[ G.R. No. 858. January 23, 1903 ] 1 Phil. 647
[ G.R. No. 858. January 23, 1903 ]
FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO MARTINEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
WILLARD, J.:
In the decision in this case it is found as a fact that the titles to the steamer Balayan and the coasting vessel Ogoño are registered in the name of the defendant. It must be assumed from this that the defendant has the legal title to the vessels, as without it they could not be so registered. These facts standing alone show that the defendant is the owner of the property.
Two other facts, however, appear in the decision which the appellee claims warranted the court below in deciding that the defendant was not the owner.
That court found that the money with which the vessels were purchased was furnished by the plaintiff, the father of the defendant. Does this fact make him the owner of them, the title having been taken and registered in the son’s name?
The various ways in which the title to property may be acquired are stated in article 609 of the Civil Code.
The plaintiff never acquired the title to these vessels in any one of the ways therein described. He did not acquire it by donation or succession. He did not acquire it by means of any contract.
The court does not find that the father and son had between themselves any contract of any kind by virtue of which the son agreed to transfer the title to the father or to hold it for his benefit.
There is an allegation in the complaint that the defendant acted as the agent of the plaintiff in the purchase. This is denied in the answer and there is no finding in the decision which supports this allegation of the complaint.
There is only the bare fact that the price of property which was conveyed to the defendant by a third person was paid by the plaintiff. It can not be said that the law by reason of this fact transfers any title or interest in the thing itself to the plaintiff.
Article 1090 of the Civil Code provides that “obligations derived from the law are not to be presumed. Only those expressly provided for in this Code or in special laws are enforceable.”
It is provided in article 161 of the same Code, relating to minors, that “the ownership or enjoyment of property acquired by a minor child with funds of his parents, pertain to the latter.” This article does not apply to the present case, for the son was of age.
This is the only provision which we have found anywhere in the laws now in force that declares the property to belong to the person who paid the money,
Nor can such general doctrine be found in the former law. Law 49, title 5, partida 5, the effect of which is incorrectly stated in the brief of the appellee, expressly provided that property bought with another’s money should not belong to the owner of the money except in certain enumerated cases of which this is not one.
Law 48, title 5, partida 5, also expressly provided that where one bought with his own money property the title to which he procured to be transferred to a third" person, such third person had the right to keep it by reimbursing the other for his outlay.
It may be true that the laws in some of the United States would in this case raise a resulting trust in favor of the plaintiff. But such laws are not in force here; and whatever other right the plaintiff may have against the defendant, either for the recovery of the money paid or for damages, it is clear that such payment gave him no title either legal or equitable to these vessels.
If there were evidence in the case which would have justified the court below in finding that the defendant acted as the agent of the plaintiff or that there was some other contract between them, he should have incorporated such findings in his decision.
Article 133 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the court to file a written decision. If the facts stated in that decision together with those admitted in the pleadings are not sufficient as a matter of law to support the judgment, it must be reversed, if excepted to.
The record, however, contains all the evidence and an examination of it shows that no such findings would have been warranted. As to the Balayato, it appears that the son had nothing whatever to do with its purchase. It was bought by the father with the money of the conjugal partnership, and the title by his direction placed in the son’s name.
As to the Ogoño, the father’s intervention in the purchase nowhere appears. He simply testified that it was bought with his money.
It is said that the court below found as a fact that the father was the owner of the vessels and that we can not disturb this finding because there was no motion for a new trial. This contention can not be sustained. The ultimate question in the whole case was: Who owned this property? The resolution of that question depended upon the application of legal principles to the facts connected with its acquisition and subsequent management. Those facts were that the father bought and paid for it, and that the titles to it were taken and registered in the son’s name. A statement that by reason of these facts the father is the owner is a statement of law and not a finding of fact.
It was found as a fact that the father had exercised acts of ownership over the vessel. That finding is entirely consistent with the legal ownership by the son. The exercise of such acts could not transfer such ownership from the son. There is in the record a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff in which the latter is asked if he desires to sell the Balayan. This letter is not incorporated into the findings and we have no right to consider it. But, if we had, it would not in our opinion change the result. Such a letter might well have been written by a son to a father, both of them recognizing the fact that the son was the owner of the property as to which the inquiry made. In conclusion we may say that even on the supposition that a written and recorded title to vessels may be overcome by parol evidence, that offered in this case was insufficient to accomplish such a result. As to the Balayan, there is nothing whatever to show why the father placed the title in his son’s name. It may have been either as a gift or a loan. As to the Ogoño, there is the simple declaration of the father that he paid for it. This may have been either a gift or a loan.
The judgment is reversed and a new trial is granted with costs against the appellee.
Torres, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ, concur.
Arellano, C. J., did not sit in this case.