[ G.R. No. 3378. December 05, 1907 ] 9 Phil. 310
[ G.R. No. 3378. December 05, 1907 ]
JOSE CASTAÑO, ATTORNEY IN FACT OF JOSE FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. CHARLES S. LOBINGIER, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND MANUEL ARAUJO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TORRES, J.:
The question involved in this original action pending in this court is whether or not the judge of First Instance of Leyte had jurisdiction, or if in the exercise of his office he exceeded his authority in admitting and granting the special remedy of certiorari against the justice of the peace of Manila, as well as when issuing a preliminary injunction directing that Jose" Castaño and the sheriff of Leyte desist and abstain from performing any act tending to enforce the decision rendered by the said justice of the peace against the defendant in the oral action, Manuel Araujo, who is the plaintiff in the said certiorari and preliminary injunction proceedings.
The bases of the decision of November 30, 1906, overruling the demurrer, are taken as reproduced herein, and notwithstanding the allegations set forth by the defendants in their answers, we consider that the special remedy of prohibition, according to section 516, in connection with section 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be granted, inasmuch as under the provisions of the last part of section 163 of said code a judge of First Instance may only grant a preliminary injunction in an action pending in the district in which he has original jurisdiction.
This same limitation is logically inferred from the wording of the said section 226 of the above-named code; therefore the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions, judicial or ministerial, to which said section refers, shall be taken to have been within and under the jurisdiction of the court which, according to law, must grant the remedy against abuse or extralimitation.
If a Court of First Instance lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal from an action in a court of a justice of the peace of another judicial district, different from the district wherein the Court of First Instance exercises its functions, he can hardly have authority and jurisdiction to issue writs granting special remedies, and much less to review the action and vacate the judgment rendered therein by a justice of the peace who is outside of the limits of his district.
Within the present system of judicial organization and of the administration of justice there exist grades, instances, and recourses, with method and legal order in the use of the same, and limits or judicial demarcation within which each judge or tribunal shall exercise its functions.
A serious confusion would be caused in the administration of justice, and the effects thereof would be prejudicial to public and private interests, if any litigant were allowed to arbitrarily interpose proceedings and obtain remedies against decisions or proceedings which he considered to be injurious to his rights, before any judge or tribunal not previously designated by the law, which has expressly defined the nature, conditions, extent, and limits of the respective jurisdiction of each judge or tribunal in its different grades.
The question as to whether the justice of the peace of Manila could lawfully hear a complaint filed against a resident of Tacloban, capital of Leyte, is quite different from the question whether the Court of First Instance of said province has jurisdiction and may legally suspend the proceedings for the execution of a judgment rendered by the said justice of the peace of Manila, and thereafter review the said judgment by means of certiorari.
Even though the justice of the peace of Manila had no authority or jurisdiction to hear and decide a complaint regarding the collection of a debt against a resident of Tacloban, it does not follow from this that the judge of First Instance of Leyte had jurisdiction to prevent the execution of a judgment in the manner and by the means stated above.
The fact that the defendant was a resident of Tacloban did not give the judge of First Instance of Leyte jurisdiction or authority to obstruct the enforcement of a judgment of the justice of the peace of Manila, and much less to review it.
The defense of the right appertaining to the defendant, by reason of his residence, should be made by means of a plea questioning the competency of the judge before whom the matter is heard; after the decision has been rendered the question of competency can not be raised.
In the Code of Civil Procedure, when treating of the place wherein actions or complaints may be filed, the provisions of the same are not limited to such actions as are filed with Courts of First Instance only; they establish general rules for all kinds of actions and trials without expressly excluding oral proceedings.
An action is instituted upon an oral complaint just the same as upon a regular complaint filed with the Court of First Instance, and when the law makes no distinction between actions it is not permissible to limit the provisions of section 377 of the code to ordinary actions.
Any citizen who resides in this Archipelago and institutes a personal action is, in the litigation, subject to the laws and to the jurisdiction of the courts of different grades established for the administration of justice under the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the pertinent part of which is of the following tenor:
“And all actions not herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff, except in cases where other special provision is made in this code.”
All questions raised upon such points by reason of an oral action should have been decided, within the jurisdiction of such court by the judge of First Instance or other tribunal upon whom the duty is imposed by law.
The judge of First Instance of Leyte is not the one designated, by the law to decide either the question of jurisdiction or to amend or correct an error committed by the justice of the peace of Manila; this power is conferred upon the judge of First Instance (of Manila), his immediate superior in rank in the judiciary.
The defendant Araujo, after having been arraigned in the court of the, justice of the peace of Manila, had the right to contest the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of that city, and to appeal from any decision denying such right and also from any judgment entered in the oral proceedings, such being the easy, speedy, and adequate remedy in the premises; but the law does not authorize him to avail himself of an,y of the special remedies before a Court of First Instance of a district other than that of the justice of the peace before whom he was arraigned because this would be to encourage disorder and confusion in the work of the courts.
For the reasons above set forth, it is our opinion that it should be held: That there was no legal reason for granting the petition of Manuel Araujo, and that, in consequence, the preliminary injunction should be, and is hereby, set aside, as well as the remedy of certiorari granted by the judge of First Instance of Leyte, and that he be ordered to desist and refrain absolutely from all further proceedings in the matter above referred to. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., and Mapa, J., concur.
Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., dissent.