[ G.R. No. 4377. March 30, 1908 ] 10 Phil. 694
[ G.R. No. 4377. March 30, 1908 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE GARCIA GAVIERES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 25th day of June, 1907, the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila presented a complaint against the defendant accusing him of the crime of “calumniating, outraging, and insulting by word of mouth, and in his presence, a public official, an agent of the authorities, in the exercise of his office.” On the 29th day of June, the defendant presented a demurrer to said complaint upon the ground that it did not conform substantially to the form prescribed by law. On the 6th day of July, the defendant presented a further objection to the complaint alleging that it contained a description of more than one crime. On the 25th day of July the judge of the Court of First Instance overruled said demurrer, to which ruling of the court the defendant duly excepted. On the 29th day of July the defendant was again brought before the court and the complaint was duly read to him, and he was asked to plead whether he was guilty or not guilty of the crime charged in said complaint, to which question he replied “not guilty” and alleged that he had been “in jeopardy.” On the 31st day of July the defendant presented a motion to the lower court in which he asked the dismissal of the complaint in the following form:
“That inasmuch as he was already convicted of the offenses with which he is now charged, he is not guilty because he is put twice in jeopardy. He therefore prays the court to dismiss the complaint or that he be acquitted, with the costs de oficio.”
This motion to dismiss the cause for the reasons stated, that the defendant had been in jeopardy, was heard by Judge Sumulong on the 23d day of August, 1907, and denied upon the ground that if the defendant had been once in jeopardy the same was matter of proof, to be presented during the trial. On the 2d day of December the cause was duly brought to trial. During the trial the prosecuting attorney, by means of witnesses, proved all the facts set out in the complaint in said cause. The defendant became a witness in his own behalf, and admitted in the presence of the court the facts charged in the said complaint, but claiming that the insulting words used were directed to Mr. Crame as Mr. Crame and not as Captain Crame. The defendant also stated that he had been arrested, tried, and fined in the sum of P25, but presented no further proof than his own statements of this fact. He did not even state for what offense he had been accused and tried in said municipal court. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial the lower court found that it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did outrage and insult, both by deed and word, Captain Jose Crame, captain of the police of the city of Manila, a public official, and an agent of the authorities, while in the exercise of his functions, in his presence, and in the presence of numerous other persons, and sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned for the period of four months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs of the prosecution. Against this sentence the defendant appealed and made several assignments of error, the principal one of which is that he had been placed twice in jeopardy. During the trial in the lower court the defendant did not present any proof to sustain his allegation that he had been once in jeopardy for this same offense. The record contains, however, the complaint which had been presented in said municipal court, but there is nothing to show how it became a part of the record. The alleged complaint presented against the defendant in the municipal court charged the said defendant with a violation of section 2 of Ordinance No. 28 of the ordinances of the city of Manila. Said section 2 provides as follows:
“SEC. 2. No person shall be drunk or intoxicated, or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place, or place open to public view; or be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any place or premises, to the annoyance of another person.”
The crime with which the defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance was that of “calumniating, outraging, and insulting by word of mouth, and in his presence, a public official, an agent of the authorities, in the exercise of his office,” and was punishable under article 257 of the Penal Code, which provides:
“The penalty of arresto mayor shall also be imposed on those who outrage, insult, or threaten, by deed or word, public officials or agents of the authorities, in their presence, or in a writing addressed to them.”
By comparing the alleged offense with which the defendant was punished in the municipal court with the offense charged in the complaint in the present cause, it will be seen that they were separate and entirely distinct offenses. It is possibly true that the offense for’ which the defendant, was convicted in the municipal court resulted from the same acts which constituted the offense for which he was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance, but this court has held that the mere fact that a person, is prosecuted twice by different governmental entities for different offenses resulting from the same acts does not justify the plea of former jeopardy. (U. S. vs. Chan-Cun-Chay, 5 Phil. Rep., 385; U. S. vs. Flemister, 5 Phil. Rep., 650.) An act may be a penal offense under the laws of the State, and other penalties under proper authority may be imposed for its commission by a municipal ordinance, and the enforcement of one penalty by the State would not preclude the enforcement of the other by the municipality. (Rogers vs. Jones, 1 Wendell, N. Y., 261; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 239; Ex parte Hong Shen, 98 Cal., 681; People vs. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611.) Where the same act constitutes an offense against each of two governmental entities exercising jurisdiction over the same territory, a prosecution brought by one does not necessarily bar a prosecution by the other. (U. S. vs. Barnhart, 10 Sawyer, 491; Abbott vs. State, 75 N. Y., 602; U. S. vs. Marigold, 9 How., U. S., 560.) It might be argued because of the doctrine established in the decision of Grafton vs. United States (206 U. S., 333) that the doctrine established by this court in the cause of the United States vs. Chan-Cun-Chay had been reversed, upon the theory that there existed in the Philippine Islands but one sovereignty. We do not believe that the Supreme Court of the United States intended that its decision in that case should be extended to cases like the present. The civil and military authorities which attempted to punish Grafton each received its authority from the same source, and, therefore, they were coordinate in their respective spheres of government. It is not believed that the doctrine established in that case should be extended to a State and its municipalities. In pleading former jeopardy, it is not sufficient simply to say that the party alleging it had been in jeopardy once, but he must allege and prove in the most specific way that the offense, of which he was formerly convicted or acquitted, was identically the same offense for which the courts were attempting to1 try him again. The evidence adduced during the trial of said cause justifies the following conclusions : First, that the defendant did, in the manner and form alleged in said complaint, outrage and insult by word of mouth and in his presence one Jose Crame; Second, that Jose Crame was an agent of the authorities at the time of said insult, and in the exercise of his office; Third, that the complaint presented in the lower court was sufficient in form and substance. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.