[ G.R. No. 427. April 15, 1902 ] 1 Phil. 210
[ G.R. No. 427. April 15, 1902 ]
CO-TIONGCO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CO-GUIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
ARELLANO, C.J.:
From the documentary evidence introduced by both parties and admitted by both of them without objection it appears that the following facts may be regarded as the antecedents of the question in issue: (1) That on March 6, 1894, by a public instrument the Chinaman Co-Quingco leased a lot from Pedro Sy-Quia, at that time the owner of the lot, as purchaser, subject to the vendor’s right of redemption; (2) that this lease was to run for ten years, the term to end on an equal date in March, 1904; (3) that the sum of 50 pesos per month had been agreed upon as the rental in this lease; (4) that in the same instrument Eugenio Guidote, the vendor, who had reserved the right to redeem, bound himself to respect this contract of lease for the period of ten years, at a monthly rental of 50 pesos; (5) that this contract of lease, signed by Co-Quingco, SyQuia, and Guidote, was recorded in the property register of the North District of Manila on March 12, 1894 (documentary evidence, pp. 20 to 23); (6) that on the 23d of January, 1901, Eugenio Guidote sold the lot in question to the Chinaman Co-Tiongco, declaring it to be free from all incumbrance or gravamen, the sale having been effected by a public instrument, which was also recorded in the property register (documentary evidence, pp. 3 to 6).
As preliminaries to the action of unlawful detainer brought by the purchaser of the land, Co-Tiongco, the following facts are also admitted by the parties: (1) That Co-Guia, on March 2, 1901, consigned in the justice court of Binondo the rental of 50 pesos a month, corresponding to the preceding February (probably meaning January), because Guidote had refused to receive the rental, without stating the motive, the consignment being made “as payment under our contract” as stated by Co-Guia; (2) that rental to the amount of 100 pesos was also consigned for the months of February and March following by Co-Guia on the 9th of April, after an unsuccessful tender of payment by notarial act to the new owner of the lot on the 6th of April. Co-Guia, “as agent of the Chinaman Co-Quingco and manager of his lumber yard,” says that “the rent corresponding to the months of February and March not having been received from him at the rate of 50 pesos per month, according to the contract,” he made formal tender to Co-Tiongco of payment of the rental, to which Co-Tiongco replied “he can not receive the sum mentioned, offered him by the Chinese manager, Co-Guia, inasmuch as he has no contract with the said Chinaman, nor with Co-Quingco, the owner of the lumber yard” (documentary evidence, pp. 24 to 29); (3) that on March 22 of the same year Co-Tiongco gave Co-Guia notice to vacate the premises, giving him to the end of the month in which to do this.
With these facts as antecedents, the action of unlawful detainer was instituted. The action was based solely upon the contention that Co-Guia was occupying the lot as lessee, as stated by him in the minutes of the consignment of rent; that the lease was from month to month, as CoGuia had stated in the same document that the rental was 50 pesos per month, and consequently that the lease expired at the end of each month. In bringing this action Co-Tiongco, the plaintiff, introduced as evidence the notice of the first consignment of rental offered to Eugenio Guidote, in whose possession this document must have been.
The defendant opposed the complaint, and in his answer vigorously denied the fundamental fact alleged therein. As evidence he introduced the contract of lease entered into between Co-Quingco of the one part and Sy-Quia and Guidote of the other part.
The question presented on appeal to this court is whether or not the action of unlawful detainer can be maintained by Co-Tiongco against Co-Guia upon the facts on which the action is founded.
The purchaser, as successor to the vendor by singular title for a valuable consideration, is not, as a general rule, bound to respect obligations of a personal character contracted by his predecessor, as is an heir who succeeds by universal gratuitous title with respect to the obligations of his decedent. Hence it is that the Civil Code in article 1571 provides, as a consequence of the rule stated, that the purchaser of the leased property is entitled to terminate a lease pending at the time of the sale. But when the rights in question are not those arising from merely personal obligations, but from an express agreement or a real right affecting the property itself which is transferred by the sale, in this case the rule does not apply. The same article 1571 denies the purchaser the right to end a pending lease in case there has been a stipulation to the contrary or if it has been forbidden by the provisions of the Mortgage Law.
The Mortgage Law provides that leases for more than six years’ duration should be recorded in the register of property. (Art. 2, par. 5.) The Mortgage Law provides further that recorded acts and contracts shall be enforceable against third persons. (Art. 23.) Recordation is a species of promulgation of the private law of the act or contract producing it, a requisite as indispensable to this law to give it obligatory force as is promulgation with respect to laws emanating from the public authorities. (Moscoso, Mortgage Law.) The lease of the lot in question agreed upon between Sy-Quia and Guidote on the one hand and Co-Quingco on the other hand having been recorded, it is obligatory law for third persons, such as is, in this case, Co-Tiongco. He being bound to respect this lease for the period of ten years, he can not pretend ignorance of the right of use which was and still is in the hands of a third person. The vendor Guidote could not transmit to him any greater right than that which he himself had at the time of the sale. At this time among his rights of dominion which he transmitted to Co-Tiongco the right of use was not really—although virtually—included, as this right had been alienated in March, 1894, in consideration of the sum of 50 pesos per month, up to an equal date in the year 1904. He could only transmit to the purchaser the right to end the lease before the expiration of the term and to reacquire the use of the lot before the date stipulated by showing some resolutory cause against the present possessor of the right of use, Co-Quingco, and obtaining a final judgment resulting in the cancellation of the inscription appearing in the property register; or, in other words, the derogation of that private law which, until such time, must bind him. Until Co-Quingco, the possessor of the right of use, has had fyis day in court and judgment has been rendered against him, the allegation of a resolutory cause tending to produce the rescission of a bilateral contract entered into with Co-Quingco can not be effective when the allegation is made and the judgment is obtained against a stranger, such as, in this case, is Co-Guia. Co-Guia was not even a sublessee. He was, as admitted by Co-Tiongco himself, the manager of the lumber yard constructed on the lot of which Co-Quingco is the owner. So that the judgment rendered by the court below against Co-Guia can produce no effect whatever against Co-Quingco, the case not having been brought against Co-Guia as representative of Co-Quingco but against a trespasser, but a trespasser who pays rent and occupies the lot by virtue of the lease.
We therefore hold that the action of unlawful detainer brought will not lie, and dismiss the complaint against the defendant, Co-Guia, reversing the judgment below in all its parts, without special condemnation as to costs.
Cooper, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Ladd, J., did not sit in this case.