[ G.R. No. 4280. February 01, 1909 ] 13 Phil. 690
[ G.R. No. 4280. February 01, 1909 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIO BUSTOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 20th day of August, 1906, the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila presented a complaint against the defendant, charging him with the crime of libel. On the same day the defendant was arrested and brought before the court and presented a bond for his appearance.
On the 24th day of August, the defendant presented a motion asking for a bill of particulars, which motion was denied by the court on the 28th day of August, to which ruling of the court the defendant duly excepted.
On the 30th day of August, the defendant presented a demurrer to said complaint, which demurrer was overruled by the court.
On the 5th day of September, 1906, the defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded “not guilty,” and the cause was duly set down for trial on the 15th day of October, 1906. The trial of the cause was actually begun on the 23d day of October, 1906.
On the 25th day of October, 1906, the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, after having obtained permission of the court, filed an amended complaint in said cause, which complaint was signed and sworn to by V. Singson Encarnacion. The amended complaint was as follows:
“The undersigned accuses Julio Bustos of the crime of libel, committed as follows:
“That on or about the 21st day of March, 1906, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Julio Bustos did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with malicious intent to injure and disgrace Vicente Singson Encarnacion, who was then and there the provincial fiscal of the Province of Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, and Dionisio Chanco, who was then and there judge of the Court of First Instance for the Second Judicial District of the Philippine Islands, write and publish, and procure to be written and published, a certain false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and injurious publication, defamation and libel of and concerning the said Vicente Singson Encarnacion and the said Dionisio Chanco, in one part of which libel there were and are contained, amongst other things, certain false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and injurious matters and things of and concerning the said Vicente Singson Encarnacion and the said Dionisio Chanco, according to the tenor and effect following, that is to say:
“’(c) Away back in 1904, a horrible murder perpetrated in the presence of many persons, and which produced general indignation among all the people of the town, took place in the municipality of Narvacan, Province of Ilocos Sur. The justice of the peace of that municipality made the proper preliminary examination in which all of the eyewitnesses to the crime testified, their testimony constituting conclusive proof. In view of this fact the justice of the peace found the accused guilty and bound him over for trial in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur where the case was registered as No. 90. The fiscal, Don Vicente Singson, without bringing information asked for the dismissal of the said case, and the same was dismissed, much to the surprise of all persons who had a knowledge of the facts.
“‘There are rumors current in Vigan, which I have heard from many persons, that the accused in the said cause No. 90 won over the fiscal, Señor Vicente, Judge Chanco, and the clerk of the court, Señor Alviar, with the sum of P6,000 which was delivered to the said clerk who distributed it among the three.
“’(d) These rumors are confirmed by others with reference to the clerk of the court, Alviar, for it is said that when he was removed from office, the authority removing him recommended to the judicial authorities of Vigan that he be prosecuted for estafa. This, however, was not done, no complaint ever having been brought up against Clerk Alviar. I have been told that the said clerk publicly stated that if Fiscal Singson and Judge Chanco should dare to prosecute him for estafa they also would be prosecuted as they had been parties to the acts committed by the said clerk,’—
“tending to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the said Vicente Singson Encarnacion and the said Dionisio Chanco, and thereby expose them to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.
“Contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.”
The defendant, after having demanded a bill of particulars and after having demurred to said complaint, upon arraignment entered the pleas of “not guilty” and “former jeopardy.”
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause the lower court found the defendant guilty of the crime charged in said complaint and sentenced him to be imprisoned in the Insular Prison of Bilibid for a period of three months and to pay a fine of P100 and the costs of the prosecution. From this sentence the defendant appealed.
From the record it appears that sometime in the early part of March, 1906, the defendant sent a communication to the then honorable Secretary of Justice, Mr. Ide, which was personally delivered by the defendant to the private secretary of the said Secretary, and later by the said private secretary to Mr. Ide, which communication, among many other things, contained the statements found in paragraphs (c) and (d) of the above complaint. This communication contains many statements reflecting upon the official integrity of the judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Sur, of the fiscal of said province and of the clerk of said court. In the present case, however, the prosecuting attorney relies only upon those statements found in said communication quoted as paragraphs (c) and (d).
