G.R. No. 3831

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CANUTO BUTARDO AND VALENTIN BUTARDO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. 3831. August 06, 1908 ] 11 Phil. 60

[ G.R. No. 3831. August 06, 1908 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CANUTO BUTARDO AND VALENTIN BUTARDO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N

TRACEY, J.:

The accused, claiming ownership  of a lot in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, adversely to their uncle, Antonio Butardo, whose children Juana and Laureano were living there, came to the house on the property on the 9th of February, 1906, at 8 o’clock, and demanded possession thereof, affixing to the door a notice to vacate.  Possession  being refused by the occupants, they went away, but an hour later returned, and while Juana and Laureano were within the house, they set fire to the roof, on the eastern side, near the window.  While the house was burning, two neighbors, Juan Exebeo and Apolonio Hurtado, who were attempting to put out the fire, were compelled to desist by the threats of the accused.  The house and the chattels therein were destroyed but the occupants escaped. Applying article 549 of the  code, the judge of the Court of First Instance imposed a sentence of  sixteen years and one day of cadena temporal. The defense consisted of an alibi, testified to by some relatives of the accused, the difficulty of establishing it being increased by an attempt to show also that the fire took place on the 9th of March instead of the 9th of February, with the result that an alibi was sworn to covering both of these dates.  On the facts in evidence there is no doubt of the guilt of the accused, but their counsel makes a strong plea in their behalf on the ground that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the offense, which was the destruction of a nipa house of trifling value.  It has been further urged that the act was not one  showing a depraved and reckless disregard of human life, such as is contemplated in the statute against arson, but was simply one of private revenge and a natural means taken by these ignorant men of asserting what they considered their civil rights. It does not appear from the evidence that the accused set fire to the house in the presence of the inhabitants or with their knowledge, or had any reason to suppose that the persons therein were on their guard or were expecting such an occurrence.  On the contrary, if any inference on this subject from the proofs is allowable, it is that, having left the house and returned to it again after nightfall, their design was to start the fire secretly and as a surprise.  It does not lessen the enormity of their offense, that the people whom they thus exposed  to danger were their own relatives, nor serve as a palliation that they harbored illfeeling against them.  The argument of counsel misconceives the  object of the  law,  the severity of which is measured, not by the value of the property that may be destroyed, but rather by the human lives exposed to destruction by  the crime of arson in an inhabited house. The limit of strict construction of article 549 of the Penal Code  was reached in United States vs. Zabala .(6  Phil. Rep., 431), where this court refused to apply it to the act of a man who had set fire to his own house while his son was therein in his company. The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed, with one-half of the costs of this instance against each of the appellants.  So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard J., concur.