[ G.R. No. 1974. March 15, 1906 ] 5 Phil. 701
[ G.R. No. 1974. March 15, 1906 ]
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. A. W. HASTINGS, ASSESSOR AND COLLECTOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, AND THE CITY OF MANILA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
TRACEY, J.:
This is an action for the return of taxes under protest. Section 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission, passed in 1901, reads as follows:
“Exemption from taxation.—Lands or buildings owned by the United States of America, the Central Government of the Philippine Islands, or the city of Manila, and burying grounds, churches and their adjacent parsonages and conventos, and lands or buildings used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, and not for profit, shall be exempt from taxation, but such exemption shall not extend to lands or buildings held for investment, though income therefrom be devoted to religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”
In the year 1901 the assessor and collector of the city of Manila imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation by virtue of the foregoing statute.
This residence is from 80 to 100 meters distant from the Cathedral Church, separated from it by one intervening building the ownership of which has not been proved, is near but not adjoining or contiguous to the church, and communicates with it by a street directly leading from one to the other. It is occupied as a residence by the archbishop, who is the head pastor of all the churches in his diocese, the cathedral being his special church.
There is attached to the cathedral and now under the same roof a chapel of earlier date called “Del Sagrario,” which is the parish church proper, the only one in the Walled City. It has a separate pastor, whose house, 8 meters away from the chapel, is already exempted from taxation as a parsonage. The parish is properly called “Del Sagrario” and not “Catedral.”
The main reliance of the appellant is on the cardinal rule of American jurisprudence that exemption from taxation not being favored, must be strictly construed against the property owner. This rule rests upon abundant authority. (Providence Bank vs. Billing, 4 Peters, 514; Yazoo Company vs. Thomas, 132 U. S., 174; Schurz vs. Cook, 148 U. S., 397.)
But it has been applied with the greatest strictness where the provisions under consideration were for future exemption, constituting an irrevocable contract, as in the cases cited. In many jurisdictions a qualification is made in favor of works of religion or charity or even of any corporation not formed for profit. (State vs. Fisk University, 87 Tenn., 233; Massachusetts General Hospital vs. Sommerville, 101 Mass., 319; Trinity Church vs. Boston, 118 Mass., 164; Association of Colored Orphans vs. Mayor, 104 N. Y., 581; The Matter of Vassar, 127 N. Y., 1; Hennipen vs. Brotherhood, 27 Minn., 460.)
And it is laid down that the presumption in favor of the tax should not work a strained or unnatural interpretation of the law. (Louisville Railroad vs. Gaines, 3 Fed., Rep., 266; People vs. Peck, 157 N. Y., 51; Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., p. 362; Black on Tax Titles, sec. 57.)
These principles are in accord with the general rules for statutory construction contained in the Code of Civil Procedure of these Islands, sections 286 and 289, and for the interpretation of contracts in book 4, Title II, Chapter 4, of our Civil Code. It is plain that sound reason does not require a departure from established rules of statutory construction in order to favor the Government in this class of cases. To the contrary, where no contractual effect is claimed for a statutory exemption, the State holds in its own hands the remedy for a defective law by repeal or amendment.
The statute before us should therefore be construed strictly, but not unnaturally, and with due regard to the true policy of its enactment. Its terms are of the broadest, and a fair reading indicates no intention to exclude from its benefits any place of worship or any clerical residence used in connection therewith. The express exemption of convents is significant of its purpose and so also is the use of the limiting phrases “and not for profit” and “for investment.”
The appellant contends—
First. That the property is not a parsonage.
Second. That it is not adjacent to the cathedral.
Third. That the exemption privilege is already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining chapel.
The Spanish version of the statute quoted renders the word “parsonage” as “casa parroquial,” and it is claimed on behalf of the assessor that only parish houses, strictly known as such under the Spanish system, can claim exemption. This interpretation is too narrow; it would not include the residence of Protestant clergymen or of Jewish rabbis, none of which have ever had a parochial status, nor those of Roman Catholic priests not living in territorial parish houses or in church convents.
Our law provides that in the event of a difference arising from the translation of the laws of the Philippine Commission the English text shall govern. (Act No. 63, December 21, 1900. The English word “parsonage” as derived from American usage must be read, not in a technical or ecclesiastical sense, but in the broad meaning of a ministerial residence used in connection with any place of worship of any denomination. It should include the house appurtenant to a cathedral, as well as to a synagogue or a country meeting house. The policy of the law reaches the one as well as the other, and a parsonage does not lose its legal privilege as such because the clergyman residing in it enjoys the added ecclesiastical dignity of archbishop.