The attorney for the appellant admits that the statement made in writing to the said Secretary of Justice tended to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the honorable judge and the fiscal, and under some circumstances would constitute the crime of libel. But there are present in this case certain facts which place them without the provisions of the law.
The appellant bases his defense in this court upon two grounds:
First. That the communication to the Secretary of Justice was a privileged communication; and
Second. That it was made in good faith.
The above-implied admission by the defendant relieves this court of the necessity of discussing the questions whether or not the said communication was libelous, and whether or not it was actually published.
The attorney for the defendant in his brief also states that “it [the official communication] was a duty devolving upon him [the defendant] with a fair and reasonable purpose of protecting his own interest, therefore is a privileged communication. (Sec. 9, Act No. 277.)” The attorney in his brief continues and says:
“This being a privileged communication, the truth or falsity of its contents is not to be taken into consideration. However, it is to be expected that a man, laboring under normal conditions, would have taken steps to satisfy his mind as to the truth or falsity of such rumors before allowing his actions to be governed by them.”
The theory of the appellant, judged by the foregoing statements, evidently is that the communication, being privileged and having been made in good faith, the truth or falsity of the statements found in it is of no importance; in other words, the contention of the appellant is that the communication belongs to a class of privileged communications, the truth or falsity of which is of no importance.
Section 1 of Act No. 277 (sec. 3427 of the Compilation of the Acts of the Philippine Commission) defines libel to be “A malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, etc., of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”
Section 2 of said law provides the punishment for the offense described in section 1.
It will be noted that section 1 says that “A libel is a malicious defamation,” etc. Section 2 which provides the punishment says that “Every person who willfully and with malicious intent to injure another * * * shall be punished,” etc.
Section 3 provides that “An injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious, if no justifiable motives for making it are shown.”
Under section 1 malice is an essential ingredient of the offense of libel. By section 3 this essential ingredient or element of the offense may be presumed and need not be proved when the defendant fails to prove some justifiable motive. In other words, if the plaintiff should prove in an action for libel that a certain publication “was injurious,” it would be unnecessary for him to prove that said publication was made with malice; malice would then be presumed. The burden is then upon the defendant to show that such publication was made with “justifiable motives.” If the defendant fails in this he is liable under the law.
Reading sections 1, 2, and 3, without reference to the other provisions of said laws, it would seem that no one can be punished for libel, if by any possibility he can show that the same was published with “justifiable motives.” The presence of justifiable motives eliminates the element of malice, and malice is a necessary ingredient of the offense. (U. S. vs. Lerma, 2 Phil. Rep., 254.) Was it the intention of the lawmaking body to relieve all persons from criminal liability for injurious publications simply by showing “justifiable motives?” If that was the intention, then what was the necessity of section 4, for example, which provides that the party committing the acts described in section 1 may be relieved from the punishment provided for in section 2, by permitting him to prove the truth of the alleged libelous matter?
Section 4 relieves the party committing the acts described in section 1 from the punishment provided for in section 2, by permitting him to prove the truth of the alleged libelous matter. By a careful reading of said section 4, it will be seen that the truth is not an absolute defense. Under said section, the alleged libelous matter must not only be proved to be true, but it must be proved that it was published (a) “with good motives,” and (b) “for justifiable ends.”
If, for example, the defendant in an action for libel should prove that his statements were true and fail to prove that they were published with good motives and for justifiable ends (or with justifiable motives) he would yet be liable to the punishment provided for in said section 2, for the law (sec. 4) expressly provides that, in the absence of proof of “good motives” and “justifiable ends,” the defendant shall be convicted.
Reading sections 3 and 4 together, the question rises: May any injurious publication be made, with “good motives” and “for justifiable ends,” which is not true? In other words, if the defendant shows that the publication was made with “justifiable motives,” will that relieve him from criminal liability, admitting that the publication was false? This question has been answered in the affirmative in the cases of the United States vs. Lerma (2 Phil. Rep., 254), and United States vs. Crozier (5 Phil. Rep., 621).
It will be difficult to harmonize section 3 with other sections (4 and 9) of the law unless we give practically the same meaning to the phrases “justifiable motives” in section 3, “good motives and justifiable ends” in section 4, and “good faith,” etc., in section 9.
