[ G.R. No. 2264. September 28, 1907 ] 8 Phil. 653
[ G.R. No. 2264. September 28, 1907 ]
P. JOSE EVANGELISTA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. P. ROMAN VEE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
TRACEY, J.:
This action to recover possession of the parish church at Laoag, in llocos Norte, was brought before a justice of the peace and, having been decided by him in favor of the plaintiff, was retried in the Court of First Instance, which rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant. In November, 1902, the plaintiff, who had for nearly two years been the priest in control of the parish, left for Manila, turning over his charge to the defendant, who had been acting as his coadjutor or assistant. It is clear that at this time the plaintiff had abandoned the Roman Catholic Church and was an avowed representative of the Independent Filipino Church. He himself testified that he made the change in October, 1902, when he signed a declaration of allegiance to the independent bishop of that district, by whom he was in writing appointed pastor on October 6, and about that time he publicly proclaimed his possession, under that appointment. By a local popular assembly in July, 1902, as well as by the municipal junta in August, 1902, he had been recognized as pastor, neither of these bodies, however, in the resolutions adopted by them, making reference to the independent church or to any religious division. Up to this time he had undoubtedly acted as a minister of the Roman Catholic Church, as appears from his communications with the temporary occupant of the Episcopal See of Nueva Segovia, the Most Reverend Fidel Larrinaga, to whom he wrote on January 8, 1901, accepting his provisional appointment to the administration of the curacy of Laoag, and an authorization to sign its official records. It appears from this letter, as well as from other testimony, that there being no permanent curate in the parish, it had for some time been cared for by three priests of the Roman communion and that in consequence of the illness of the eldest of these, Padre Ciríaco Blanco, the duties of the curacy had fallen upon the plaintiff, who was assisted by the defendant. While the attitude of the defendant toward the new organization is left somewhat in doubt, his own contention is that he never recognized it nor adhered to it.’ The argument of the plaintiff to the contrary rests upon a declaration dated October 15, 1900, signed by both the plaintiff and defendant together with several other priests of the province, pledging themselves to a course of conduct, in which there is nothing to indicate an adherence to one church or the other, unless the third clause, in which it is laid down that they should sustain the rights of the Philippine clergy over the Philippine Church. The time was one of great confusion, consequent upon war and insurrection, when the tenure.of office by the clergy was beset with uncertainties. The signature of this document nearly two years in advance of the organization of the Independent Church in the province, which seems to have occurred in August, 1902, does not fairly prove the adherence of those signing it to the forthcoming organization, especially as it is plain that this very plaintiff continued during these two years to administer the rites of the elder church and to act under its appointment. There is contradictory oral testimony by witnesses concerning the part taken by the defendant at the time of the secession, not as to his overt acts, but as to his understanding of the position of the seceding priests, and as to the extent of his cooperation with them. We find nothing in the evidence seriously conflicting with his claim that he made and intended to make no change, except the admitted fact that he accepted the charge of the church from the plaintiff, whose public profession of an independent faith and whose avowed exercise of its ministry must have been known to him. On the 28th day of February, 1903, the defendant formally assumed office as curate and was, by the Roman Catholic bishop, formally appointed permanent curate or parish priest on March 30, 1903. During all this time the plaintiff seems to have been absent from the locality, professing to act not as curate of Laoag, but as bishop of the diocese of Manila. It is not shown that the vacancy in the curacy of the Independent Church, caused by his promotion and removal, ever has been filled. The justice of the peace was of the opinion that the arrangement between these parties constituted a private contract under which the defendant having received possession of the property from the plaintiff was bound to return it to him on demand, being estopped from setting up an adverse title. In two cases in this court it has been held that a person taking possession of parish property in somewhat similar circumstances may not deny the title of his ecclesiastical superior from whom he received it. (Barlin vs. Ramirez, 7 Phil. Rep., 41; Dougherty vs. Evangelista, 7 Phil. Rep., 37.) In the Barlin case it was said :
“As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the property as the servant or. agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to the possession at the time he took it was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took possession under the agreement to return that possession whenever it should be demanded of him. Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when the return of such possession is demanded of him by the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. The principle of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord’s title, which is found in section 333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable to a case of this kind. An answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he himself was the owner of the property at the time he received it from the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the owner of the property at that time, would constitute no defense. There is no claim made by him that since the delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the title thereto by other means, nor does he in his own behalf make any c}aim whatever either to the property or to the possession thereof.”
