to the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by plaintiffs in their subsequent pleadings, the evidence of this character introduced by them consisting of books or pamphlets written in Chinese characters and marked “Exhibits AH, AI, AJ, and AK,” which they claim contain a compilation of the laws of China, being useless and of no value. It may be that they contain, as plaintiffs claim, the laws of China, but we have no Spanish translation of them, they being in the Chinese language, and written with characters which are absolutely unknown to this court and to the defendants. Further, the plaintiffs have not introduced expert testimony in the manner and form prescribed by section 292 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, finally, there is no evidence that these four books or pamphlets were printed by authority of the Chinese Government or that they have been duly authenticated by the certificate of competent authorities or that they are properly sealed with the seal of the nation to which they belong. For this” reason the said books or pamphlets can not, under any circumstances, be considered as documentary proof of the laws of China. Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
“Books printed or published under the authority of the United States, or of one of the States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or country, or proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of such State or country as evidence of the written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine Islands as evidence of such law.”
Section 301 of the same code provides:
“A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any State or country, attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State or country, is admissible as evidence of such law or writing.”
Section 302 provides as follows:
“The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of the United States or of any State of the United States, or foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the United States or of such State or country, or proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.”
The jurisprudence of American and Spanish tribunals is uniform on this subject. For the purposes of this decision however it will be sufficient to refer to the judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 26th of May, 1887, wherein it is said:
“Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our tribunals, its existence must be satisfactorily established as any other fact.”
If the pamphlets or books, written in Chinese characters, do not satisfactorily establish the existence of certain Chinese laws invoked by the plaintiffs, not only because such pamphlets or books lack the aforesaid formalities and requisites, but further because there is no evidence as to the nature of the laws contained in those books or pamphlets and the subjects with which they deal; on the other hand, the two witnesses whose testimony was introduced for the purpose of establishing the authenticity of the laws which, according to the plaintiffs, are contained in the said books, were unable to say positively at least that the book marked Exhibit AH contains an exact copy of the original. And the Chinese consul of this city, Sy Int Chu, after stating that he had never made a regular study of the laws of his country, simply consulting the same in connection with his official reports, admitted that he had never read or seen the original copy of this alleged compilation, the books not being duly certified, adding that he could not say whether the book marked “Exhibit AH” was an exact copy of the original. The testimony of the witness Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter, as to the written and unwritten laws of China, does not show, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, that he knew such laws or that he was acquainted with the nature of the laws alleged to be contained in the said books. He merely confined himself to expressing his own opinion with reference to the two classes of laws. He, not being an expert on the subject thoroughly conversant with the laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which he testified, can not even be accepted as partial evidence that the said four books really contain the written and unwritten laws of China. From the foregoing facts and provisions of law referred to we conclude: First. That it has not been duly established in this case that the Chinaman Sy Quia, married in 1847 at Am Thau, Amoy, China, the woman Yap Puan Niu, or that the plaintiffs are the descendants of the said Sy Quia, for the reason that the marriage of Sy By Bo, Sy By Guit and Sy Jui Niu, respectively, the affiliation and parentage of the latter and of Sy Chua Niu and Sian Han, and the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay have not been proven. Second. That, even assuming that Sy Quia actually married Yap Puan Niu in 1847, and that the second marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in 1853 is, therefore, void, Sy Quia having contracted this second marriage in bad faith by concealing the fact that his former wife was still living, his half of the property of the conjugal partnership between him and his second wife, who married him in good faith, was forfeited by operation of law in favor of his said second wife, for although the law recognizes civil effects to a void marriage, it, nevertheless, deprives the party who married in bad faith of his share in the community property acquired during the existence of the marriage up to the time of its annulment. Third. That, as a consequence of the foregoing conclusion and under the same hypothesis, the plaintiffs, as the descendants of Sy Quia by his first marriage, have no right to claim Sy Quia’s share in the conjugal property acquired during his second marriage with Petronila Encarnacion for the reason that by the express provision of the law the half of the said conjugal property which would have otherwise belonged to the husband was transmitted to Petronila Encarnacion, together with the other half of the said property to which she was rightfully entitled under the law as the deceived wife. Fourth. That, under the same hypothesis that the marriage of Sy Quia with Petronila Encarnacion is void, his former marriage not having been dissolved when he married the said Petronila Encarnacion, the children by the second marriage are, nevertheless, legitimate, this being one of the civil effects of a marriage contracted in good faith, as in this case, at least on the part of one of the contracting parties, Petronila Encarnacion. Fifth. That Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having become a regularly domiciled denizen under the laws above cited by reason of his long residence in this country for more than fifty years and by reason of the further fact that he married a native woman, established himself in this city with a home of his own, acquired real property and engaged in business generally, most of the property left by him at the time of his death being real property, the questions raised by plaintiffs’ petition must be determined in accordance with the laws of the Philippines to which Sy Quia submitted himself when he came to the Islands and secured a residence therein, and not in accordance with any other foreign or unknown law. Sixth. That, aside from the fact that it does not specifically appear from the record what are the Chinese laws applicable to the issues of this case, there is no proof of the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by the “plaintiffs, nor is there anything to show that the books or pamphlets introduced by them in evidence contain any specific laws of the Celestial Empire. The foregoing disposes explicitly or implicitly, affirmatively or otherwise, of all the questions raised by the various assignments of error submitted by both parties; and in our opinion it is not necessary to dispose of each of them in detail in view of the conclusion at which the court has arrived in this most important litigation. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the trial court, appealed from by both parties, should be reversed, and that we should, and do hereby, absolve the defendants of the complaint upon which this action was instituted, without any special order as to the costs of both instances. The bond given by the receiver, Gregorio Sy Quia, is hereby discharged and the petition heretofore made for the appointment of a new receiver is hereby denied. It is so ordered. Carson and Elliott, JJ., concur. Arellano, C. J., concurring: I concur, reserving my additional opinion. Mapa, J., concurs in the result.