It is manifestly impossible to give illustrations of all the defenses which would show “justifiable motives.” These must be settled one at a time, from time to time, as cases arise. The law has, however, given us two cases: (a) the truth always when made with good motives and for justifiable ends (sec. 4); and (b) communications made under the conditions enumerated in section 9.
In an action for libel suppose the defendant fails to prove that the injurious publication or communication was true. Can he relieve himself from liability by showing that it was published with “justifiable motives” whether such publication was true or false or even malicious? There is no malice in law when “justifiable motives” exist, and, in the absence of malice, there is no libel under the law. (U. S. vs. Lerma, supra.) But if there is malice in fact, justifiable motives can not exist. The law will not allow one person to injure another by an injurious publication, under the cloak of “good ends” or “justifiable motives,” when, as a matter of fact, the publication was made with a malicious intent. It is then a malicious defamation. The law punishes a malicious defamation and it was not intended to permit one to maliciously injure another under the garb of “justifiable motives.” When malice in fact is shown to exist the publisher can not be relieved from liability by a pretense of “justifiable motives.” Section 3 relieves the plaintiff from the necessity of proving malice simply when no justifiable motives are shown, but it does not relieve the defendant from liability under the guise of “justifiable motives” when malice actually is proved. The defense of “the truth” of the “injurious publication” (sec. 4) and its character as a privileged communication (sec. 9) means nothing more than the truth in one instance and the occasion of making it in the other together with proof of justifiable motive, rebuts the prima facie inference of malice in law and throws upon the plaintiff or the State, the onus of proving malice in fact. The publication of a malicious defamation, whether it be true or not, is clearly an offense under Act No. 277.
Section 9 of said law furnishes another justification for the publication of matter that might be, under some conditions, considered libelous. Said section 9 provides that—
“A private communication made by any person to another in good faith, in the performance of any duty, whether legal, moral, or social, solely with the fair and reasonable purpose of protecting the interests of the person making the communication, or in the interests of the person to whom the communication is made, is a privileged communication, and the person making the same shall not be guilty of libel nor be within the provisions of this Act.”
It will be noted from this section that, in order that a private communication, libelous in character, shall be privileged, certain conditions must exist:
(a) It must be made in good faith;
(b) It must be made in the performance of a duty, which duty must be legal, moral, or social; and
(c) It must be made solely with the fair and reasonable purpose of protecting—
(1) The interests of the person making the communication; or
(2) The interests of the person to whom the communication is made.
It will be seen, then, from the provisions of this section that, if the communication was made, in good faith, for example, or in the performance of some legal, moral, or social duty, and not for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the person making the same or the interests of the person to whom it was made, it would not be a privileged communication. Granting that, under said section 9, a private communication is made and published, in good faith, in the performance of a duty and with the sole purpose of the protection mentioned in said section, but is false and malicious, is it entitled to the privilege mentioned in said section, and is the party relieved from liability when the communication was made “with good motives” and for “justifiable ends” or with “justifiable motives?” Malicious motives are inconsistent with “good motives,” for “justifiable ends” and with “justifiable motives.” It was not the purpose of the Legislature to make the “private communication” in section 9 “absolutely privileged.” Such communications must also be free from malice.
Section 9 must be read in connection with sections 3 and 4. Section 4 provides that in all criminal prosecutions, etc., the party charged with libel may be relieved from criminal responsibility, under the conditions therein mentioned. It would seem, therefore, that one who is charged with libel and seeks the privilege granted under section 9, must always comply with the conditions, under which the privilege is granted, mentioned in sections 3 and 4. The mere fact that a private communication is made in good faith, etc., under section 9, will not relieve the party from responsibility, unless he can show that the same was made “with good motives,” “for justifiable ends,” and “with justifiable motives” and without malice.
In the case of the United States vs. Lerma (2 Phil. Rep., 254), the communication was a private communication (a petition) made to a justice of the peace before whom a criminal complaint was pending against the defendant. The lower court found the defendant guilty.