It is contended that either as a tenant to his landlord, a servant to his master, or an agent to his principal, the defendant is bound to the plaintiff for the restitution of the property. It is obvious that in applying to the relations of ecclesiastical officials these various terms we have done so by way of analogy only, not intending to place them in any one of these classes. Indeed, strictly speaking, they fall within no part of this classification. In the United States it has been held that the relation between a Roman Catholic bishop and a pastor of a church in his diocese is not that of master and servant (Baxter vs. McDonnell, 155 N. Y., 83, p. 99), not that of hirer and hired, nor of principal and agent (Tuigg vs. Sheehan, 101 Pa., 363). They are fellowservants of their church, for which the bishop acts merely as a superior agent and not as a principal. (Rose vs. Vertin, 46 Mich., 457.) Nor are they landlord and tenant. (Chatard vs. O’Donovan, 80 Ind., 20.) A like rule in respect of master and servant hastaeen laid down as to bishops and clergy of the Methodist Episcopal Church. (Bristor vs. Burr, 120 N. Y., 427.) By way of further illustration we may add that their relation is somewhat akin to that of principal and assistant teacher of a school, one of subordination without agency or service, their powers not passing from the one to the other directly, but only indirectly through the person of their common principal or master. If the defendant had been an independent third person, not already charged with duties in regard to the property, he would have come into possession of it as representative of the plaintiff only, and then the question would have arisen whether under the law of the Barlin and Dougherty cases he was estopped to deny the title of his grantor or principal. The facts herein before recited are sufficient to show that such was not the true relation of these parties. At the outset and up to the 15th of October, 1902, they both, together with the sick priest, were in care of the parish, the plaintiff, however, by ecclesiastical authorization, performing the office of pastor. They both owed allegiance and duty to the Roman Catholic Church, a juridical person, which long had been the owner of the property. It is admitted that, as against that owner, neither of them separately could have set up an adverse claim to any part of the property, nor could both of them have been allowed to make such a claim jointly. Can it be that what they could not do either jointly or separately, they could compass by interaction, so that one of them could free the other from his obligation to their common superior for the property committed to their care? It is not disputed that at the suit of the Roman Catholic Church, the plaintiff, were he in possession, must yield up the property, but it is urged that in the first instance the defendant, although in occupation as a delegate of that church, must surrender it to him, leaving him in turn to be deprived of possession in an action by the defendant’s principal, the owner, thus involving the parties in two unnecessary lawsuits, a result that indicates the error in the argument. It is also said that the defendant, after recognizing his possession under the plaintiff, had no right to return to his former allegiance. The answer to this is that, in so far as it involves property rights and obligations, allegiance is not a thing to be shaken off at will, and the real owner being now in possession of the property and continuing to maintain the defendant there as its representative can not be temporarily ousted on the strength of any alleged act of disloyalty on his part. We do not think that the defendant ever lost his right, growing out of his duty, to defend his possession in behalf of his principal, the owner of the property. As a second obstacle to a recovery by the plaintiff, the defendant takes the ground that, according to the canons of the Roman Catholic Church, it is not within the powers of a pastor to alienate church property or to attorn for it to an adverse claimant, or to relieve his assistant from his duty in respect to it, or to vary his rights and obligations, and that these acts are controlled by the rules of the church under which they were serving. It is settled law in the United States that the canons and rules of a church will be enforced in adjusting property rights growing out of ecclesiastical relations. They enter into the contract and appointment of officers and members in the same manner as do the bylaws of a mercantile association or of a club, and, when not in contravention, of established law, they will be sustained by the courts. (Watson vs. Jones, 80 U. S., 679; Baxter vs. McDonnell, 155 N. Y., 83, p. 93; Leahey vs. Williams, 141 Mass., 345; Roshi’s Appeal, 69 Pa., 462.) In the new order of things in these Islands we perceive no reason why the same principle should not be applied here and to all religions alike. The constitution of the Roman Catholic Church, in so far as it is already recognized and defined under Spanish laws that have come down to us, can be taken cognizance of by the courts up to the time of the American dominion, but as to the changes effected since that time, it also is a proper subject of proof. It is not clear, however, that in the instance we have before us there is sufficient proof to serve as the basis of a judgment, on this ground. A third defense arises out of the plaintiff’s own status. Such possession as he may have held or claimed after leaving the Roman Catholic Church, he did not seek to justify in his individual character, but rather by virtue of his appointment as pastor of the Independent Church, an office which, by his removal and acceptance of another dignity, he may fairly be assumed to have vacated. If so, any right of his to demand possession from the defendant would “seem to have passed to his successor or to lie dormant. At least it is not clear that as Independent bishop of the diocese of Manila he is entitled to the possession of a church at Laoag, which is shown to be within the province of another Independent bishop. The rules of the Independent Church on the subject of appointment, tenure, and vacancies are not before us, and for this reason we prefer not to rest our judgment on this point, but to dispose of the case on the ground first considered. The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with costs. Arellano, C. J., Torres and Johnson, JJ.; concur.