From the testimony in this case it appears that the relations of an archbishop to his cathedral are pastoral in character and that he is the ecclesiastical dignitary properly having a residence tributary to it.
The second requirement of the law is that the residence shall be adjacent to the church. In this instance there is a distance from one to the other of from 80 to 100 meters, with an intervening block of buildings, the communication between them being along an open street, affording a passage and a view from one to the other, the cathedral abutting on this street and the residence standing at its head. The word adjacent does not mean contiguous, but on the contrary is frequently used in contradistinction to it and is generally defined by lexicographers as equivalent to “close” or “near by.” Reference to the many definitions cited by counsel for plaintiff satisfies us that this is its prevailing meaning. In this acceptation it can hardly be said that this residence is not close to the cathedral nor near by it; regard must be had to suitability and surroundings, as well as to physical distance. It appears to have been chosen as the fittest available site for this purpose, and its long use in connection with the cathedral furnishes the fairest test of whether it can be considered reasonably near, so as to be adjacent to it. We think it can be so considered and that any other ruling would work a harsh and strained interpretation of the statute.
It has been urged that this statutory word, if not equivalent to contiguous, may yet have such force as to restrict the exemption to such structures only as are not separated by property of different ownership—in other words, that both must stand on one integral lot. It has not been shown whether the plaintiff owns the intervening block or any part of it, so as to render the properties contiguous. Obviously this meaning would bar a parsonage divided from its church by any space, however small; for instance, as is frequently the fact, by a public street or lane, and would thereby shut out many cases plainly within the object and the reason of the law. We do not find, either in the generous terms of the statute or in the physical conditions of church property in these Islands, sufficient justification to establish such a severe rule nor any reason to believe that such was the intention of the Commission. We fail to read the purpose on their part, suggested as a motive for this construction of their enactment, to exempt only convents and parsonages physically annexed to churches or on the same lots with them, as is commonly the condition in Roman Catholic parishes. We think, on the contrary, that the design of the lawmakers was to reach the conditions common to the parsonages of all creeds and religions.
In the third place, it is contended that the residence of a pastor having been already exempted as appurtenant to the chapel “Del Sagrario,” there can be no further allowance of a parsonage of the cathedral. As presented in the briefs of counsel, this argument also gains force from the use of the Spanish phrase “casa parroquial,” which is lost when rendered into the English word “parsonage.” Though there are not two parishes so as to admit of two parish houses, there may be two churches. We think that the proof in this case establishes that there are. Though the buildings are physically united under one roof, they were built independently and at different periods, stand on different levels, communicating by means of steps, have separate walls, and their common doors, though serving for passage from one to the other, may be, and sometimes are, closed; so that they may be considered practically separate though contiguous buildings. This actual condition might not suffice to prevent their merger had they been used and treated as a unit, but it appears that while one is recognized as the cathedral, the other alone constitutes the parish church, and they have distinct privileges, treasuries, and officers. It is not an unnatural incident that they should possess distinctive residences for their respective clergy.
On these facts it is not necessary to decide whether one church may not have two or more parsonages as residences for different individuals of its appropriate clergy or to discuss the question, as to which the courts in the United States have differed, whether a parsonage may not be considered “a building used exclusively for religious purposes;” nor do we attempt to lay down any general rule as to the limitations of the word “adjacent,” but only hold that, for the reasons stated on the proofs before us in this particular case the appellee has established the exemption claimed and is entitled to recover the tax paid.
The decision of the assessor is not final but is subject to revision by the courts. (Lackawanna vs. Commonwealth, 156 Penn. State, 477; National Bank vs. City, 53 N. Y., 49; Aetna Co. vs. Mayor, 153 N. Y., 331.)
While for an assessment erroneous because excessive the taxpayer must seek redress by appeal to the board of tax appeals as a board of review, yet where that remedy is not expressly made exclusive and where there is a tax in itself illegal, he may resort to the courts. (See cases collected in 2 Cooley on Taxation, third edition, p. 1382, and also Stanley vs. Supervisors, 121 U. S., 535, 550.)
The judgment of the inferior court should be affirmed and entered against the city of Manila and its collector in his official capacity, but not individually, declaring that the tax paid by the plaintiff to the defendants under protest, amounting to $1,607.47, United States currency, was improperly collected, and ordering its return by the defendants to the plaintiff with legal interest from the 14th day of January, 1904, but without costs. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and the case remanded to the lower court for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.