In that case this court found (p. 259) that—
“The matter contained in the petition presented to the justice by the defendant all related to the supposed prosecutions against the latter, and we think the circumstances of the case show quite conclusively that the sole motive of the defendant in presenting the petition was to defend himself against those charges. It was not an attempt to make use of judicial proceedings as a vehicle for the utterance of slander. It was merely an exercise of the natural right which a person accused of crime possesses, and which it is for the public interests that he should enjoy unhampered so long as he exercises it in good faith and in a proper manner, to bring to the notice of the tribunal which is to pass upon his guilt all such considerations as he thinks may influence its judgment in his behalf, even though he may in so doing “incidentally disparage private character.” In the sense of the law we think, therefore, that the defendant’s motives must be regarded as justifiable.”
In the case of Lerma (supra) he believed that he was being persecuted and, after stating his grounds for this belief, petitioned the justice of the peace to hear him before any sentence should be rendered against him. This right to be heard was a right accorded to him under the law. He simply stated in his petition what he had a right to say before the justice of the peace in open court. (Sec. 7, Act No. 277.) There was no malice shown. He merely exercised a natural right which he possessed. His petition was made to one who had a right to hear it and one who had power to remedy the wrong if one had been done. The petition was clearly presented in good faith and with the sole purpose of protecting the interest of the one making it and with justifiable motives. Had this same communication been made to a third person who had no interest to be protected, or who could in noway protect the interest of the one making it, even though with good faith, would it have been protected under section 9? Section 9 provides that such communications must be made with the sole purpose of protecting the interest (a) of the one making it and (b) or of the one to whom it is made. This section clearly implies that such communications must be made not only for the purpose of protecting the interest of the one making it, but that such communications must be made to persons who have the power to furnish such protection. Otherwise such communications would be idle and that provision of the law meaningless. In a government where all or practically all of the higher officials are appointed without the consent of the governed, every avenue of communication between the former and the latter should be left open, and this was one of the evident purposes of section 9. Said section did not contemplate, however, that the files of any and every department of the government should be filled with idle effusions of malignity and detraction with perfect immunity. Its purpose, among other things, was to permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances, to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for, requiring, however, at all times that such petitions or communications shall be made in good faith or “with justifiable motives.” This privilege must not be abused. If it appears that the communication was made maliciously or to persons who could not furnish the protection, then the mere pretext can not afford protection under the law, nor furnish an occasion for a privileged communication.
In the present case the communication (a part of which is found in paragraphs (c) and (d) in the complaint) was a private one. It was made with the evident intention of having said judge and prosecuting attorney removed from office. There was no pretense that the injurious communication was made for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the defendant or for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Secretary of Justice to whom it was made. The concluding part of said communication shows quite a different purpose. The conclusion is:
“Said facts sufficiently explain the partiality with which they [the judge and fiscal] have both acted in the criminal case against Jose Rivero for robbery. But as the dismissal ordered in this case does not, in my opinion, prevent the bringing of a new case against him for the same crime, of robbery, that is to say, for the acts which have been denounced, I appeal to Your Honor [the Secretary of Justice] petitioning that you issue the proper order to the end that some fiscal of the Government other than the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Sur, Sr. Vicente Singson, bring information of the acts against the said Jose Rivero, and that he be tried by some judge other than the Honorable Dionisio Chanco.
“Respectfully petitioned.
(Signed) “JULIO BUSTOS, petitioner.”
The burden of the petition seems to be, as indicated by the above quotation, to have the said Jose Rivero brought to trial upon a charge for the crime of robbery.
Neither do we believe that the communication was made in good faith. The defendant, during the trial of the cause, admitted that he had personally made no investigation with reference to the truth of many of the statements made in said communication, and especially with reference to the statements relating to the rumors that the said judge and prosecuting attorney had received a bribe in a particular case. The defendant stated that he had heard the said rumor from two or three persons. These persons were called as witnesses and they each stated that they had made no investigation whatever with reference to the rumors referring to the said bribery and the other illegal acts charged against the said judge and fiscal.
It seems clear to us that the communication was malicious, was not made in good faith, nor was it made with the sole purpose of protecting either the interests of the defendant or for protecting the interests of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, and is, therefore, not a privileged communication. The communication having been made, as we believe, with malice, and without the presence of the justifiable motives mentioned in said section 9, we are of the opinion and so hold that the sentence of the lower court should be revoked and that the defendant should be sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six months, to pay a fine of P100, and to pay the costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur. Tracey, J., concurs in the result.